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ABSTRACT
Feminism Under and After Franco:
Success and Failure in the Democratic Transition
by
Kathryn L. Mahaney

Advisor: Dagmar Herzog

This dissertation, through an examination of late-20th century Spanish feminism, analyzes how
Spaniards’ anxieties about their nation’s post-Franco identity have influenced domestic debates
about women’s rights and, eventually, gender equality policy. In this way debates about
women’s rights have been central to Spaniards’ post-Franco political and cultural identity. I have
also argued for a broader understanding of both the Sección Femenina and of Spanish feminism
that places each in context of developments in Western European, and not just Spanish, culture
and politics. The dissertation undertakes this argument over four chapters. Chapter One argues
that unlike other elements within the Franco regime and despite outsiders’ perceptions of the
organization, the Sección Femenina was not an unusually repressive outlier either within its
international networks or among its peers. Rather, in terms of women’s civic participation and
economic rights, which were the group’s major areas of focus, the policies that the Sección
Femenina pushed aligned with those of organizations like the United Nations’ Commission on
the Status of Women (CSW), as well as of prominent women’s groups in other European and
Western nations. Chapter Two argues that, despite the Spanish government’s abolition of
repressive Franco-era legislation that, for instance, criminalized female (but not male) adultery;
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its passage of feminist-friendly legislation; international sympathy for the plight of Spanish
women; and leftist politicians self-identifying as feminist allies, the feminist movement itself had
little political leverage in transition-era Spain. Chapter Three describes the shift from an
international feminism driven by grassroots activists to an international feminism instead
dominated by government-affiliated feminist organizations. Particularly in Spain, the creation of
a federal women’s bureau, the Instituto de la Mujer, disrupted long-established feminist methods
of protest and caused tension between grassroots campaigners and women in the Instituto.
Lastly, Chapter Four examines domestic violence legislation as the first instance in which direct
feminist influence, or at least direct institutional feminist influence, dramatically shaped a major
piece of Spanish legislation. This was significant both for its impact on the rupture between
feminist ideological camps as well as for its grounding in international tenets that feminists had
long struggle to leverage for domestic change.
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INTRODUCTION
On International Women’s Day 2018, in an effort jointly organized by Spain’s labor
unions and feminist organization Comisión 8M, 5.3 million female laborers and hundreds of
thousands of additional supportive women and men participated in marches and work strikes
across the country in an effort to draw attention to women’s inequality in Spain.1 An
accompanying manifesto circulated by 8M, and reprinted or excerpted by various major
international as well as domestic periodicals, listed organizers’ demands and justifications for
such spectacle.2 Activists pointed to domestic problems like the rate of abuse against women by
their domestic partners, which they described as a form of “male chauvinist violence” persisting
in great part due to the state’s negligence prosecuting the crime; they bemoaned the pay gap
between men and women, which national newspapers reported was 13%; they insisted on the
recalculation of state pensions so domestic care work qualified; and they requested that the
government fully implement a law it had passed in 2007, which guaranteed equality in education.
To protest these issues and more, women participating in International Women’s Day events
pledged to engage in a broadly-conceived strike – not just in the union-sponsored “labor strike”
for which they would stop work for several hours in the mid-afternoon, but also a “care strike”
wherein they would stop domestic work for the day and a 24-hour “consumption strike” that

1

Susana Urra, “Spanish unions say 5.3 million observed morning strike on Women’s
Day,” El País (In English), March 8, 2018,
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/08/inenglish/1520498047_423763.html.
2

An El País article contains excerpts of coverage from international newspapers,
including The Guardian (UK), Le Monde (France), la Repubblica (Italy), and the New York
Times, among others. “La primera huelga feminista en España, en los principales medios
internacionales,” El País, March 9, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/08/actualidad/1520528768_368042.html.
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would stop female buying activity.3
The manifesto also made clear that Spain’s activists understood themselves to be part of a
global community of female activists and their allies. International Women’s Day, as they saw it,
was truly international. Spanish women partly planned to march in solidarity with women from
other countries who would also be participating in similar marches and strikes.4 An article that
ran the following day in the leading left-leaning Spanish national newspaper El País drew
parallels between the 8M demonstration and the historic Icelandic women’s strike of 1975,
which had led to Icelandic society reimaging how it could better enshrine women’s equality and
incorporate women into all aspects of Icelandic life. El País interpreted these parallels as
deliberate and understood the 8M demonstrations as Spanish feminists’ attempts to force a
similar moment in Spain.5 Moreover, though some of 8M’s demands targeted uniquely Spanish
social, political, and economic ills, others transcended national boundaries. Indeed, meeting
some of these demands, such as a call for the Spanish government to ratify International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 189, would require the nation’s politicians to engage in
international networks as well. Others, including a plea for global leaders to take the threat of
climate change seriously, expanded not only the range of marchers’ activism on a global scale,

3

Comisión 8M, “Manifiesto 8M,” Hacia La Huelga Feminista, accessed March 27, 2018,
http://hacialahuelgafeminista.org/manifiesto-8m/; Pilar Álvarez, “Las mujeres exigen medidas
urgentes tras el éxito del 8 de Marzo,” El País, March 10, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/09/actualidad/1520621522_367555.html.
4

Comisión 8M, “International,” Hacia La Huelga Feminista, accessed March 27, 2018,
http://hacialahuelgafeminista.org/international/.
5

Rocío González, “Escaso seuimiento de autónomas en la huelga del 8 de marzo,”
Cincodias: El País Economía, March 9, 2018,
https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2018/03/09/autonomos/1520582490_764679.html?rel=str
_articulo#1521064890527.
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but also its scope, identifying as a feminist issue something that affects the entire world’s
population.
Yet the strike as organizers conceived it and news outlets reported it was not necessarily
the strike as most Spaniards themselves understood it. Journalists who asked women’s opinions
about the protest received a range of answers about what women thought the protests were for,
whether they intended to participate and why or why not, and what they hoped the strike would
accomplish. Some, like 20-year-old university student Carmen Blanco, expressed unqualified
support and a clear idea of their desired outcomes. Blanco planned to participate because she
wanted greater representation of women in university life as well as “a broader approach to sex
education, one that is feminist, that talks about consent, that will teach men that no means no and
that silence does not necessarily mean yes.”6 Others did not define how they thought “inequality”
manifested, or seemed ambivalent about the strikes. For example Valencian pop star Bebe, who
had on previous occasions denied being a feminist, voiced “support [for] the movement and the
feminist struggle,” albeit with reservations. Bebe’s primary concern was that the strike might
alienate men, who she believed activists needed to include if they were to meet with success. 7
And an El País article about eight women who did not plan to attend the strike found that they
either wanted to participate but could not afford to take time off, or believed that the planned

6

Pilar Álvarez, “Las mujeres exigen medidas urgentes tras el éxito del 8 de Marzo,” El
País, March 10, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/09/actualidad/1520621522_367555.html.
7

“Bebe, sobre el feminismo actual: «Ahora parece que está mal nacer hombre»,” ABC,
March 12, 2018, http://www.abc.es/estilo/gente/abci-bebe-sobre-feminismo-actual-ahora-pareceesta-nacer-hombre-201803081144_noticia.html.
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protests and strikes were not the right method for addressing inequality. The majority of
responses, whether they agreed with the strikes or not, reflected the latter belief.8
Politicians, too, differed in their degree of support which, significantly, broke down not
by gender identity or religious belief, but rather by political party affiliation. Left-wing parties
supported feminism and the marches, while conservative parties waffled on feminism and
criticized the marches. Female politicians from the Partido Popular (PP) and from Ciudadanos,
both right of center, refused to support the strike, while male members of the center-left Partido
Socialista Obrera Español (PSOE) and the anti-capitalist Podemos echoed feminist activists’
own rhetoric calling for autonomy. Nor did political parties’ support hinge on the opinions of the
Catholic church. Despite the long-standing association between conservative political parties and
Catholicism, official religious response within Spain varied and does not seem to have
influenced parties’ decisions to support or disavow the strike. Though at least one member of the
episcopal hierarchy, the notoriously retrograde Bishop of San Sebastián, condemned the strike, at
least three others supported it, with another Basque bishop, the prelate of Bilbao, even
suggesting that the Virgin Mary herself would have marched.9
Left-wing political parties Podemos and PSOE, as well as some Independent politicians
and government administrative officials, supported the marches, the strike, and the messaging
behind the day’s protests. In Barcelona, mayor Ada Colau of the Podemos-affiliated Barcelona
En Comú party, and independent Parliamentary delegate Manuela Carmena vowed to strike. “Of
course I will strike,” said Colau, asserting that she felt “a double responsibility as a woman...and

8

Paco Puentes, “Ocho mujeres no harán huelga el 8M,” El País (Fotografía), March 7,
2018, https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/07/album/1520413389_137070.html.
9

Pere Vilanova, “El día después,” El País (Cataluña), March 11, 2018,
https://elpais.com/ccaa/2018/03/09/catalunya/1520551021_231064.html.
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as a politician” to represent those who “would like to strike and will not be able to due to
precariousness, exploitation, or fear.”10 Carmena similarly expressed that she felt it important to
strike because, as a public official, she could use her position to point out “social inequalities”
that might otherwise go unobserved.11 Echoing long-standing rhetoric of Spanish feminists who
demanded greater autonomy, Podemos MP David Llorente tweeted that male support of the
strike was “supporting women to be protagonists.”12 And right-leaning national newspaper ABC
reported that female leaders and politicians in Toledo, in the central Spanish region of CastillaLa Mancha, also spoke in support of the strike, including the director of the region’s
government-sponsored Instituto de la Mujer, or women’s bureau, Areceli Martín, who asserted
that the inequality women experienced did not “arise by spontaneous generation,” but rather
from “a thousand-year old cultural construction” that she hoped the strike could help overturn.13
Meanwhile, right-wing parties insisted that they supported women’s demands for
equality, but either refused to endorse the strike or pledged their support while also equivocating
about the strike’s real meaning and its impact. The most common critiques centered on what
conservatives interpreted as the strike’s attacks on men and on feminists’ misguided attempt to

10

Elsa Garcia de Blas and Anabel Díez, “Las políticas más influyentes ante la huelga
feminista del 8 de marzo,” El País, March 6, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/05/actualidad/1520245523_685055.html.
11

Elsa Garcia de Blas and Anabel Díez, “Las políticas más influyentes ante la huelga
feminista del 8 de marzo,” El País, March 6, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/05/actualidad/1520245523_685055.html.
12

“7.000 personas claman en Toledo por la mujer y el respeto a sus derechos,” ABC
(Toledo), March 9, 2018, http://www.abc.es/espana/castilla-la-mancha/toledo/ciudad/abci-7000personas-claman-toledo-mujer-y-respeto-derechos-201803082113_noticia.html.
13

“7.000 personas claman en Toledo por la mujer y el respeto a sus derechos,” ABC
(Toledo), March 9, 2018, http://www.abc.es/espana/castilla-la-mancha/toledo/ciudad/abci-7000personas-claman-toledo-mujer-y-respeto-derechos-201803082113_noticia.html.
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exclude men from the political decision-making process regarding women’s rights. The Partido
Popular was perhaps the most vocal in this equivocation, with party leader and Galician regional
president Alberto Núñez Feijóo seeming to agree that women faced discrimination and touting
his region, Galicia’s, successes correcting the problem. Yet he also asserted that “[t]o think that
[the strike] has been a political manifestation is, in my opinion, a lack of respect and a grave
error towards women with different ideologies and thoughts who have told us that equality has
not yet been achieved or that conciliation is not only a policy, but an attitude.”14 He implied that
the strike divided men and women and called for greater cooperation between the sexes, with the
Galician government issuing a statement that read, in part, “[r]eal equality is not going to be
achieved by going against each other, but by going against the problem.”15 Miguel Tellado,
general secretary of the PP in Galicia, condemned the strike in harsher terms, calling it “macho”
and “elitist,” while Ciudadanos’ representative on the Madrid City Council, Begoña Villacís,
who had asserted in the days before the strike that “a large majority of women [did] not feel
represented” by the protests, later addressed the 8M crowd to boos.16

14

D.G., “Feijóo: «El 8-M fue un clamor que hemos de entender los gobiernos»,”ABC
(Galicia), March 9, 2018, http://www.abc.es/espana/galicia/abci-feijoo-clamor-hemos-entendergobiernos-201803092030_noticia.html.
15

Z. Rial, “Paros en empresas y una treintena de actos marcan el 8-M más
reivindicativo,” ABC (Galicia), March 8, 2018, http://www.abc.es/espana/galicia/abci-parosempresas-y-treintena-actos-marcan-mas-reivindicativo-201803071942_noticia.html.
16

D.G., “Feijóo: «El 8-M fue un clamor que hemos de entender los gobiernos»,” ABC
(Galicia), March 9, 2018, http://www.abc.es/espana/galicia/abci-feijoo-clamor-hemos-entendergobiernos-201803092030_noticia.html; Alexis Romero, “Rivera asegura que ‘solo unas pocas’
abuchearon a Villacís en la manifestación feminista,” ABC, March 9, 2018,
http://www.abc.es/sociedad/abci-rivera-asegura-solo-unas-pocas-abuchearon-villacismanifestacion-feminista-201803091435_noticia.html; Europa Press, “Villacís sobre 8m: ‘Una
mayoría de mujeres no se sienten representadas,’” ABC, March 5, 2018,
http://www.abc.es/espana/abci-villacis-sobre-mayoria-mujeres-no-sienten-representadas201803041400_video.html.

7
These parties also argued that, contrary to feminists’ claims, they had in fact made great
progress working for women’s rights within Spain. Indeed, Tellado asserted that the strike was
the domain of “feminist elites, but not real women with daily problems” and that women striking
in his region improperly understood the political situation surrounding their rights. Galicia, he
argued, boasted Spain’s smallest gender wage gap because of the combined efforts of his party
and the PP. Similarly, PP’s official position was that “there [was] no problem of recognition of
rights, but of transferring the recognized rights to the day to day [relationships] of women and
men.”17 In other words, though these parties agreed that Spanish society perhaps had more work
to do to enforce policies guaranteeing women’s rights, they rejected feminist protestors’
demands for more legislation. This position ultimately won the day. Despite the historic nature of
the strike and the groundswell of support for activists and their demands, the Spanish
government’s official response was to refuse new policy goals and to restate that its intention
was simply to continue with the political agenda they already had planned.18
Though itself quite recent, the strike and the tensions surrounding it represent the latest
flare-up of a whole array of social, cultural, political, and semantic struggles with profound
bearing not just on the lives and experiences of women in Spain, but also more generally on the
trajectory and basic nature of Spain’s democratic political culture. Rhetoric surrounding the
strike – what did participating women feel they were striking for? Were these women feminist,
and who qualifies as a feminist? Who supported the strike, and why, and under what

17

Elsa Garcia de Blas and Anabel Díez, “Las políticas más influyentes ante la huelga
feminista del 8 de marzo,” El País, March 6, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/05/actualidad/1520245523_685055.html.
18

Anabel Díez, “El Gobierno está «muy satisfecho» con las movilizaciones de las
mujeres del 8 de Marzo,” El País, March 9, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/09/actualidad/1520594787_282640.html.

8
circumstances? – is and has been a crucial part of the complex battle over defining feminism in
Spain.
The strike also underscores that renegotiation of women’s rights has historically sprung
up and continues to surface at moments of intense political turmoil in Spain, including the
transition from democracy to dictatorship in the early 1930s with the fall of the Second Republic
and the rise of the Franco dictatorship, and then the transition from dictatorship to democracy
sparked by Franco’s death in November 1975. Indeed, this year’s strike coincided with a
renewed period of dissatisfaction with the Spanish democracy. This dissatisfaction is marked by
ongoing unrest in Spain and a moment of constitutional crisis exacerbated by Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy’s low approval ratings and difficulties forming coalitions, his attempts to alter
some constitutional agreements and also ignore calls for agreed upon renegotiation of
constitutional tenets, and the Catalan crisis. In this vein, the scheduled demonstrations were a
response to what feminists and progressive activists interpret as the failure of Spain’s democratic
government to protect constitutionally guaranteed women’s rights and a failure to enforce legal
statutes guaranteeing women’s safety and autonomy.19 Each of these moments – the descent into
dictatorship, the transition to democracy, and today’s uncertainty about the continued strength of
the post-Franco government – has been accompanied by a period of renewed debate about
women’s role in society, the rights women should have, and the extent to which the government
should become involved in relations between the sexes.
This dissertation analyzes and historicizes these tensions. It argues that the intersection

19

Comisión 8M, “Manifiesto 8M,” Hacia La Huelga Feminista, accessed March 27,
2018, http://hacialahuelgafeminista.org/manifiesto-8m/; Pilar Álvarez, “Las mujeres exigen
medidas urgentes tras el éxito del 8 de Marzo,” El País, March 10, 2018,
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/03/09/actualidad/1520621522_367555.html.
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between Spaniards’ struggle to process living in a post-fascist society and debates about
women’s rights and gender discrimination has influenced the shape of Spain’s democracy over
the past half-century since Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s death. Yet I also argue that the
sustained murmur of conversation about feminism and women’s rights does not mean that
Spanish feminists have been successful in achieving the rights they have desired. Nor does the
seeming legislative progress. Instead, non-feminist actors and/or well-meaning male allies have
co-opted both the label of feminist and, at times, feminist rhetoric, to push for restrictions on
women’s rights or on the passage of ostensibly “feminist” legislation that was more limited than
what feminists themselves desired or were willing to recognize as feminist. In addition, since the
beginning of Spain’s modern feminist movement in the last years of the Franco regime, feminists
themselves have lacked consensus about what it means to be feminist and about which demands
qualify as feminist. The 2018 International Women’s Day protests in Spain serve as the most
recent lens through which we can examine these long-standing tensions and understand their
continuing manifestation in 21st century Spanish politics and society.
*

*

*

The mid-twentieth-century sociopolitical context in which these conflicts first developed
was markedly different from, but also inextricably formative to, the Spain that hosted the
International Women’s Day strike in 2018. As the countercultural 1960s dawned in Western
Europe, Spain was entering its third decade as a dictatorship under the rule of Generalissimo
Francisco Franco. The Franco regime (1936-1975), the memory and legacies of which remain
deeply divisive in Spain, was more than the simple domain of a political strongman. Rather, the
regime had from its inception sought to reengineer Spanish society. In the founding mythology
on which the Francoist imaginary was built, Spain was an exceptional nation, divinely blessed
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with unique spiritual and cultural gifts and thus destined for global moral as well as social and
political leadership. In this vein, the regime continually relegitimated its hegemony through
dissemination and frequent commemoration of a carefully curated official version of the bloody
conflict – the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) – that had brought Franco to power. This narrative
cast the war as having saved Spain from the disastrous Second Republic, which the regime
painted as a failed democracy that had threatened to tear Spanish society apart and destroy the
nation’s traditions and culture. Indeed, as historian Sandie Holguín has argued, Franco and his
Nationalist forces began to construct this official memory of the Spanish Civil War while it still
raged, shepherding tourists around active battlefields on tours that
played a critical role in creating and consecrating a series of narratives that the Franco
regime would repeat obsessively until its demise in 1975, and helped to fashion a
Francoist vision of national identity that – the Nationalists claimed – had temporarily
been stolen by the architects of the Second Republic. On these tours, the Nationalists
depicted the war as both a Crusade and a new Reconquista, thereby exalting a Nationalist
heroism that depended on complete humiliation of the ‘Red’ enemy.20
Francoist officials thereby sought to cement the legitimacy of their newly-established Catholic
moral and social order, with Spain’s homegrown counterpart to the various fascist parties that
had emerged in Interwar Europe, the Falange, at the center of the regime’s political organization,
Franco’s Movimiento Nacional (National Movement). Franco’s new order included a rejection of
democratic politics, criminalization of all political parties save the National Movement and its
subsidiary ideological camps, and revival of archaic legal structures that in many cases dated to
the Napoleonic Code Civil introduced when French forces occupied Spain in 1808, or earlier
still. As part of this, the regime harshly imposed a legal and social subordination of women both

20

Sandie Holguín, “‘National Spain Invites You’: Battlefield Tourism during the Spanish
Civil War,” American Historical Review 110, no. 5 (December 2005): 1400,
https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.110.5.1399.

11
to their male relations and to the patriarchal designs of the regime as a whole. Authorities
accomplished this especially through the complicity of the Spanish Catholic Church, which
preached a deeply conservative and nationalistic brand of religion termed “NationalCatholicism,” as well as with help from the Sección Femenina (SF), the official Women’s
Section of the Falange.21
Under this new National-Catholic social order Spanish women found their access to the
public sphere severely curtailed. National-Catholicism’s gender hierarchy stressed domestic life
– more specifically, the roles of wife, mother, and homemaker – as women’s divinely-ordained
and thus highest calling. The Franco regime committed itself quite early to this ideology, evident
in its wartime Fuero del Trabajo (“Labor Charter”) of 1938, which would serve a cornerstone for
subsequent Francoist legality and which spoke of “free[ing] married women from the workshop
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and factory.”22 In line with this mission, both the regime’s own legal edifice and the full weight
of Franco-era society’s expectations conspired to drive women from the workplace and into
caregiving roles in the home.
A second Francoist policy dating from 1938 explicitly prohibited married women’s work
if authorities judged the male breadwinner’s salary sufficient, and otherwise still required wives
to obtain written permission from their husbands in order to secure legal employment (or to
engage in commercial activities, hold a passport, or open a bank account).23 Regardless of their
marital status women were furthermore barred from entry to certain professions – most notably,
the legal field – and were subject to the absolute authority of their head of household, whose
permission they likewise needed even to take a trip of any length.24 All of these controls
stemmed from National-Catholic authorities’ dread that unrestricted exposure to the opposite sex
would inevitably lead to temptation and sin, a fear that also moved the regime to impose a ban on
coeducation past the age of six; to establish a puritanical censorial regime that, for instance,
retouched inappropriately racy posters for films such as the 1949 Cecil B. DeMille epic Samson
and Delilah; and to require that swimsuit-clad beachgoers (including children) don modest
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ankle-length robes whenever unsubmerged.25
The Sección Femenina was thoroughly complicit in the imposition of this gendered order.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, women’s magazines published by the SF disseminated a
domestic, submissive, and pious feminine model in keeping with the group’s 18-point creed,
which exhorted Spain’s women to, for instance, “let the man in your life be the best patriot,”
“obey, and by your example teach others to obey,” and “try always to be the wheel of the cart
and let the one guiding it be in control.”26 Also, by law, women could only avail themselves of
their already-limited right to work, or attend university, or even get a passport, with proof of
having performed (or having received an exemption from performing) a period of “national
service” in the SF’s Servicio Social (“Social Service”), which trained participants in domestic
and caregiving skills while inculcating them with National-Catholic gender notions. Nearly
825,000 women spent time in this system between 1938 and 1961, and as many as 1.2 million
had done so by the time the program ended in 1978.27
Meanwhile, Franco sought to legitimize his regime in foreign eyes, particularly after the
fall of his earliest allies, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Despite the repression that
characterized his dictatorship, Franco aspired to a place among the globe’s elite nations. Toward
this end, from the late 1940s onward, he sought to cultivate Spain’s ties with leading nations in
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the Cold War-era Western bloc and he took steps to improve his regime’s foreign image enough
to make such diplomacy possible. In 1953, for example, Franco negotiated a partnership with
American President Dwight D. Eisenhower allowing the US to establish strategically
advantageous military bases in several Spanish cities. Spain gained United Nations membership
in 1955, after a decade of rejection, in part as a result of this alliance. Franco’s actions as a UN
member further demonstrate his concern about Spain’s reputation: he signed several UN
conventions he had no intention of complying with because, as scholar Lynn Savery has argued,
Franco wanted Spain to be “part of the international community on paper if not in practice.”28
The Franco regime never wavered in its ambition to, rather than simply become part of an
international global elite, raise Spain to a global leadership role. In its infancy, the Franco regime
had touted its new Spain as a “spiritual sentinel of the West” – a beacon of Christian morality
relighted in an age of spiritual decadence.29 This conceit never disappeared (and in fact would
underlay Sección Femenina’s aspirations to global leadership on women’s rights in the late
1960s), but during the 1950s and especially the 1960s, a period when Spain possessed one of the
world’s fastest-growing economies, it shifted in focus beyond moral leadership and toward the
aim of establishing the nation as a leading trade power in Europe and the world. Hence, Franco’s
repeated efforts to established economic as well as diplomatic ties with his European neighbors
as well as with the United States, particularly after the launch of the European Economic
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Community (EEC) in 1958.30
Despite Franco’s efforts, and some notable successes, his authoritarian Spain never did
manage to fully sell itself as a typical, prosperous Western European capitalist nation. For
example Eisenhower met with Franco in Madrid in 1959, becoming the first sitting U.S.
President to visit Spain under the dictatorship – yet when Franco’s regime applied for
membership to the fledgling EEC in 1962, hoping to build on this diplomatic success and extend
Spanish influence, the application was rejected. Amid an international press campaign opposing
Spain’s admission, the Congress of the European Movement decreed that, “only democratic
nations could join the European Community.”31 Clearly, “democratic” was something they did
not consider Spain to be. This was hardly surprising, as memory of the world wars and the
commitment to liberal democratic values that the EEC claimed to champion left that body
unwilling to partner too closely with a regime that many considered a fascist relic. Preferential
economic affiliation, negotiated in 1970, was the most they were willing to offer.32 UN leaders
on occasion showed similar unease: in September 1975 for instance, General Secretary Kurt
Waldheim criticized Spain’s reliance on terror and lobbied the government to release political
prisoners and stay executions. 33
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Nor did lived conditions in Spain ever come to resemble any sort of Western European
normalcy. The nation, thanks to the transformative economic Stabilization Plan implemented by
regime officials in 1959, possessed the second-fastest growing economy in the world throughout
the 1960s. Yet throughout, Spaniards remained plagued by anxiety over what they perceived to
be their nation’s continued backwardness by comparison with the rest of Western Europe.34 The
nation’s repeated rejection from EEC membership, coupled with the businessmen’s and officials’
fears of Spanish exclusion from the European “Common Market,” did nothing to mitigate this
sentiment. Western notions of Francoism’s comparative anachronistic conservatism on social
issues underscored the continued differences that set Franco’s Spain apart from its neighbors,
even as Franco’s desire for international connection grew and manifested in his ultimately
unsuccessful pursuit of EEC membership.
There was, moreover, substance to Spain’s fears of its own backwardness: as historians
Antonio Cazorla Sánchez and Inbal Ofer have noted, pockets of abject poverty persisted
alongside spectacles of mass consumption even in Spain’s most prosperous cities, with outlying
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areas like Madrid’s Orcasitas neighborhood lacking running water into the 1970s.35 Similarly,
while Spain seemed to make strides toward expanding women’s legal and economic rights –
several Sección Femenina-backed reforms enacted by the regime in the late 1950s and 1960s put
some Spanish women’s rights on par with, if not ahead of, the norm in Western Europe – these
advances had a limited impact on those women who remained banned from the legal profession
and any trade involving machinery deemed “dangerous.” This was even more the case for those
whose spouses simply denied them the still legally-indispensable permission to work or beat
them with impunity in the absence of any law criminalizing such abuse.36
Franco’s death in 1975 did little to dispel these problems. The EEC expressed doubt that
Spain would or could pursue sociopolitical reforms in the post-Franco era. Partly in response to
these doubts, Spanish politicians and activists battled over how best to define the nation’s new
democracy and, more specifically, how as well as whether to create policies on gender equality.
Contemporaneously, Spanish feminist organizations, which had formed and operated
clandestinely during the last decade of the Franco regime, began to publicly demand legislation
on issues such as decriminalization of adultery and abortion, and legalization of divorce. At the
same time, politicians who in 1977 began to draft a new democratic constitution for postFrancoist Spain did so fully aware that international observers expected the new democracy to
protect women’s rights. The resulting document consequently included a clause that proclaimed
Spanish women full and equal citizens – this guarantee, the framers hoped, would convince the
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global community of the nation’s liberalizing intentions, and at last win Spain international
acceptance and EEC membership.37 Meanwhile, the simultaneity of the Constitution’s historic
new protections for Spanish women and the visibility of feminist protest in Spain led
contemporaries and historians alike to interpret the document’s final form as a feminist triumph –
when in fact, as this dissertation shows, these activists had little direct voice in crafting the
constitution, whose architects were driven less by feminist pressures than their own desire (long
felt by the Franco regime, too) to combat Spain’s lingering political notoriety abroad.
Spain’s feminists were hardly well-positioned to exert any such influence: they struggled
to agree about what “feminism” was, and who as well as what policy positions qualified as
“feminist.” Indeed, these categories remained slippery throughout the period examined here, and
so require some measure of explanation before proceeding further.
As used in most discourse circulating during much of the Franco era, “feminist” (the
Spanish word was feminista) amounted to little more than an ill-defined slur used to discredit
women deemed troublesome by Francoist society for behaving counter to the regime’s
hegemonic gender norms. Thus, for instance, correspondents covering Britain’s 1966
parliamentary election for ABC argued that gender-bending “boyish” feminists were to blame for
that year’s decreased number of female candidates for parliament. They also blamed these
“feminists” for male hippies’ effeminacy and for the bikini’s emergence, a garment they believed
women wore to provoke shows of masculinity from men like the hippies even though such
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display of female flesh was, according to National-Catholic norms, vulgar.38
Though Sección Femenina fought to expand women’s legal and economic rights, the
organization’s leadership were among those using “feminist” as a pejorative term. In a speech
celebrating the passage of a major law on women’s rights in 1961, SF founder Pilar Primo de
Rivera underlined that “this legislation is not in the least way feminist…we do not seek to make
men and women the same…this law, rather than being feminist, is to the contrary support that
men give to women as the weaker sex in order to simplify their lives.”39 Indeed, the consensus
among Spanish historians is that, despite its support for some expanded rights for women, the SF
was neither feminist nor had feminist aspirations. Historian Aurora Morcillo, a leading authority
on the organization, theorized the distinction between women’s rights activists like those in the
Sección Femenina and those feminists (she called them cultural) who believe that whatever
differences may exist between the sexes are no bar to equality: “Right-wing women celebrate the
distinction between the sexes, but whereas cultural feminists challenge patriarchal privilege,
right-wing women call themselves antifeminist and seek protection within patriarchy.”40 This
dissertation agrees with Morcillo’s explanation and does not challenge the consensus of Spanish
historians that the SF cannot be considered feminist, despite arguing that the organization’s
periodic calls for reform ultimately helped place Spain’s women’s rights policies on par with
what the rest of Western Europe promoted. In relation to neighboring countries, the Sección
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Femenina’s activism was progressive – defined here as genuinely supportive of some degree of
emancipatory social and political reform, or “progress,” by contrast with immobilist or
reactionary stances – but its motivations were emphatically not.
As of the mid-1960s and especially a decade later, as Franco lay dying, the term
“feminism” became more acceptable, but often even less easily defined. The SF continued to
disavow all notions of feminism in its work to preserve traditional feminine subservience and
domesticity, but other conservatives were increasingly willing to define as “feminism” a limited
vision of women’s legal equality with men. In general use, these conservatives described as
“feminists” a subset of respectable women who promoted a tepid form of women’s rights
advocacy similar to the SF’s, even as conservatives, along with the SF, rejected the feminist
activists and politics emerging from clandestine organizations in the late 1970s.
Even traditionally regime-aligned camps such as the Spanish Catholic clergy became
willing to contest what was “feminist” and what wasn’t. The Church, for instance, embraced a
tightly-circumscribed “christian” feminism that largely reinforced rather than challenged Francoera gender relations. Between 1963-1967 multiple ABC articles featured author Lili Álvarez
advocating this kind of “purified” and “feminine” feminism that stressed piety, sexual purity, and
humility alongside support for the SF’s conception of women’s rights.41 Likewise, following an
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August 1975 speech in which Pope Paul VI advocated a feminism grounded in women’s divinely
ordained destiny as “daughter, virgin, wife, mother, and widow,” prominent Spanish journalist
and Sevillan cathedral canon Juan Ordóñez Márquez called for a “Marian” feminism following
the example of the Virgin Mary, which he deemed “in flagrant contradiction with the feminist
promotion efforts of [the time].”42
Yet while these as well as the Sección Femenina’s positions could be described as falling
within a larger category of activism for women’s rights and might also in some cases be termed
“progressive,” it is a more complex matter – and in the case of the Sección Femenina, would be
inappropriate – to label them “feminist,” a slippery term that covered a variety of reformist as
well as revolutionary ideologies. This is only further complicated by the pattern, illustrated
throughout this dissertation, of male politicians claiming the mantle of “feminist” and instituting
“feminist” policies and legislation without female input or approval – a pattern continued
steadily through the remainder of the century.
As “feminism” became a more widely-used term in the late Franco years, both selfidentified feminists in the clandestine feminist movement and their conservative critics often
rejected their political foes’ versions of feminism. Thus, for example, conservative critics
rejected their opponents not for being feminist – the term was, depending on who wielded it and
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in which context, not necessarily a damning slur – but rather for being the wrong kind of
feminist. Significantly, moreover, the self-identified feminists emerging from clandestine
organizations did so not as a unified force, but as activists who themselves had different beliefs
and priorities. Though these activists all rejected conservatives’ idea of respectable and limited
“feminism,” they also disagreed amongst themselves about how to define their own feminism
and its demands and they rejected those who believed differently as insufficiently feminist or as
wrongheaded about what feminism and its goals were.
Generally speaking, feminists emerging from clandestine movements and opposing
Francoist conservatives broke down into two camps: double militants and single militants. The
two differed somewhat on what they felt constituted equality with men, but they differed far
more on how they thought women ought to achieve the aim of equality. Double militants
believed that feminist activism ought to take place within as well as outside the political parties
seeking to effect broad-ranging social change in Spain and, during the framing of the 1978
Constitution, supported this document’s ratification and the political order it established
notwithstanding their exclusion from its creation. Single militants, by contrast, considered this
constitutional order irredeemably tainted by its overwhelmingly male and often conservative and
cynical authorship, in which Franco-era political elites had figured far too much. For them, true
feminist progress could only come through a fundamental break with the preexisting order, and
militancy should take place exclusively within feminist organizations not tied to Spain’s
ideologically-compromised party politics.
These differences only ossified over time. In the early 1970s, single and double militants
had attempted to find common ground even as they critiqued others whose ideas conflicted with
theirs. A decade later, however, in 1983, the establishment of a national Instituto de la Mujer
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(Instituto) irrevocably divided single and double militants into two distinct and non-overlapping
ideological camps. Double militants, many already active in political parties, populated the
Instituto and became ensconced in government administration, while single militants chose to
remain outside government structures and continue their grassroots activism. Each condemned
the other, though single militants did so most vociferously, for being either not truly feminist or
for being the wrong kind of feminist.
In this dissertation, I use the terms “single militant” and “double militant” to refer to
these groups before the formation of the Instituto. After its formation, the terms “independent
feminist” and “institutional feminist” are perhaps more useful descriptors. “Independent
feminists,” those who chose to continue grassroots work, refers to the single militants who
remained in organizations separate from political and government structures and who were
critical of their government-affiliated counterparts; “institutional feminists” signifies those
double militants who became part of the Spanish government by joining and working within
political parties, government administration, and, of course, the Instituto. In general, independent
feminists had politics that both institutional feminists and the Spanish public perceived as
“radical,” and so I also occasionally refer to independent feminists as radical when doing so
might be helpful. Lastly, even though there were stark ideological divisions between feminists, it
is sometimes useful to highlight points of common ground or common action and, in these
instances I simply refer to “feminists” and intend it to be a very general descriptor of women
who participated in or allied with the different branches of the feminist movement.
Though the groups shared a mutual disdain, the disdain they felt for each other was not
necessarily equally great. Institutional feminists voiced less public criticism of independent
feminists than vice-versa, likely because the government-funded feminists of the Instituto had
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the satisfaction of access to comparatively greater (albeit still limited) political leverage. They
also enjoyed more positive public perception. Throughout the end of the 20th century and the
beginning of the 21st, Spanish society was sympathetic to institutional feminists and their
demands: institutional feminism was the new “acceptable,” mainstream form of feminism and
independent feminism, to which critics now applied the pejorative label “radical,” was either
dismissed as populated by man-haters or mocked and belittled in other ways. With the dawn of
the new millennium, conservative public figures in Spain muddied the rhetorical waters still
further as, in a perverse turn of events, they began to use feminist rhetoric to argue against
feminist ideals and pursue the repeal of legislation that had during the intervening decades
markedly increased the scope of women’s rights in Spain, most notably expanded access to
abortion and protections for victims of domestic violence.
This dissertation suggests that the semantic confusion and oftentimes tense ideological
conflict that marked Spanish feminism during and following the birth of Spain’s current
democracy points to larger truths about the forging and character of post-Franco Spanish
political culture. In the years leading up to the constitution’s framing, and even more so in the
decades that followed, debates within and about feminism – in particular the battles to define
what constituted women’s rights and to delineate how women could best lay claim to those rights
– are in large part how Spaniards wrestled with anxieties about their nation’s perceived
backwardness within Western Europe and uncertainties about the shape that the nation’s identity
would take after Francoism. These debates consumed the rest of the 20th century as feminists,
politicians, international organizations, and ordinary citizens alike fought protracted battles over
adultery, divorce, abortion, and domestic violence legislation. However, I show, the debates also
played out as a composition of theme and variations: Spaniards’ anxieties evolved as the nation
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gained a respected position in Western Europe and as its citizens embraced the nation’s
liberalization. My dissertation tracks these variations and this evolution.
This dissertation also argues that even as debates about women’s rights played a central
role in defining and refining Spain’s democracy, feminism and feminist activists had less
political leverage than historians and activists have supposed. Indeed, there remains much
concerning the nature of modern Spanish feminism and its relationship to contemporary Spain’s
society and political culture that scholars have yet to explore; have examined with an
insufficiently critical eye; or that stems from (often partisan) popular as well as scholarly
assumptions about women’s movements in Spain under and after Franco. As such, this study first
aims to expand our understanding of the structure of and trajectory followed by Spain’s feminist
movement and organizations: when and where, it asks, did feminism emerge, how did its female
champions organize themselves, what were their demands, and to what degree were these
internally diverse and even contradictory? Answers to these questions abound in scholarship on
Spanish women, but they are far from complete. While the basic narrative of feminism during
the late Franco years and the Spanish transition to democracy is fairly well understood, many of
those accounts date from the mid-1980s, a historiographical moment tinged by a feminist
triumphalism born of Spain’s then-recent legalization of divorce and abortion. Scholars like
Monica Threlfall, writing in 1985, painted the inclusion of equal citizenship in the first postFranco constitution as a distinctly feminist victory, and argued that the ruling socialist
government’s creation of a ministry to address women’s issues, the Instituto, represented a
“conquest by the women’s movement of a branch of state power.”43 This has proved an
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optimistic assessment, with subsequent historians – Pamela Radcliff in particular – questioning
such triumphalist accounts, and instead advancing interpretations of the transition era as one in
which negotiations between political actors were significantly more complex. Radcliff, for
instance, has noted that the 1978 constitution’s equal citizenship clause was politically expedient
for male politicians hoping for acceptance from Western Europe, and that feminist demands thus
did not factor into its passage.44
This dissertation builds on Radcliff’s work by similarly arguing that we need to
understand ostensibly feminist victories as, instead, the result of negotiations amongst multiple
actors, some with views counter to those of feminists, but who found that supporting feminist
goals or adopting feminist rhetoric advanced their own political aims. It adds a nuanced
understanding of Spanish feminism as polyvalent rather than monolithic, underscoring the
conflict and divisions that have marked it since its modern inception. As such, my dissertation
argues against a triumphalist narrative that has portrayed feminist activism as beholden to a
single set of beliefs and strategies, that has described this activism as uncomplicatedly
successful, or that has understood seemingly feminist legislative progress as either
unproblematically desirable or in fact as primarily a result of feminist efforts.
In addition, my dissertation encourages a deeper look at the forms that feminist
organizational efforts have historically taken, seeking to counter narratives that have argued for
female inaction, weakness, and invisibility during much of the 20th century and particularly
under Francoism. In fact, Spain has a rich recent history of women’s organizations, a history that
includes a wealth of female-led agitation in the early 20th century, as working-class women
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mobilized within their neighborhood networks to demand improvements in quality of life for
themselves and their communities. Temma Kaplan’s groundbreaking analysis of a series of
strikes in Barcelona in the 1910s, for example, demonstrated that the authority women derived
from responsibility to family and neighborhood enabled them to organize and wrest reform from
reluctant government officials.45 But women of the early 20th century demanded more than
neighborhood reform; as Mary Nash has shown, the feminist Mujeres Libres action groups
helped organize women’s contributions to the war effort during the Second Republic.46 And
women, at least in Catalonia, won access to abortion and the right to divorce before the Civil
War. Here, Nash and Kaplan show two different types of female organization, but reading them
together makes clear that networks of organized women – and, in Nash’s argument, selfconsciously feminist women – existed and flourished in early 20th century Spain, with women
fighting for issues beyond suffrage.
These feminist antecedents are now well established; for years, however, the popular
conception was that this early Spanish feminism had not survived the dawn of the Franco regime
– Monica Threlfall even went so far as to describe the 1970s push for female autonomy as falling
“on almost virgin soil.”47 Fortunately, in the last two decades historians like Kathleen Richmond,
Aurora Morcillo and Inbal Ofer have used analyses of the Sección Femenina (henceforth SF), the
Women’s Section of the regime-sanctioned and ideologically fascist party Falange Española, to
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revise our understanding of how women’s networks functioned under Francoist repression.
Richmond showed that while the Sección Femenina was a minority organization, counting a
mere fraction of the total female population in its ranks, it was able to exert a great deal of
influence. Indeed, as Ofer argues, the SF “initiated” legislation “for the promotion of women’s
legal, political, and professional equality,” including changes to the Spanish Civil Code in 1958
and the landmark Law of Political and Professional Rights for Women of 1961. In other words,
the SF successfully championed women’s rights legislation before the booming Spanish
economy of the late 1960s and early 1970s definitively convinced Francoist officials of the need
for such reform.48 Aurora Morcillo has similarly argued that though the Sección Femenina
rejected the label of ‘feminist,’ it also strategically paired an adherence to traditionalist gender
roles with fervor for nationalist doctrines and activities to gain legitimacy to push for
improvements in women’s lives.49 Richmond, Morcillo, and Ofer thus show that even women
who believed in National-Catholicism, even at the height of Franco’s power, worked together for
access to the public sphere and for greater governance of their own lives at a time when women
were legally under the power of their fathers or husbands.
Similarly, work by Temma Kaplan and Pamela Radcliff pushes us to think about other
forms of acceptable female organization during the Franco era and how these groups evolved
into the increasingly visible Spanish feminist movement of the 1970s. First, Kaplan and Radcliff
argue that Franco-era female networks laid the groundwork for feminist consciousness to emerge
in the late Franco period and during Spain’s transition to democracy. Radcliff’s monograph on
female associational life in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, shows that government-sanctioned
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neighborhood networks amplified individual women’s concerns by allowing them to find
common cause with those experiencing similar problems.50 In addition, Kaplan found that the
Movimiento Democrático de Mujeres (MDM), which would come to play a significant role in
Spain’s feminist movement, began as a support group for women whose husbands had been
imprisoned for their political activism and opposition to the Franco regime. Over time, this grew
into involved women making demands for the right to vote, for access to birth control, and for
legalization of divorce.51 In this respect especially, the development of Spanish feminist
awareness seems to have much in common with the consciousness-raising groups made popular
by the 1970s American women’s liberation movement.
Such parallels, this dissertation shows, were not always coincidental. Beyond a few
initial attempts at comparative analysis, the relationship between Spanish feminists and
counterparts elsewhere in Europe as well as Latin America have yet to be widely studied; I argue
that such transnational links in fact comprise a significant part of how feminists both within and
outside Spain developed their ideas and managed their interactions with bodies like the European
Economic Community, the European Union, and the United Nations, in addition to myriad
NGOs. This research, then, aims to move scholarship on Spanish feminism beyond a purely
domestic or otherwise strictly comparative analysis, placing these feminists in the international
context in which they consciously chose to operate.
More broadly, this study seeks to revisit a longstanding periodization of Western feminist
development. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars of European feminism concerned with
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understanding the nature of these movements – work that was often as personal and political as it
was scholarly, undertaken by scholars with ideological or organizational ties to second-wave
feminist movements – sought not just to describe these feminisms, but to diagnose what
conditions helped them function well and compile data to support the work of incorporating
women into the public sphere.52 These scholars traced where and when feminism emerged and
catalogued which issues feminists concerned themselves with at which particular historical
moments. To this end, historians offered summaries and case studies of the arguments that
feminists in different nations had made; researchers like Gisela Kaplan and Joni Lovenduski
understood Western European feminisms as developing in dialogue with different national paths
toward industrialization and economic development, different types of government structure, and
varying dominant cultural norms.53 Such scholars also sought to understand the relationship
between first-wave feminism and second-wave feminism by gauging the influence that different
nations’ first-wave movements had on the structure and ideology of their second-wave
successors, and mostly shared the assumption that Northern European feminisms – in Britain and
Scandinavia, especially – had developed earlier and with more clearly-defined demands. Some,
such as Clyde Wilcox, further contended that these nations’ successful first-wave movements
had enabled “a continuous tradition of feminist activity,” while other European nations instead
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saw an absence of feminism at mid-century or in the case of Catholic nations like Italy and
Belgium, never experienced a first-wave feminist movement at all.54
Historians of Catholic and Southern Europe, as well as of U.S. feminism, have countered
this narrative, showing that first-wave feminism was not the exclusive domain of Protestant
Northern Europe, and that nations beyond Britain did host nascent feminist organizations at midcentury. The feminist movement, this work has underlined, did not suddenly materialize in 1968:
Nancy Cott, for instance, has argued that scholars have overlooked female activism after suffrage
in the U.S., misinterpreting the absence of a mass movement, which was due to ideological
divisions among mid-century American feminists who continued to fight in more diffuse ways,
as silence.55 Claire Duchen has exposed similar misconceptions in the study of French feminism,
noting that while she herself had formerly assumed that May 1968 had been the start of women’s
liberation in France, grassroots opposition to discriminatory laws was in fact already well
established by then, and that if French women’s activists at the time spoke of 1968 as a “year
zero” for their cause, this merely spoke to either an ignorance or intentional misrepresentation of
their own history.56
Meanwhile, historians of Spain have worked to reveal the extent of mid-century women’s
activism there by expanding our understanding of what such activism could look like. Temma
Kaplan’s work on women in the early 20th century, for example, has provided a model for
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thinking about ways in which women banded together to push for change both in their lives and
in the lives of their communities well before feminism emerged as a concept.57 And indeed,
histories of fascist and authoritarian women’s organizations have underlined the difficulties in
defining what is and is not truly feminist in such national contexts. Spanish historians have
recently begun to wrestle with these issues by examining the role of the Sección Femenina in the
late Franco era’s admittedly tepid social reforms, and by seeking to recover clandestine histories
of organizations like the path breaking feminist organization MDM founded in the 1960s.
Though consensus among historians of modern Spain is that the Sección Femenina was
decidedly not feminist, specialists studying both that organization and regime-sanctioned
associations of housewives have added studies of Spain to the canon of scholarship debating the
agency, or lack thereof, of fascist women.58
From its foothold in Spanish history, my work advances this scholarly shift by
complicating the picture of what feminist activism looked like under late Francoism and by
exploring the consequences that this embryonic advocacy for expanded women’s rights had for
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subsequent feminist organization during the transition era. It argues that, as with Duchen’s
discovery about French feminism, Spanish feminism did not have its own version of “year zero,”
even though contemporaries and Spanish historians have thought of 1975 in this way. While
periodicals like the New York Times portrayed the nation’s feminist movement at the time as
backward, silenced by Francoist policies, and unable to participate in activism before his death,
they also at times portrayed political activism in general as nonexistent in Spain prior to the
regime’s collapse, despite covering the actions of Basque terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna
(ETA), as well as student protests and labor strikes, all of which were, of course, forms of
political activism taking place well before 1975.
Notably, this dissertation also seeks to counter a too-common perception that a discrete
set of vanguard women’s movements were responsible for the subsequent birth of movements
elsewhere, along with arguments like sociologist Valentine Moghadam’s assertion that, “prior to
the mid-1980s the world’s women had not yet developed collective identity, a collective sense of
injustice, or common forms of organizing.”59 Such assertions overlook the sentiments, actions,
and networks of grassroots feminists in European nations like (but not limited to) Spain, women
who also worked in solidarity with North and Latin American counterparts. As noted earlier, this
study uses the case of Spain to show that feminist internationalism, which well predated the turn
of the century, existed before and only intensified during the latter half of the 20th century as
women’s organizations exchanged information, participated in each other’s initiatives, and
pushed for standardized international protections for women.
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Finally and most broadly, work on women’s organizations and activism offers an
opportunity to intervene in larger debates about the extent to which Spain was indeed
“backward” by comparison with its Western neighbors. Though the question of Spain’s
“backwardness” has mostly focused on Spanish political and economic development in the late
19th and early 20th century, there has been a recent upsurge in scholarship posing this question for
the Franco and transition eras. Historians are starting to examine Spaniards’ insecurity about
their status relative to the more economically developed, and more politically and socially
liberal, Western European nations and United States. As Julio Crespo MacLennan argues,
beginning in the 1950s, Spanish officials who desired EEC membership saw Western-European
style modernization as their path to inclusion. In practice, this process was equal parts economic
development orchestrated by government officials and unplanned liberalization of cultural and
social norms driven by exposure to Western European tourism and consumer culture during the
1960s and 1970s, as Sasha Pack and Alejandro Gomez-del-Moral have respectively shown.60 A
side effect of the economic miracle that tourism and consumer culture helped generate was the
expansion of women’s roles, particularly in terms of their ability to own property after marriage,
to procure work without spousal permission, and to exercise individual legal rights without a
male guardian – yet Franco’s regime instituted these changes not out of any great desire to alter
gender norms, but rather because the regime hoped to gain a more advantageous economic
relationship with Western Europe without making substantive changes to Spanish society or to
government structure.
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The coupling of women’s rights and a more general liberalization began under Franco,
but it continued more aggressively after Franco’s death in 1975. Post-Franco Spanish politics
also revolved around an ongoing and extensive pro-Europe consensus and a wish to join the
EEC, but unlike in prior years, it coexisted with citizens’ awareness that the EEC was unlikely to
accept a non-democratic Spain and with politicians’ willingness to create actual change. Pamela
Radcliff argues that politicians thought making women equal citizens would send a strong
message about the efficacy of Spain’s burgeoning democracy and its willingness to change. Yet
throughout the transition to democracy, feminist dialogue about women’s rights existed in
parallel with the dominant political conversation. Spanish politicians took notice of feminist
demands, but feminists lacked the ability to participate in political conversation in a meaningful
way. Instead, journalists and politicians mocked and dismissed feminists – for example, openly
feminist politician Carmen Diez de Rivera, Director of the Cabinet of the Presidency of Spain,
was subject to crude sexual comments and insinuations she was King Juan Carlos’ mistress, and
was ultimately fired for her feminism61 – even as they sought to inscribe gender equality in the
constitution. For these men, women’s equality was means to an end – recognition by Western
Europe – and was not a serious attempt to incorporate women into Spanish society. Thus, the
extent to which women gained entrée to public life was a byproduct and not a goal of
constitutional creation.
This dissertation examines the above patterns and the questions across four chapters.
Chapter One argues that unlike other elements within the Franco regime and despite outsiders’
perceptions of the organization, the Sección Femenina was not an unusually repressive outlier
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either within its international networks or among its peers. Rather, in terms of women’s civic
participation and economic rights, which were the group’s major areas of focus, the policies that
the Sección Femenina pushed aligned with those of organizations like the United Nations’
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), as well as of prominent women’s groups in other
European and Western nations.
Chapter Two argues that, despite the Spanish government’s abolition of repressive
Franco-era legislation that, for instance, criminalized female (but not male) adultery; its passage
of feminist-friendly legislation; international sympathy for the plight of Spanish women; and
leftist politicians self-identifying as feminist allies, the feminist movement itself had no political
leverage in transition-era Spain. Feminists lacked access to political debates, even when elected
as members of the Spanish Cortes, and politicians with access to those debates introduced
ostensibly “feminist” legislation that in fact excluded feminist demands and ignored feminist
arguments. Consequently, what scholars have judged to be two major feminist political victories
of the transition era – the inclusion of an equal citizenship clause in the 1978 Constitution and
the partial legalization of abortion in 1985 (which allowed abortions in cases of rape or incest,
“serious mental or physical defects” of the fetus, or poor mental or physical health of the mother)
– were not feminist-driven.
Chapter Three describes the shift from an international feminism driven by grassroots
activists to an international feminism instead dominated by government-affiliated feminist
organizations. Particularly in Spain, the creation of a federal women’s bureau, the Instituto de la
Mujer, disrupted long-established feminist methods of protest and caused tension between
grassroots campaigners and women in the Instituto. Moreover, this chapter argues that a
rhetorical shift also manifested at this time, reflecting the evolving goals of feminists. Whereas
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activists previously used the phrase “gender discrimination” to label women’s lack of a discrete
set of rights, in the 1980s addressing “gender discrimination” increasingly referred to a broader
attempt to foster equality of the sexes by restructuring social and cultural relationships between
men and women. For instance, Spanish opponents of gender discrimination in the 1980s and
1990s advocated coeducation as a method of normalizing the ideal of gender equality in young
children, but funding for these programs came at the expense of funding enforcement of
legislation aimed specifically at improving women’s material and legal circumstances, like equal
pay laws.
Chapter Four analyzes the history of domestic violence legislation in late 20th-century
and early 21st-century Spain. Debates about this legislation shared a political moment with
debates about the legalization of gay marriage and a revisitation of debates to expand abortion
access. Feminists sought to leverage international human rights resolutions to reinforce their
positions; conservative politicians also played to international organizations’ expectations. That
Spanish Foreign Minister Benigno Blanco (1996-2004) of the right-leaning Partido Popular
(PP), for example, could equate abortion, which his party opposed, with “gender violence,” and
that PP supporters have labelled attempts to protect abortion access as “fascist”, “totalitarian”,
and “Francoist” illustrates how conservative politicians have coopted internationally-sanctioned
feminist rhetoric in their attempt to deprive women of the very same rights such rhetoric was
developed to protect. Moreover, this rhetoric demonstrates Spaniards’ challenges in coming to
terms with Franco’s legacy: politicians and activists of all political stripes continue to apply the
terms “fascist” and “Francoist” to policies they oppose, in an attempt to tar these with the brush
of being backward and undemocratic.
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In the backdrop of all the chapters is that Generalissimo Francisco Franco has been dead
for only 41 years. In addition, Spain has not yet celebrated its fortieth anniversary as a
democratic nation, and the country is in fact at this very moment still struggling to define the
terms of its democracy, a struggle that plays out, most often, in political, social, and cultural
negotiations to delineate the rights of women.
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CHAPTER ONE
Female Sentinels of Occident:
The Sección Femenina and the Struggle for Women’s Rights in the Postwar West
In September 1968, Pilar Primo de Rivera, sister of Falangist leader Jose Antonio Primo
de Rivera and head of Sección Femenina (SF), Spain’s state-supported women’s organization,
announced plans for a Congreso Internacional de la Mujer (International Congress of Women).
National newspaper ABC reported that the Congreso would establish commissions to study four
areas where women’s problems, according to the “numerous letters [Sección Femenina]
received,” had been “unresolved or resolved incompletely”: women and the family, women and
work, women and the law, and women and education.1 In part, the conference was a continuation
of Sección Femenina’s reformist legislative agenda. Since the 1950s, the organization had fought
for – and won – the expansion of women’s economic freedoms and ability to participate in the
labour market, an achievement crystallized with passage of the Law of Political, Professional,
and Labor Rights (LPPLR) in 1961.2 But the conference was also part of Sección Femenina’s
attempt to create networks of solidarity with women around the globe: women from 44 countries
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attended the conference when it convened in 1970,3 and the lede of a La Vanguardia Española
article covering the Congreso echoed Sección Femenina’s own hope that this would prove the
first in a series of such events designed to keep countries “united in [their] concern with so many
important issues relevant to modern women.”4 The Sección Femenina hoped to further the
successes they believed they had achieved with the LPPLR and the Congreso with a successful
defense of Spain and its policies on women at the World Conference on Women (WCOW) in
Mexico City in 1975, but its delegates instead came away feeling alienated and frustrated at the
their inability to engage with like-minded women at that event.
Historians of modern Spain have concentrated primarily on the Sección Femenina in its
domestic context and assumed the SF’s failure to shine on the international stage. Because of the
organization’s origins in Spanish fascism, its complicity in creating and enforcing regime
policies like National-Catholicism that oppressed Spanish women, and its subsequent
incorporation into Franco’s political hierarchy, contemporaries and historians alike have
portrayed the SF as out of touch with Western European attitudes about women’s rights.
Yet these depictions of Sección Femenina are based in a self-congratulatory democratism that
assumes the comparative liberalism of democratic Western nations while simultaneously looking
at the SF as functioning purely within Spain and Spanish domestic politics.
This chapter argues that placing Sección Femenina in an international context – a context
that the organization in fact sought to place itself within – provides a more nuanced and more
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accurate picture of the organization and its policies. Analysis of the Sección Femenina’s political
goals shows that, unlike other Francoist policies, its attitudes toward women’s rights fit neatly
into the geopolitical milieu of the mid-20th century. The organization accomplished this by
blending its adherence to Francoist ideology and the regime’s prescribed gender roles with
advocacy of legislation, the LPPLR in 1961, that liberalized Spain’s approach to women’s
economic and labor rights and brought those aspects of the nation’s legal code in line with
policies promoted by organizations like the United Nations’ Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW) and the European Economic Community (EEC). In addition, due to the Sección
Femenina’s efforts, authoritarian Spain adopted the LPPLR before some influential Western
nations, like the United States which famously prided itself on the strength of its democracy
during the Cold War era, adopted similar legislation.
This is not to suggest that Sección Femenina favored a wholesale reexamination of
women’s place in Spanish society, or that Spanish society ever fully realized the legislative
reforms Sección Femenina championed. The Sección Femenina embraced National-Catholicism
even as it promoted a limited set of women’s rights, and Pilar Primo de Rivera consistently
disavowed any connection with feminism and indeed denounced it. Meanwhile, despite reformist
moments and a turn away from the harsher repression of the 1940s and 1950s, Spanish
legislation continued to restrict female agency. Until 1975, for example, women needed their
husbands’ permission to apply for passports and open bank accounts, and until 1978 they –
unlike men – faced draconian prison sentences and custody provisions if accused of adultery.5
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This, however, did not disqualify the SF or Spain from similarity with the United States or with
Western European democracies. Indeed, American women similarly needed spousal permission
to open bank accounts, and moreover, while they were entrusted only with small-scale domestic
financial matters and not those of any importance, as historian Lizabeth Cohen has noted, the
same was not true of Spanish women. Francoist society expected husbands to turn full authority
over the household budget to their spouses.6
After the passage of the LPPLR, the SF understood itself – not entirely incorrectly, given
that Spain fit the international bell curve on women’s rights legislation and its implementation –
as model activists for women across the globe, and this was in part the impetus for organizing
and hosting their Congreso. They hoped the Congreso would open dialogue about how to
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year prison sentences and a large fine; they were acquitted only because there was no proof that
adultery had occurred.
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modernize women’s roles in Spanish as well as global society and be a starting point for
fostering an international network of like-minded peers. The SF interpreted the Congreso as a
success at the time, and in fact attended the WCOW in 1975 prepared to discuss Spain’s
exceptional model for female equality, but historical hindsight shows that the SF’s experiences at
their Congreso and the WCOW were, even by their own metrics, resounding failures. Each
occurred at intense moments of cultural conflict that removed SF from its place on the vanguard
and positioned the organization on the outskirts of international consensus.
This was in part due to renewed international attention to the brutality and repression of
the Franco regime. During the 1960s and 1970s the regime committed violent atrocities that
shocked the international community, even earning letters of condemnation from the United
Nations and a series of unflattering international newspaper headlines.7 The regime’s treatment
of political dissidents, striking laborers, and university students in particular attracted unwelcome
global attention. Outreach efforts by Franco and by the Sección Femenina were met with
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declining enthusiasm in the wake of this bad publicity.
Yet for Sección Femenina specifically, the rise of feminism in the mid-to-late 1960s was
perhaps most impactful, especially given that it occurred as the SF was grooming itself for
international prominence. Though Spanish feminists, like other political dissidents, found
creative ways to challenge Francoism and the SF throughout the late Franco years, they did so in
limited arenas and with limited impact. This alone made Spain anomalous: though democratic
nations were also appalled by feminists, their relative freedoms meant that feminism could exist
publically and compete for political, social, and cultural capital. This enabled the emergence of
feminism in 1968 to lead to full-blown ideological change on the international women’s rights
circuit, a shift that became evident during the WCOW in 1975.
Ultimately, feminist politics dominated the Mexico City WCOW, as well as several
subsequent UN conferences, 8 and the international attention that the UN-sponsored International
Women’s Year (IWY) placed on emerging feminist organizations worldwide gave voice to
nascent feminist organizations in Spain as well. Whereas policies the SF promoted had been in
line with international trends in the 1950s and 60s, the rise of feminism and its ability to access
and influence international debates on women’s rights meant that by the mid-1970s the SF and
its policies were out of touch and Franco’s death only a few months after the WCOW proved an
opportune time for the nation’s new feminist organizations to capitalize on the attention they had
received during the IWY and WCOW. This period of political and cultural transition, already
begun under Franco and accelerated with his death, opened the door to more nuanced and varied
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conversations about women’s rights and the extent to which Spain’s new democracy should
embrace them in the process of moving beyond Francoism.

The Sección Femenina in International Context
The Sección Femenina did not begin its push for women’s rights until the mid-century. It came
from humble origins and, only with time and shrewd political calculation, evolved into an
organization with a great deal of political access and leverage. Originally a women’s
organization affiliated with the fascist Falange in the early days of the Spanish Civil War, the SF
combined its fascist notions with a fervor for Spanish nationalism and a belief in strict adherence
to Catholic gender norms. As the war progressed Franco relied increasingly on Sección
Femenina’s ability to mobilize Spanish women who supported the Nationalist cause, and at the
war’s conclusion in 1939 he incorporated the group into his regime.
The group’s status was not solely the result of its political association with the Falange.
Franco’s need for Falangist support was a factor in his initial embrace of Sección Femenina,
giving Pilar Primo de Rivera (see Fig. 1) and the SF leverage in the regime’s (admittedly limited)
political decision-making process. But historical memory played a role as well. Primo de Rivera
cloaked her political requests in appeals to public sentiment for two dead but well-connected and
fondly-remembered relatives: brother Jose Antonio, the Falange’s founder, and father Miguel
Primo de Rivera, dictator for almost a decade in the late 1920s. Her relation to these men, and
her self-stated mission of carrying on the ideals they held dear, lent her and the SF greater
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political legitimacy and a more exalted social status than affiliation with the Falange alone could
have provided.9
Figure 1:10

Because of its skill articulating and reinforcing the regime’s rigid gender order, Sección
Femenina maintained its position and autonomy even after Franco began purging Falangists
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from his government.11 Throughout the 1940s Sección Femenina oversaw women’s participation
in Spain’s Social Service (a requirement for women hoping to work, hold a passport, or attend
college), and it also enforced pronatalist policies, such as the distribution of family allowances to
non-working mothers with more than two children - both policies designed to shape generations
of post-Civil War women into true Catholic women.12 Franco did not provide the SF with much
financial support – indeed, the organization constantly turned to outside sources for funding –
but he did allow it to maintain its institutional structure following its incorporation into the
regime, a privilege not afforded to the Falange itself. This support and organizational freedom is
why the SF was able to exert a great deal of influence. And Pilar Primo de Rivera, who came to
stand for the organization, so captured Franco’s respect that he appointed her first to the National
Council and then, upon its formation in 1947, to the Cortes, the nation’s parliamentary body.
In the mid-1950s, Pilar Primo de Rivera and Sección Femenina began using this political
access to push for an expansion of women’s rights in Spain. The SF’s vision of what that
expansion should encompass was limited by its commitment to strict gender roles requiring
women’s dedication to family and to domestic life. Yet Pilar Primo de Rivera also felt that
promotion of female participation in civic life would enrich women as well as enriching the
vitality of the patria.13 To this end, she began advocating legislation to increase economic
freedoms and access to the labor market for women, as well as to grant women voting rights. In
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1961, due in large part to Primo de Rivera’s impassioned defense of the proposed legislation, the
Cortes passed the 1961 Law of Political, Professional, and Labor Rights (LPPLR) for women.14
In addition to guaranteeing equal pay and overturning legislation preventing married women
from working, the LPPLR also moved to end sex discrimination in the hiring process, allowed
women to hold public office, and expanded the range of professions open to women, even
allowing them to take entrance exams for civil service jobs.15
Despite these legal changes, there is no consensus among historians of modern Spain
about the impact the LPPLR actually had for Spanish women. Aurora Morcillo argues that the
law “represented a legal sanction of the economic and social transformation that had already
taken place in the country,” most significantly “women’s presence in the labor market in force”
which she asserts occurred during the 1950s.16 Jessica Davidson agrees with Morcillo that the
LPPLR was a way to prepare women for the already-changed economic environment, in which
the number of women in the workforce had doubled and in which the state had expanded labor
opportunities for women.17 Inbal Ofer, on the other hand, argues that the economic changes
making women essential to Spain’s workforce occurred after the LPPLR, and that the law’s 1961
passage meant that the SF successfully championed women’s rights legislation before the
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economic miracle of the 1960s made Franco perceive such reform as a necessity.18
Moreover, historians have shown, the LPPLR did expand women’s rights – but these
rights nevertheless remained carefully circumscribed, in large part because Primo de Rivera, who
continually denounced feminism and denied feminist influence over the law, wanted to preserve
traditional Spanish femininity that prized female submission, maternity, and domesticity above
all else. Indeed, Primo de Rivera positioned the LPPLR not as a means of liberating women and
giving them new roles in society, but rather of helping them to become better versions of
themselves so each woman could be “a better teacher for her children and companion to her
husband.” She defended the law by explaining that “every necessary precaution has been taken
so [it] does not disturb in any way married life,” and she assured members of Cortes that the
LPPLR “...doesn’t even resemble a feminist law” while also stating that if the law had “any
feminist inclination” it “would horrify [her and her colleagues].” 19 To this end, after the
LPPLR’s passage employers could no longer legally fire women after their weddings, but
married women needed to obtain their husbands’ permission in order to keep their jobs or seek
new employment.20 And even as the LPPLR expanded the range of jobs women could hold, it
also continued to bar them from others including non-nursing military posts and employment as
lawyers or judges, all professions which Primo de Rivera deemed “dangerous or unhealthy” to
women’s physical or spiritual health.21 Women also never achieved the equal pay to which they
were legally entitled.
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Yet interviews with contemporary Spanish women show that they most likely understood
the LPPLR to be part and parcel of the Sección Femenina’s longer-term attempts to restructure
the roles that hardline adherents to National-Catholicism prescribed for women in Franco’s
Spain. Indeed, even women who supported the regime had longed for a less repressive
environment. Historian Victoria Enders, for instance, interviewed a number of Spanish women
who related having felt discontent with their prescribed roles and who expressed a belief that the
Sección Femenina, rather than reinforcing those roles, was working to reshape them. One in
particular recollected that she was a Republican trying to live her values in the 1940s and 1950s,
which left her with few options. She did not agree with Communists or with Nationalists, but
found Sección Femenina’s promise of a “revolution” for women and its connection to Falangism
both personally appealing and in keeping with her family’s values.22 Others Enders interviewed
touted the benefits of the SF’s focus on “social justice” and differentiated themselves from
women they defined as truly right-wing, like those in the Carlist movement or enmeshed in
Catholic traditionalism.23 Passage of the LPPLR only reinforced women’s faith in the SF’s
potential to expand their roles in Spanish society. Enders’ interviews with former Sección
Femenina members revealed their enthusiasm for the SF’s political advocacy and their belief that
they had benefitted from it.24 More significantly, as historian Jessica Davidson has shown,
passage of the LPPLR not only increased the SF’s esteem among Spanish women, but these
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same women also understood the SF to be engaging in a reformist struggle with male Cortes
representatives who possessed a narrower definition of regime-sanctioned gender roles.25 For
women like these, passage of the LPLLR almost certainly represented a concrete step toward
exactly the “revolution” and “social justice” they felt the SF had been promising since its early
years.
Though these kinds of increasingly nuanced considerations of the SF, the impact of its
LPPLR, and its role in Spanish women’s lives have been a feature of modern Spanish historical
scholarship over the past few decades, scholarship on how SF fits into an international context is
still, lamentably, sparse. To the extent that scholars have investigated this topic, it has been
tangential to larger studies of Spain’s relationship to Europe and they have focused on how
Spain’s historic mid-century economic boom influenced the LPPLR or on the increasingly
Europeanized consumption patterns that women’s magazines like the SF’s own Teresa
encouraged. As scholars have noted, between 1959 and 1974, Spain possessed the second fastest
growing economy in the world, becoming the 12th largest economy worldwide. The Franco
regime responded to these changes in several ways: first, by trying to crack down on labor
activists hoping to capitalize on economic flux, secondly, by courting European approval and
requesting membership to the European Economic Community (EEC), and thirdly by accepting
and even encouraging a certain amount of Europeanization in Spain and particularly in consumer
relationships.26 Interpretations of how this economic shakeup affected the LPPLR range from
Inbal Ofer’s assertion that the legislation’s economic changes predated the felt effects of the
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economic boom, to the contention shared by Jessica Davidson and Aurora Morcillo that the law
only passed to compensate for already-occurring changes that were proving problematic for the
regime.27 Scholars have also noted this moment’s impact on SF membership more broadly by
analyzing how ads in the organization’s women’s magazine, Teresa, promoted the new
consumerism in Spain and its attached notions of a foreign-influenced Spanish rise to modernity.
For example, Teresa ads for Coca-Cola and Pond’s Cold Cream advertised those products and
glamourous new ways of living that consumption of those products promised their purchasers;
these lifestyles were familiar to Americans and Western Europeans but heretofore seemingly outof-reach of Spaniards for reasons both economic and ideological. 28
This chapter works to the extend the scholarship placing Spain in international
perspective to the Sección Femenina and the policies that organization promoted. I argue that
placing the SF’s demands and its successfully-championed LPPLR in more nuanced
international context allows us to see that though scholars have portrayed Spain and Spanish
women of the 20th century as ‘backward’ or as mere disseminators of Europeanization within
Spain – for example, here, as Teresa ran ads touting European lifestyles alongside purchases of
new foreign products – the role the SF played was, in fact, more complex than either of those
characterizations allows. Indeed, the fascist SF promoted a vision of women’s rights that was in
line with that of contemporary Western Europe and the United States, and which in some cases
outpaced those democratic countries’ attempts at female equality. Moreover, as the SF’s
commencement of the Congreso in 1970 and its dedication to participating in the 1975 WCOW
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demonstrated, prominent Spanish women of the mid-century increasingly inserted themselves
into international exchanges on women’s labor and economic rights, albeit with limited success.
The formation of the United Nations (UN) in a postwar moment of optimism laid the
foundation for the international women’s rights activism of the mid-century with which the SF’s
LPPLR ultimately aligned. Leading politicians and thinkers agreed that a hallmark of modernity
was western liberal democracy that protected equality.29 The focus on human rights also went
hand in hand with conversation about women’s rights and how they ought to figure in.
Conversation about women’s rights wasn’t new – but for a brief moment it seemed as if a more
expansive vision of female equality might be folded into the generally agreed upon postwar
conception of equal rights. The UN formed the Commission on the Status of Women in 1946 and
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In the 1950s the EEC, despite a
historical misconception that it was formed purely to mediate Europe’s economic concerns,
toyed with creating broad social and cultural legislation that included advances in women’s
rights. But the moment was short-lived; the recognition that women’s rights were human rights
would not come until the 1990s.30
In the 1960s, then, popularly-supported women’s rights policy in Western Europe was
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less expansive than debates of the prior decade seemed to promise. Mid-century international
women’s rights advocacy thought of those rights not as broadly falling under the umbrella of
human rights, nor of women’s rights as resting on a set of irrevocable political and civic rights as
turn-of-the century suffrage-focused activists had insisted, nor indeed on the recognition of
female bodily autonomy that many activists in the interwar period hoped to secure. Instead, this
advocacy embraced a looser conception of equality that included a grab-bag of policies but
focused primarily on, as Charlotte Bunch phrased it, “women’s rights as socioeconomic
rights.”31 Political battles raged both domestically and internationally as women’s rights activists
demanded access to labor markets and to equal wages. And it is not just that these debates
transcended national politics and then became part of international politics – they functioned as a
feedback loop, with international negotiations and compromises fanning fires of domestic
opposition/support, which in turn influenced subsequent international negotiations, and so forth.
The formation of the EEC demonstrated the challenges that intergovernmental
organizations faced in creating expansive social policy guaranteeing equality, and the ways
compromises necessary to surpass those challenges also often excluded more comprehensive
ideas about what women’s equality could encompass. In 1955, France, West Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg, the six members of the European Coal and Steel
Community, began negotiations on a new treaty for creating a federalized Europe. Initial plans
went beyond economic integration to include “creation of a powerful, supranational human
rights regime” along with vague notions of a single European standard for social legislation
called “social harmonization,” but there was no consensus about what these policies might be
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and there were conflicting ideas about how nations could implement them.32 Some nations were
comfortable with EEC clauses mandating the passage of legislation and immediate conformity to
social harmonization policies; both the West German and Dutch governments believed that
market conditions would inevitably cause the social harmonization under debate, but that forcing
social harmonization could cause irrevocable harm to their cultures and their economies.
West Germany and the Netherlands’ unease with social harmonization policy manifested
in their objections to the Treaty of Rome’s Article 119, which France had requested and which
stated that “each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female
workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.33 Though West Germany, like France,
had included an equal rights article in its Constitution in 1949, the West German conception of
equal rights diverged from that of the French. West Germans and, more significantly, the West
German court, considered equal rights to be relational, contingent upon an understanding of and
respect for differences between the sexes. Legal experts interpreted this to mean that separate
spheres ideologies should hold sway in labor arrangements. As such, women’s labor contracts
almost universally stipulated wages 20-30% lower than men’s wages. It was not until 1955 that
the West German Federal Labor Court granted female union members’ demands to end lower
wage classifications for women.34
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Dutch wage regulations similarly revolved around the belief that the sexes played
different roles in society, specifically that men worked to support families and women did not.
The Dutch government sanctioned unequal pay, requiring equal pay only in labor fields
populated by both sexes so that lower women’s wages did not lead to industry reliance on
cheaper female labor. Authorities acknowledged that there was no justifiable reason to pay
women lower wages, but they also based wage policy exclusively on recommendations from the
industry-led labor organizations that objected to equal pay. In the government’s opinion, though
paying women less than men was not justifiable, the social and economic costs of increasing
women’s wages would be too much to bear.35
Meanwhile, scholars have debated whether France proposed Article 119 out of a fervent
dedication to protecting women’s rights or out of fear that the nation’s industries would face a
competitive disadvantage unless other EEC nations also guaranteed equal pay.36 France’s wages
were far closer to parity than either West Germany’s or the Netherlands’,37 and the nation’s
economic advisors were concerned that companies would move business out of France to take
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advantage of cheaper female labor elsewhere.38 Either way, passage of Article 119 hung on
questions of political expediency and, once it passed, equal pay existed in EEC nations largely in
name only. After 20 months of talks EEC treaty negotiators from each nation agreed that Treaty
of Rome signatories would progress toward equal pay for equal work – the less radical of the two
equal pay options on the table – with the goal of each nation implementing the provision by 21
December 1961. No nation met the deadline, a situation that remained unchanged as of the late
1960s.39 Social harmonization efforts meanwhile faded into insignificance and ceased to be a
feature of EEC negotiations. The attempt at equal pay was the only such attempt at women’s
rights policy in the EEC’s early days.
The UN similarly struggled with women’s rights policy implementation. In 1946 the UN
subsumed the International Labor Organization, or ILO, which had supported equal pay since its
inception in 1919. As with the equality clause in France’s Constitution, there are questions of the
ILO’s motivations in promoting equal pay. The ILO’s initial equal pay demand had ‘protected’
the labor market for veterans returning from WWI by ensuring that businesses did not choose
cheaper female labor at the expense of men newly in need of work.40 By 1951 when the UNaffiliated ILO passed its Equal Remuneration Convention, its equal pay demand was perhaps less
cynical and countries ratifying the convention were (and remain) ostensibly required to ensure
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equal pay for work of equal value.41 Yet guaranteeing compliance was another matter. The UN
and its agencies could request member nations’ ratifications for such treaties, and could declare
noncompliance illegal, but ultimately had no powers of enforcement. Nations signing treaties and
ratifying conventions thus frequently neglected to implement the required legislation despite
having a legal obligation to do so. ILO Conventions are legally binding when ratified by member
states, for example, but there was an average 15-year lag between those Western European
nations ratifying the ILO’s Equal Remuneration Convention and their passing domestic federal
laws guaranteeing equal pay. Only France, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands passed domestic
equal pay legislation before their respective ratifications of the convention, and of those the
Netherlands and the UK were late ratifiers who did not guarantee equal pay until 1968 and 1970,
respectively. The United States has never ratified the ILO Convention.42
Even when nations were willing to constitutionally guarantee women equal rights, there
was no consensus, either domestically or internationally, about what those rights should be or
how to guarantee them. Western Europe and the United States generally looked to economic and
labor rights in the mid-century, such as equal wages, as an indicator of female equality. Yet
equal economic rights was one of the least progressive visions of female equality that existed at
the mid-century; there was not even consensus that equal economic rights were or should be
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achievable; and despite nations’ commitments to international and regional bodies’ treaties that
mandated measures like equal wages and non-discrimination in hiring, the reforms themselves
remained elusive. When groups like the UN and the EEC demanded change, national
governments resisted, acquiesced only under pressure, or ratified conventions with no teeth and
then failed to enforce their provisions. The intentions of the ILO and of France to guarantee
equal pay may have been genuine desire to help female laborers, but they may also have had
other motivations. In addition, passage of their desired equality legislation by the UN, and
inclusion of pay equality as a prerequisite for EEC membership, did not mean that parties to
those articles were similarly desirous of change – and it did not mean that the changes would be
adopted on a domestic level, either in name or in actuality. Indeed, despite international attention
to women’s economic equality legislation, and despite the widespread Western European
ratification of often multiple conventions requiring member nations to institute equal pay
legislation, as of 1961 few Western nations outside of Scandinavia had laws with requirements
for equal pay and the prohibition of sex-based discrimination in hiring on the books.43
The SF’s reconception of Spain’s labor laws, then, was in line with what the international
community and intergovernmental organizations mandated, and passage of the LPPLR placed
Spain on the vanguard, one of a small cadre of nations with a legally enshrined commitment to
women’s labor and economic rights. The nation’s shift toward liberalization did not go
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unnoticed: in 1964, American women’s magazine Cosmopolitan published an article lauding
what it titled the “New Roles for Spanish Women” and favorably contrasted these changes with
women’s status in Spain before passage of the LPPLR. In addition to explaining the lack of
rights women previously experienced – being “deprived by law and custom of the most basic
human rights” – the piece celebrated Spain’s guarantees of equal pay and as well the increase of
female representation in the Spanish Cortes and the growing female student body at the
University of Madrid.44 This is especially telling given the state of women’s labor and economic
rights in the United States at the time: Congress had passed The Equal Pay Act of 1963 only one
year prior. Authoritarian Spain had beaten the US to the punch.
Spain’s equal pay legislation was not the only manifestation of its complicated
relationship with women’s rights policy. The existence of a dedicated women’s ministry within
the national government structure also set Spain and Sección Femenina apart from the Western
political milieu. Only the United States had a similar organization, the Women’s Bureau,
established in 1920 as a division of the United States Department of Labor. Throughout the 20th
century the US Women’s Bureau worked to end sex discrimination in wages and hiring
practices, but it was not until December 1963 when President John F. Kennedy created the
President’s Commission on the Status of Women (PCSW) that the US government had an
advisory board to brief the President on women’s issues.45 The combined influence of the
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Women’s Bureau and the PCSW smoothed the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and paved
the way for reintroduction of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s. Yet the SF enjoyed a
closer relationship with its government and gained more progressive, more consequential
legislation, sooner than did the Women’s Bureau or PCSW. In addition, no other comparable
government-affiliated women’s organizations existed in the mid-century. The French Ministry of
Women’s Rights was not established until 1981. The German Federal Minister for Youth,
Family, and Health only explicitly folded women in as of 1986. And Britain did not have a state
representation for women’s interests until 1997, when Prime Minister Tony Blair created the
position of Minister for Women.
The SF and its achievements highlight a seeming contradiction – Spain’s restrictive
political environment, in a nation with few women’s rights, simultaneously nurtured the ability
of a women’s political group to develop government policy. On the one hand, Franco’s regime
subsumed Sección Femenina and expected the organization’s work to align with and indeed
support regime goals, which denied the SF autonomy while strengthening cultural expectations
that women remain in the home and subservient to their fathers and husbands. On the other hand,
the SF’s relationship to the Spanish government also gave Spanish women an opportunity to
demand and realize change in their economic and civil statuses. As historian Jessica Davidson
observed, “the unique role that…the SF…played in the Franco regime [was that] it was both an
official state organization and one that represented an advocacy group that, despite its
collaboration with the regime, had a vested interest in improving working conditions for Spanish
women.”46 The “unique role” granted the SF political and tactical advantages – a comparatively
greater level of political access – that women in other, otherwise freer societies lacked, enabling
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them to better press for and secure reforms their counterparts abroad also desired.

The Congreso
By the late 1960s, the Sección Femenina began expressing an ambition to guide women’s rights
policy internationally as well as within Spain and they secured permission from the Franco
regime to host an international conference, the Congreso International de la Mujer, in Madrid in
1968. Organizers stated their purpose as “try[ing] to achieve a more just world,” especially for
women. They observed that “being a woman still pose[d] many problems in all parts of the
world,” and they intended the Congreso as a venue where participants could, through
“exchanging and contrasting opinions and exposing the realities of [life for women in] all
countries,” “provide solutions” to these “many problems.”47 Significantly, Sección Femenina
leadership also billed the conference as “the first of its kind” because “it touche[d] absolutely all
issues related to women.”48 With their conceptualization of the Congreso the Sección Femenina
billed itself as uniquely qualified for international leadership in women’s rights and as in
possession of a necessary and unique new vision for how to conceptualize these rights. In this
way, they echoed Franco’s own desires and motivations for international engagement. Franco
wanted not just to be seen as part of Europe, but he wanted Spain to be a model for the rest of
Europe; to have Europe as well as Spain itself recognize what he portrayed as his nation’s
exceptional character. The SF understood its role in global women’s rights politics in this vein.
The organization intended to serve as an example for other women’s organizations, and sought to
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extend its vision of true Catholic womanhood and a platform of women’s rights crafted with
those gender roles in mind, worldwide. The Congreso was their vehicle.
Announcement of the Congreso in Teresa, the SF’s official magazine, described the
conference and its organizers as heirs to the legacy of prominent early-20th century women’s
rights activists: the Congreso was going to “look at and remix” the “three Dutch
commemorations of the International Congress of Women.”49 This was likely a reference to the
International Congress of Women held in The Hague in 1915, which prominent suffragettes from
Europe and North America organized to demand an end to World War I, as well as to demand
that women gain the right to vote. Organizers also framed the Congreso as a response to prior
unnamed “feminist” international conferences that had failed because their alleged feminism
prevented attendees from correctly identifying and resolving the inequality women faced.50 In
placing their own Congreso within this tradition of international women’s rights activism, the SF
claimed the mantle of international, not just Spanish, leadership on women’s rights policy while
also signaling dedication to the Francoist regime through their stated political opposition to an
undefined and bogeyman like “feminist” ideology.
For the SF, international leadership was more than symbolic: it also involved building
solidarity through interpersonal networking. For this reason, the organization sent delegations of
its own members to women’s groups in other countries and urged them to attend the Congreso.
In so doing, the SF’s international outreach showed parallels with Pilar Primo de Rivera’s own.
Primo de Rivera had gained ambassadorial experience in the early years of the Franco regime
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through meetings with Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar during the Spanish Civil
War and Adolf Hitler in 1941, when Franco could not personally visit his ally for fear of
international reprisal; she had also already sought solidarity with other women’s organizations
sharing her ideals and, by extension, those of the Sección Femenina. Before her trip to Germany,
for example, Primo de Rivera corresponded with the National Socialists’ women’s section to
profess her happiness with the “cordial relationships that united…in friendship” Spanish women
and their “German comrades.”51 Notably, Primo de Rivera personally fostered these “cordial
relationships” only with like-minded, fascist women and served as an ambassador specifically to
nations whose fascist and/or repressive politics were so internationally objectionable that Franco
himself could not visit.
Similarly, though the SF insisted that its Congreso was open to “all nations” and “all
Spanish women who wished to take part in its tasks, without regard to political, religious,
nor...social affiliation”52 the organization courted attendance primarily from right-wing women
who ultimately made up the majority of the Congreso’s attendees. Shortly after announcing the
organization’s intention to host an international Congreso, for example, Primo de Rivera and
members of the SF leadership team toured Latin America in order to personally extend
invitations to sympathetic women’s organizations. They visited Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, and Colombia on their trip – all, with the exception of Costa Rica, fellow
dictatorships – meeting with presidents and senior officials, holding events with these nations’

51

Jessica Davidson, “‘Never of Feminism:’ Pilar Primo de Rivera and the Spanish
Right,” World History Connected 7, no. 1 (February 2010), accessed April 16, 2018,
http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/7.1/davidson.html.
52

6.

“La mujer en el mundo de hoy: Congreso Internacional de Madrid,” Teresa, July 1970,

65
first ladies, and meeting members of local women’s groups.53 The tour offered SF members
opportunity to burnish their foreign policy credentials as well as to build a network of similarlyminded women’s organizations with which the SF could evangelize about their shared, fascismtinged and Catholic infused, gender politics. These meetings were successful, as were efforts to
publicize the Congreso. Latin American delegates dominated the Congreso, but women from
around the globe also attended, representing organizations from nations as far-flung as Iran,
Cameroon, Taipei, India, and Vietnam.54 SF leaders were thrilled about the turnout and
envisioned the conference as the first of many. The LPPLR had put them on the map in Spanish
political life and in the nation’s women’s rights policy development; they expected the 1970
Congreso to give them similar stature in international circles. Despite welcoming primarily
conservative women to discuss an exclusively conservative agenda, the leaders of the SF also
clearly understood themselves as women’s rights activists on a global scale, with the aim of
serving as international ambassadors not only for Spain, but for their vision of women’s rights.
Yet the SF’s image of the Congreso and its significance stood at odds with reality: the SF
badly misjudged the historical moment and, as a result, the possible impact the Congreso could
have. The SF had fit neatly into the geopolitical milieu of the mid-20th century, but 1968 was a
year of dramatic global unrest during which that milieu changed significantly. The LPPLR had
dovetailed with Franco’s attempts to court approval from Western Europe and had helped ease
Spain’s internal economic and societal pressures; it had also matched the predominant approach
that Western Europe took to women’s rights, which stressed legislative change to give women
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equal opportunities – especially equal economic opportunities – but which would otherwise
render governments and bureaucracies unchanged.55 In contrast, announcement of the Congreso,
as well as the event itself, existed within a transitional moment for international women’s rights
activism as cultural unrest both in Spain and throughout the West in the late 1960s fueled the
development of new feminist strategies and networking tactics.
Initial plans to announce the Congreso in 1967 coincided with a wave of labor unrest and
student strikes in Spain that closed eight universities. In response, the SF, in consultation with
the regime, chose to delay publicizing the Congreso until authorities quelled the protests.56 But
these protests and their impact were inescapable. More flourished in Madrid and Barcelona in
1968, and Europe and the United States also experienced a surge of cultural contestation when
feminists, laborers, LGBT organizations, minority organizations, and students took to the streets
to demand acknowledgement and reforms from their respective federal governments. These
activists also increasingly held mass demonstrations calling for a rejection of fascism and
colonialism.
The international movement for women’s rights became swept up in momentum
generated by the counterculture and split into two “branches” – an older branch that “usually
work[ed] within the system to change laws and public policies unfavorable to women” and a
“younger branch” that “typically focuse[d] on building alternatives outside the existing system,
for instance, cooperatives run and controlled by women including economic enterprises,
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women’s shelters, health clinic, and daycare centers.”57 The divergence in organizational strategy
also pointed to an ideological divergence between the branches. Until the mid-20th century,
women critical of government hierarchies languished on the ideological fringe and moderates
with connections to establishment politics ran the show, but the 1960s countercultural fireworks
brought the ideological fringe to the foreground. Female activists applied social and cultural
critiques promulgated by countercultural organizations to the discrimination they encountered
both in their daily lives and at the hands of their peers in radical organizations; as a result,
feminists began to argue that women experienced a unique form of oppression that underlay
every social and political structure, that the global community could take steps to alleviate it,
and, moreover, that one of the unmet ideals of liberal Western democracy was its guarantee of
female equality.
The Sección Femenina, which had been more or less in line with international women’s
rights efforts in the 1950s and early 1960s, faltered in the mid-to-late 1960s and throughout the
1970s. Primo de Rivera’s organization was of the “older” branch of women’s rights
organizations and emerging organizations of the more radical “younger” branch crowded out the
SF and other right-wing women as they found a voice in international women’s politics during
the 1960s. This shakeup happened at the domestic level as well. While Sección Femenina
delighted in its policy successes in the 1960s and planned the Congreso – its international
coming-out party – the organization also experienced a membership crisis that it perceived to
result from the changing political environment and the perception of young, educated women
that Sección Femenina was “a devalued political organization” incapable of giving the
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professional opportunities they desired.58 Also, for the first time under Franco, Spanish women
who felt this way about the Sección Femenina had other options, both legal and extralegal, for
political involvement.
Beginning in 1964, Franco allowed the creation of a network of neighborhood and
housewives’ associations throughout the country. These associations were in principle apolitical
and loyal to the regime– they would not have been legal otherwise – and though the SF had no
affiliation with such organizations, some individual members chose to participate in both the
associations and in the SF. However, the housewives’ associations and the SF attracted different
kinds of women. Since the SF only concerned itself with furthering its political capital as a
“female political elite” and with recruiting “modern” women, the organization focused its
activities on women engaged in professional activities and on university students who had begun
eschewing membership in the organization.59 Nevertheless, the Sección Femenina was no longer
the only option available to Spanish women who wished to become involved in politics –
especially local politics – and who wished to improve their lives and those of the women in their
communities.
Moreover, in Franco’s Spain, feminist organizations formed and began to gain a
following during the 1960s and 1970s, albeit clandestinely. Sección Femenina thus had to
wrestle with both an emerging feminist-driven international consensus about how to work for
women’s rights, and with the emergence of feminist organizations within Spain that threatened
the regime and the ideological foundations of Sección Femenina’s work. Over the course of the
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1960s Spanish women increasingly turned to their nation’s nascent clandestine feminism despite
penalties for feminist activism that included hefty jail sentences and torture.60 As early as 1965,
the MDM, backed by Spain’s clandestine Communist Party, recruited members for a women’s
rights movement. Most neighborhood associations were Francoist, but feminist organization
Movimento Democratico de Mujeres (MDM) infiltrated some, resulting in five new MDMaffiliated homemakers’ associations and thereby creating networks of feminist consciousness and
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solidarity in several working-class neighborhoods. Activists participating in this infiltration did
so at great personal risk and when they were discovered, police raided their groups, disbanded
them, and reiterated the illegality of feminism. Still, such attempts at infiltration continued and
feminists also found other ways to organize. In 1967, the MDM gathered roughly 1500
signatures on a petition demanding equal rights, including access to birth control and divorce.61
Other women wrote anonymous letters critical of SF gender policy to sympathetic periodicals,
which published the missives.62 In all, despite the regime’s harsh penalties for political
dissidence, and despite their clandestine activities, feminist organizations nevertheless became so
widespread that even the SF had to acknowledge their existence. 63 Indeed, estimates suggest that
shortly after Franco’s death there were as many as 90 feminist organizations throughout Spain.64
These feminists engaged with, challenged, and condemned Sección Femenina and its
Congreso. In addition to creating networks of solidarity by infiltrating housewives’ associations,
in 1970 the MDM also used such infiltration in a plot to sway the SF’s political platform and to
exert influence over the conclusions of the Congreso.65 Some high-profile Spanish women with
links to feminist organizations participated in the Congreso and openly, if cautiously,
disregarded the SF’s restrictions on what topics could and could not be discussed. Maria Campo
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de Alange and several members of her Women’s Studies Sociology Seminar (SESM), for
example, caused controversy when they insisted on promoting coeducation for children, one of
the banned topics – though, as Mary Salas recalled, they had to speak of it in coded language as
“the word coeducation could not be said then.”66 Still others convened a clandestine, competing
conference where they denounced the SF’s Congreso. In January 1970, representatives of
feminist organizations from around Spain gathered in Madrid under the name Mujeres
Democraticas de España (MDE). Their meeting’s minutes included a rejection of the Congreso:
We believe it important … that this first general meeting took place months before the
Women’s Congress … [This Congress is] sponsored by Pilar Primo de Rivera (observer
of woman’s awakening [in Spain]) … [who] with typical Falangist demagoguery now
intends to turn us into a means to integrate [women’s activism] into the Regime, just as
she formerly did all she could to marginalize us, “inspired” by the doctrine of José
Antonio. We roundly denounce this Congress as foreign to the true interests of women.67
By sarcastically naming Primo de Rivera a mere “observer of woman’s awakening” and referring
to her legislative successes as “‘inspired’ by the doctrine of José Antonio,” MDE positioned the
SF as regime henchwomen and not as the reformists that the SF and their supporters believed
themselves to be. Feminists at the time largely defined themselves in opposition to Francoism
and their demands included the dissolution of the regime, amnesty for its political prisoners, and
an end to the particular oppression women suffered under National-Catholicism; they also
opposed the SF’s limited vision of women’s rights, pushing for a more expansive vision of labor
and economic rights, as well as for legalization of abortion, contraception, and divorce. In sum,
despite the Sección Femenina’s claims, MDE argued that the Congreso was simply an SF
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attempt to coopt and dilute feminist demands and not an honest attempt to represent Spanish or
indeed any women.
Ultimately, both the sanctioned neighborhood associations and the feminist organizations
challenged the SF’s control and illustrate the changing methods of working for women’s rights.
Of themselves, Spain’s newly-legal, official neighborhood and housewives’ associations did not
challenge the SF’s international claims; their emergence did, however, represent an alternative to
the SF’s erstwhile monopoly on women’s activism while feminist infiltration of the associations
blurred the boundaries between Francoist and radical. Over time even those associations
supportive of the regime began to behave like the emerging “younger” branch of women’s
activism inasmuch as they used grassroots networks to advance the regime’s ideology at the local
level. Organizationally, if not yet ideologically, the nation’s growing number of alternative
women’s groups conformed with rather than resisted shifts occurring in the international
women’s movement. Growing support for outright feminism, meanwhile, increasingly forced the
SF and the Franco regime to fight to retain Spanish women’s loyalties as popular views on
women’s rights shifted to leave the SF’s by-then-antiquated reformism behind. Spanish
feminists’ approach to women’s rights was not unique: it corresponded with the gains of
international grassroots women’s rights activists and centered on rectifying oppression as
opposed to economic injustice. This ascendant movement increasingly outshone conservative
activists and formal women’s organizations, who now found themselves struggling for influence.
The SF’s sponsorship of and participation in the Congreso, and its representation of the
Congreso’s aims and their hopes for action arising from the discussion topics, existed within a
transitional moment for both domestic and international women’s rights activism, which became
increasingly clear as the 1970s wore on and came to a head with the SF’s participation in the
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1975 WCOW in Mexico City. It is perhaps ironic that the very moment when the SF’s approach
was becoming passé was the moment the organization chose to push beyond Spain’s borders in
search of solidarity.

The Transitional Moment and the International Women’s Year (IWY)
Oblivious, perhaps, to the disconnect, SF members concluded the Congreso feeling optimistic
about the state of women in Spain and around the globe, and about their role in championing
women’s rights. The organization’s leadership excitedly jumped into preparations when the
United Nations’ General Assembly announced that 1975 would be the International Women’s
Year (IWY) and that its programming would include an international conference. Francisco
Franco appointed Pilar Primo de Rivera head of the Spanish National Committee for the
International Women’s Year. News that that the Committee had already held its first meeting on
Spain’s involvement in the World Conference on Women (WCOW) greeted Teresa readers in
the magazine’s August 1974 issue, along with the assurance that Primo de Rivera was preparing
to host the second meeting “[a]t the time of drafting these lines.”68 Subsequent editions of Teresa
provided in-depth detail about the National Committee’s structure as well as about individual
members of the committee, including Primo de Rivera, of course, but also Carmen Salinas and
Carola Ribed de Valcárcel, each of whom were on the SF leadership team and were entrusted
with important speaking or public relations roles during the WCOW.
The SF approached the WCOW confident in Spain’s exceptional record on women’s
rights. After all, they felt that though Spanish society still needed some work, Spain had already
managed to achieve female equality. According to Pilar Primo de Rivera,

68

“El Año Internacional de la Mujer, en marcha,” Teresa, August 1974, 16.

74
Nowadays, one can almost say that woman is no longer subject to [male] tutelage, as she
was before. Within the specific context in which she undeniably exists, she has beyond a
doubt made enormous strides toward equality with man. Not acting against him nor
placing herself ahead of him, but rather eliminating discrimination that kept her from
developing her abilities, till now nearly always confined to the exercise of household
duties or second-tier labors. Now woman studies, works, interests herself in politics, is in
principle an equal member of society. This is more or less accepted today.69
In addition, Teresa reported on the SF’s continued international engagements in the lead-up to
the first World Conference on Women, to be held in Mexico City in 1975, which they used to
gauge reception of the Spanish delegation’s ideas as well as to gauge what kinds of demands
were in vogue in other nations. To this end, the SF expressed surprise, wonderment, and
amusement that the Swedish delegation wanted greater maternity and paternity leave while the
Malian delegation desired access to technologies that could relieve housewives of their domestic
labor.70
SF leadership felt secure that their calls for labor and financial rights for women were
among the best proposals for international action. The Spanish delegation’s fundamental goal for
women’s rights policy in the WCOW was twofold. First, Spanish delegates encouraged other
nations to adopt “equality legislation and to negate all the rules that discriminate against
women,” which consisted first of “the establishment of equality in the field of political,
professional and labor rights.” In her speech to the WCOW Plenary Session, Vice-President of
the Spanish Delegation Carmen Salinas allowed as how “most countries [had] resolved” this
step, and posited that the next vital component of such equality was in ensuring “legal equality”
and giving women “the same opportunities” as men. To this end, she exhorted women “that only
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with their effort and determination [would] they achieve their rightful place in the society of the
future.”71 After securing legislative advances, then, Salinas and the SF argued that the work of
ensuring female equality fell entirely on the women who wanted equality. Women should be
“integrated” or “incorporated” into society, but society should not be changed to accommodate
them.72 Instead, they argued, women should be given the legal equality and resources to work
hard to exist in society in its present form.
Secondly, the SF lobbied the WCOW to refrain from proposing a universal method of
tackling women’s inequality. The SF once again asserted its exceptional character, arguing that
because of Spain’s special traditions and state of development, other nations’ solutions or
suggestions to improve the lot of women would not work there. SF delegates felt that the lesson
Spain had to teach Europe and the world was about the need for nationally specific solutions, a
lesson the government reinforced: Spanish Prime Minster Carlos Arias Navarro similarly argued
that other nations also had their own individualized needs.73 Spain’s delegates were steadfast in
their belief that the conference’s participating nations would best be able to combat female
oppression through individualized approaches tailored to their particular cultures and traditions,
and remained convinced of this after witnessing the dramas of the WCOW.
Despite the SF’s confidence leading into the WCOW, the delegation failed to have its
desired impact. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the SF was in step with the international
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consensus on women’s rights politics, but by the 1970s the SF was increasingly out of touch,
both organizationally and ideologically. Organizationally, a split emerged between older
branches of women’s rights activism and newer branches of second-wave feminist activism – the
former intent on a bureaucratically-administered top-down international solution to women’s
inequality, the latter influenced by the counter-culture of the 1960s and reliant on the grassroots
tactics of mass political movements pioneered in student uprisings, the Civil Rights Movement,
and Vietnam War protests. Notably, WCOW organizers fell on the “older” side of this divide:
American delegate and activist Arvonne Fraser described them as “CSW women…bent on using
the power of international institutions and governments as a vehicle for the transformation they
desired,” the antithesis of “newer” activists’ goals.74 The Spanish delegation fell into the “older”
category as well, as much for their relationship with Spanish governmental institutions as for
their disdain for the emerging feminism and its grassroots activism. Meanwhile, grassroots
feminist activists involved in international women’s rights politics attended the WCOW
primarily through an associated NGO Tribune, which hosted organizations which were
unaffiliated with the UN and were denied access to conference proceedings. The UN resented the
new model of NGO involvement and attempted to soften their role in WCOW negotiations by
cordoning off NGO staging areas, but NGO lobbyists found ways to connect with UN
representatives and delegates, pushing grassroots-aligned NGOs’ agendas into conference
proceedings.
Ideologically speaking, the Spanish delegation also found itself isolated. First, the
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delegation’s goals and beliefs were no longer mainstream, nor in line with what other
international women’s rights activists advocated. This was complicated by the particular political
tensions that riddled the 1975 WCOW in Mexico City, as well as the two subsequent WCOW.
Though the UN intended the IWY and its accompanying WCOW to find points of commonality
and build networks for politically-active women, the WCOW instead highlighted the differences
between ideologically diverse groups of women and exacerbated relationships already fraying
under Cold War tensions. Cold War political conflict between the Soviet delegations and the
Americans fundamentally shaped the development and goals of international feminism, as well
as the agendas of not just the first UN World Conference on Women held in Mexico City in
1975, but also the second and third, held in Copenhagen in 1980 and Nairobi in 1984. This clash
marked the battle lines between women who, like the Soviets, felt that “gender equality could
only be achieved within a more just economic system” and Americans who dismissed those
arguments. That Soviets also wanted to expand the WCOW agenda to include conversation about
international political issues beyond female equality frustrated American delegates. Moreover,
Soviets, in a move antithetical to American and Western feminist beliefs, also put forth what
scholar Kristen Ghodsee has called the “peace agenda” rooted in a cultural feminism celebrating
differences between the sexes and offering solutions based on those differences.75
The more “radical” Soviet aims held sway at the Mexico City conference and through the
following decade. Some of this was due to the American government’s reluctance to invest in the
WCOW proceedings, as officials generally believed that women’s rights activism was a mere
front for communist agitation. Arvonne Fraser’s recollections of the US government’s
prohibition on female American delegates talking with Soviet women or advocating binding
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proposals are perhaps easier to comprehend within this context, as is the National Security
Council’s strenuous objections to U.S. First Lady Betty Ford giving opening remarks on behalf
of the American delegation at the conference. But the American government was not solely
responsible for American activists’ limited influence; their activist colleagues also marginalized
and even mocked them. This conduct was so extreme that one conference attendee later recalled
women pulling each other’s hair in physical fights during mid-conference debates; in more
prosaic opposition, the Mexico City WCOW’s concluding documents contained multiple tenets
with which American women were uncomfortable while both they and their foreign counterparts
viewed resolutions about some issues, like Zionism, as referendums on American foreign
policy.76
Neither of the two major branches of debate was compatible with SF ideals. The SF
defended capitalism and industrialization, unlike the Soviet bloc. The Western European side did
desire increased labor and economic rights for women, but also advocated democracy and
broader roles for women in civic life than the SF supported. Moreover, in siding with the
“Western European” nations, which Salinas did by identifying them as the only nations who had
ideas worth entertaining, the SF chose the ‘losing’ side of the WCOW debate: as Ghodsee
shows, the Western feminist perspective was roundly criticized during the first three WCOW and
instead it was the Soviet ideologies which dominated for the next decade after the Mexico City
WCOW. Spanish feminists, not the SF, were in line with those ideologies and demands.
The Spanish delegation further distinguished itself by the lack of any objection among its
membership to the inclusion of male delegates within their ranks. While feminist delegates from
other nations resented the inclusion of men in their delegations, the Spanish contingent did not.
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Spain’s explicit inclusion of men in its delegation and debates was a clear statement about the
role they felt men ought to play in the process of determining women’s rights, as opposed to the
veiled role that men played in other delegations that declared their intentions to promote
women’s involvement while simultaneously pushing women and their opinions into the margins.
Though women comprised 73% of the 2,000 WCOW delegates and headed 113 of 133 attending
nations’ delegations, many women nevertheless felt they struggled to make meaningful
contributions to the conference agenda.77 Arvonne Fraser recalled:
Unnoticed by the media was the solidarity among women in recognizing discrimination even
across lines of intense political disparities. Males headed virtually every government
delegation, even in the preparatory conferences. Interested primarily in the political issues
and protecting their country’s point of view, they left their chairs to female delegation
members unless a political issue was on the agenda; then the blue suits, white shirts, and ties
would emerge en masse into the meeting hall. Women would turn around and look at each
other knowingly as they relinquished their seats. Finally, in one preparatory meeting when
the men emerged from the outer hall, a swell of spontaneous laughter greeted them. By 1985,
many women led delegations and the political officers were more discreet.78
Though Fraser’s numbers are inaccurate – women, in fact, headed the majority of government
delegations – her anecdote nevertheless points to the feelings of irrelevancy some women felt
even at a conference specifically for women, as well as to the significant role that men continued
to play even in ostensibly women’s politics. Fraser herself noted the phenomenon of “male
delegates who thought the whole idea of a world women’s conference was unnecessary.”79
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Fraser was not the only delegate to feel this way. As Ghodsee notes, both the Soviet and the
American delegations remained “under the firm control of male politicians back home,” with
American delegates forbidden to even informally engage Soviet women in conversation.80
More anomalous still was the SF’s repudiation of NGOs and radical feminist politics.
Other delegations were willing to at least entertain radical feminist ideas, communicated most
often to official WCOW delegates by unaffiliated activists in Mexico City for the NGO Tribune;
the SF eschewed them. In her post-WCOW remarks, Carmen Salinas in fact blamed NGOs for
the radicalism of the WCOW and asserted that the conference’s ineffectual conclusion was at
least in part due to the presence of NGOs and their accompanying NGO Tribune:
The problem stems from the clearly extremist position that some women’s organizations
have adopted. This is the case with the “free tribunal”, an assembly formed in parallel to
the Conference, and which more than 3000 delegates attended. At this free tribunal,
highly daring topics were discussed, subjects that have nothing to do with the serious
matters considered at the International Conference. I cannot speak to those topics
[discussed at the Free Tribunal], as I did not attend any of the sessions and I am nearly
certain that no members of the Spanish Delegation [to the International Conference] did
either.81
This rejection of both NGOs and the new, feminist, wave of women’s politics their
representatives championed put the SF firmly outside newly developing lobbying methods for
international women’s rights policy.
The SF also represented a model of conservative female activism increasingly out of
touch with even other Western groups that self-identified as conservative. The SF was
comfortable with UN involvement and with formal international women’s networks, whereas

80
81

Ghodsee, “Revisiting the United Nations Decade for Women,” 5.

Isabel Perez, “Año Internacional de la Mujer: Regreso la representacion española en la
conferencia de mejico,” ABC (Madrid), July 5, 1975,
http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/abc/1975/07/05/046.html.

81
conservative women elsewhere expressed concern about global politics crowding out individual
choice and the sovereignty of national democratic governments. For example, the IWY and
WCOW coincided with the controversial Equal Rights Amendment ratification process in the
United States that propelled conservative women like Phyllis Schlafly, who spoke out against
ratifying the amendment, to prominence. Schlafly and her supporters denounced the IWY and
WCOW as UN attempts “to institute one-world government”; they also argued that President
Jimmy Carter’s establishment of a corresponding US-sponsored International Women’s Year and
subsequent American women’s conference in 1977 was a “federally-funded effort to rally
support for the ERA” and that it was “a front for radicals and lesbians.”82
On the fringe and bereft of a bully pulpit from which to tout the strengths of Francoist
gender ideology and the opportunities that Franco’s Spain afforded women, Sección Femenina
struggled to assert their ideas in the WCOW. The structure of the published conference summary
is such that contributions of individual delegates and nations to phrasing of drafts are difficult to
trace, but the record does reveal which delegations participated in which drafting processes and
how delegations voted on proposed resolutions.83 This record shows that the Spanish delegation
contributed to just two resolutions. One stressing the importance of “education, vocational
training, employment and housing” for women in “developing countries” and “in rural and lowincome urban areas.”84 They also helped shape resolution 17, “The Family,” which stated that
“the family is the primary and fundamental nucleus of society” and recommended ways in which
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the state could protect the family unit.85 Beyond this, the Spanish delegation abstained from
every vote but one.86
Notwithstanding their experience at the WCOW, the Sección Femenina’s faith in Spain’s
exceptionalism remained unshaken: after the conference, SF leaders criticized other nations in
attendance and reported back that they had been correct to feel so exceptional. Yet coupled with
this sense of vindication was a deep dissatisfaction with the WCOW, its conclusions, and its
organization. One key point of dissatisfaction was that the WCOW offered the SF less
opportunity for outreach and solidarity than its leaders had expected. In a January 1976 postWCOW retrospective for Teresa, Carola Ribed, secretary of the Commission, contrasted the
WCOW experience with the SF experience of prior conferences. Members of the SF leadership
team had served on the Spanish National Commission of the IWY and attended multiple
international conferences in the period between the Congreso and the WCOW, and Ribed
recounted that she and other SF members had, for example, attended conferences in Ottawa,
Paris, Brussels, and Bonn. She reported that each of them had “been very interesting seminars,”
and that at her favorite, Ottawa, “countries attended to engage in an exchange [?? likely “of’]
projects and come into contact [with one another] ... it became clear that there was a need to
create government organizations in the various nations specifically dedicated to dealing with
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women’s issues.”87 Though Ribed seemed hesitant to provide explicit critique of the WCOW, the
implication was that the WCOW had not represented a similar opportunity for the exchange of
ideas.
SF leaders also felt that the WCOW failed to adequately address women’s real problems.
Salinas, for example, criticized the WCOW as a farce “politicized” by national delegations
ultimately less interested in working together on women’s rights issues than on forcing their
agendas on the assembled multitudes. Kristin Ghodsee’s work explains the dynamic between US
and Soviet women that shadowed the conference; Arvonne Fraser noted those key conflicts in
her recollections; Spanish delegates represented themselves as caught between warring factions.
Salinas expressed particular frustration at the “interventions” of developing nations, which “used
[the conference] to attack…the issues of colonialism, neocolonialism, occupied territories,
‘apartheid’, etc.” The nations included the “black countries [who]…intervened extensively
and…lashed out against industrialized countries” as well as “Arab women [who] spoke in their
own language, with no means of translating them and, even more, using a really unacceptable
tone.” The division was so all-encompassing, she noted, that “the mere mention of a Third World
country, like Chile, started an endless amount of applause.” Only “the interventions of the more
developed countries - the United States, France, Holland, England – that is to say, almost all of
Western Europe” passed Salinas’ muster; other delegations’ contributions crowded out
opportunity to talk about women’s “true social, cultural, and economic problems” to the point
where the WCOW accomplished, in Salinas’ eyes, little of consequence.88
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Salinas hewed to Spain’s exceptionalism while painting her nation as sharing Western
Europe’s cultural values, but in actuality Spain’s emerging feminists more closely aligned with
the new international paradigm on display during the IWY and at the WCOW than did the SF or
the Spanish WCOW delegation. And while these feminists did not participate directly in the
UN’s WCOW they did engage with it. Spanish women of varying radical affiliations organized
their own feminist conferences to coincide with the IWY and sent out press releases exploring
the implications of the WCOW and responding to the UN’s goals. The Organizaciones de
Mujeres de Madrid (OMM), for example, laid out a specific program – with categories roughly
corresponding both to the IWY development goals and to the Congreso’s categories of
discussion – to improve Spanish women’s lives. They deplored Spain’s backwardness, stating
that “Spain [was] one of the most backward nations in Europe,” and proposed changes to bring
Spain on par with Western Europe.89
On the other hand, the Asamblea de Mujeres de Barcelona (AMB) only halfheartedly
welcomed UN support in publicizing women's problems and fighting their oppression. They
interpreted the WCOW as “paternalistic” and denounced the Spanish delegation for buying into
both the UN’s paternalism and Spain’s own: the SF members were, the organization argued,
“appointed by decree” and were not truly representative of Spain because they made up only a
specific sector of the population. In addition to critiquing the Franco regime and the conservative
Sección Femenina, AMB implied that the UN WCOW similarly allowed only a narrow group of
women to share their experiences and participate in the negotiations. Yet, like the
Organizaciones de Mujeres de Madrid , the women at the Asamblea de Mujeres de Barcelona
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used the WCOW as an opportunity to promote their own agenda and propose changes that they
felt could address the real challenges women faced.90
Lastly, the Movimento Democrático de Mujeres, affiliated with the CCOO, agreed with
OMM that “the UN initiative to promote the International Women’s Year is a positive measure,
inasmuch as it has pushed women in all countries to take note of the discrimination to which they
are subjected. We celebrate it as a measure that promotes women's movements that we believe
have the duty to be the firmest and consequential defenders of the fight against discrimination.”
But they also agreed with the Barcelona Asamblea’s prediction that the International Women’s
Year could have no effect on Spanish women’s lives:
[I]n our country the official celebration of the IWY is not having the least impact among
the female masses, due to the fascist nature of the organizations to which the Government
has entrusted the organization of the IWY in Spain, [organizations] that have done
nothing more than try to keep women in the passive and isolated role assigned to them for
all these years by the Dictatorship, and because of this the immense majority of women
have confirmed that they can expect nothing from the current political regime – to the
contrary, it is a reality that women themselves, despite the political and every other kind
of repression [they face], are establishing their own popular and democratic
organizations.
The simple fact, they argued, was that “the fascist dictatorship and liberation of women are
incompatible and we reaffirm the conviction that the struggle against fascism, objectively, is a
feminist struggle.” In this regard, the MDM felt that the struggle against Spain’s fascist dictator
was a more important step than to work with the UN for increased protections for women’s
rights.91
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The SF remained on the margins and failed to meet its objectives during the WCOW, but
the increased international attention to the issue of women’s rights garnered during the IWY and
the WCOW conversely gave Spanish feminists opportunities to create the kinds of solidarity that
the SF sought. If the SF was out of touch with the dominant international consensus on how to
work toward women’s rights, and with growing conservative movements in other nations,
Spanish feminists resembled their counterparts abroad who had mixed opinions about the
conference but nevertheless tried to imagine ways it could improve women’s lives. Yet for all
that Spanish feminists were now in a position to speak, critiques of the IWY and international
policy by emergent grassroots organizations heralded a new struggle on the horizon, one Spanish
women had been fighting domestically and would now begin fighting abroad.

Conclusion
The latter half of the 20th century witnessed sharp shifts both in the rhetoric of international
women’s rights politics and in the strategies for gaining those rights. Understanding the role of
Sección Femenina, and consequences it had for emergent Spanish feminist organizations,
requires placing the policies each promoted in this international context. Despite the arguments
of contemporary feminists and post-transition scholars focused on domestic affairs within Spain,
the Sección Femenina was not a conservative outlier in women’s politics of the mid-20th century.
The economic and labor policies for women that its leaders promoted throughout the late 1950s
and early 1960s – and which the Franco regime passed at their behest – were in fact in line with
what international bodies advocated. At this time, these activists saw women’s rights as centered
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primarily around economic equality, labor rights, and political rights. To this end they worked to
establish legal frameworks, not only within international law, but in individual nations’ federal
legal policies, through which women could claim their rights. Few groups, and then only on the
leftist fringe, advocated anything else at mid-century, and so the dominant way of politicking for
women’s rights happened through calls for legislative change and for female equality in the
workplace. To Sección Femenina, these ideas paired well with the traditional Spanish model of
femininity, in which women focused on domesticity and family life.
The Sección Femenina’s announcement of its Congreso and its international ambitions
coincided with the shift in women’s rights politics that left their policies and political approaches
out of favor, though the shift did not become evident for another few years. Carmen Salinas’
comments at the IWY show that SF leaders portrayed the Congreso as a great success for
Spanish and international women’s rights policy discussions even into the mid-1970s.92 Still,
Sección Femenina had struggled at the Congreso – it struggled to navigate some participants’
support for policies antithetical to fascism, it struggled with the emergence of feminist networks
denouncing the conference specifically, and it struggled to recapture the attention of Spanish
women who comprised its potential membership base.
These struggles came to a head at the WCOW. SF participants went to the UN
conference hoping or expecting to be lauded for their work and, upon finding that they were not,
realized that the changes that were taking place in global women's politics were beyond them.
The growing women's movement had, by the time of the UN conference, left them behind.
Grassroots and radical feminisms’ influence on the conference agenda left Sección Femenina
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with nothing substantive to negotiate. The transition in international women’s politics moved the
SF from mainstream to far right and thus made the organization irrelevant. That Franco died
shortly thereafter completed the organization’s fall from international and domestic power and
paved the way for Spanish feminists to come out of hiding.
The divide between the Sección Femenina and its domestic as well as foreign detractors,
then, provides a lens through which to examine the culture of Spain in a moment of politicalidentitarian transition. By understanding how Sección Femenina’s policies reflected international
trends in tackling women’s rights, as well as how women like those in Sección Femenina
interacted with their peers across the globe, we can better understand the ebbs and flows of
international feminist activism throughout the mid-century. Moreover, the domestic narrative in
which we can place Sección Femenina is significant on its own, but its intersection with broader
international activist networks helps us explore how Spaniards debated and reconstructed their
political and cultural environments as Francoism waned. Moreover, it allows us to better
understand Spain’s relation to and participation in the vibrant global politics of women’s rights
and the international negotiations to define modernity and progress.
Spanish feminism flourished in this international moment. Its emergence, and Sección
Femenina’s dissolution in April 1977 as part of the transition government’s dismantling of
Franco’s National Movement in advance of Constitutional negotiations, changed the landscape
of Spain’s female political activism. With that said, even as feminism overtook conservative
women’s activism, National-Catholicism’s impact lingered and permeated political debates about
the shape of the nation’s post-Franco governance.
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CHAPTER TWO
“What we want is for each woman to be her own protagonist”1:
Re-examining the Feminist “Triumphs” of Transition-Era Spain
From shortly after Franco’s death in November 1975 through the ratification of Spain’s
Constitution in December 1978, feminist magazine Vindicación Feminista ran a column called
“Women in the World” to educate Spanish women about the feminist movement both around the
globe and in Spain. Writers Paloma Saavedra and Regina Bayo stated their mission as “reporting
on existing [women’s] groups, their lines of actions and programs,” and envisioned the column
as a “public forum for all groups who fight for the liberation of women.” In July 1976, Saavedra
and Bayo dedicated the majority of their inaugural column to cataloguing contemporary
organizations advocating women’s rights in Spain, which they subdivided into “Los Partidos,”
official political parties, and “Los Independientes,” stand-alone feminist organizations with no
formal political ties.2
The political parties profiled included the Workers’ Party of Spain, the Communist
League, the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), the General Union of Workers, and the Popular
Union of Women from the Patriotic and Anti-Fascist Revolutionary (FRAP-UPM) – in other
words, the radical communist and socialist parties that readers would have expected to support
anti-fascist activism and, at a minimum, favor equality. The list also included one glaringly
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anomalous addition: the Carlist Party, founded as a result of a dynastic dispute in the 18th
century. Of it, Saavedra and Bayo wrote:
[The Carlist Party] aims to end alienation by means of struggle. Women’s incorporation
into a social and political struggle for progress represents for them a recovery of two
dimensions of their identities: their place in their communities as well as in worldly
affairs. At this time, women's participation in the struggle is necessary for ending it, and
women’s response to the system['s dysfunctions] is already global/comprehensive in
scope.3
Contemporary readers could have been forgiven for being confused by this summary. The Carlist
Party was, and had long been, politically, socially, and culturally conservative, with roots in
Catholic theology and strict gender roles. Indeed, the Carlist party was founded on
discrimination against women: it formed when the dying King Ferdinand VII decreed in 1830
that his female first-born child, who became Queen Isabella II, would ascend to the throne in
instead of her cousin, Carlos. Carlists refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Isabella II’s rule
and, to this day, insist on recognizing only a line of succession that follows Carlos and his male
heirs. During the Spanish Civil War the Carlists fought for the Nationalist side, if grudgingly
because they supported a monarchy, and though they often disagreed with policies set by
Franco’s regime and despised its Falangist elements, Carlists nevertheless participated in
Francoist administration. In sum, both because of its founding mission of enforcing sex
discrimination via Salic Law and its long-standing complicity with the Franco regime’s
oppression, the Carlist Party seemed at odds with everything the women’s rights movement of
the 1970s stood for.4

3
4

Saavedra and Bayo, Mujeres del Mundo, 53.

José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds., Spanish History since 1808 (London:
Hodder Arnold, 2000) and Payne, Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977. For the Carlists’ ties to the
Catholic church and further information about the party’s ideologies, see: William J. Callahan,

91
Yet Carlists were far from the only unexpected champions of women’s rights in the
transition period. When Vindicación Feminista published its first issue the combination of
Spanish feminism’s emergence from the shadows and the international attention that both the
global women’s rights movement and Spain’s political instability had attracted meant that
appeals for female equality were becoming a powerful form of political currency. There also
seemed to be consensus among Spaniards and among international observers that guaranteeing
some measure of women’s rights was a hallmark of democracies. As Juan Carlos’ political
machinations made liberalization – and particularly democratization – more certain even amidst
criticism from public figures both on the left and right of the political spectrum, politicians of all
political affiliations found themselves obliged to champion women’s rights in order to
demonstrate their commitment to the new Spain, and negotiating what these undefined rights
were became key to negotiating the exact form of the new democracy in Spain. Defining the
democracy meant defining women’s rights as well, and each were hotly contested, especially as
the contestation occurred under the lingering shadow of Francoism. Spaniards pondered how
many women’s rights could be guaranteed simply by stripping away remnants of NationalCatholicism, whether it was possible or desirable to fully strip those remanants away, and if it
could even be accomplished without alienating Francoist sympathizers still in government who
might stage a coup to protect Franco’s legacy. The results of these debates also had significant
international consequences: Spain’s politicians undertook their political negotiations before a
Spanish citizenry hoping to move beyond Francoism, as well as in front of a European audience
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demanding Spain’s turn toward liberal democracy, including a guarantee of women’s equality, in
exchange for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC).5
Though feminism by virtue of its visibility across Western Europe seems to have
contributed to these perceptions of an immutable tie between democracy and guarantees of
women’s rights, in Spain negotiations about what those rights should actually comprise took
place both as the nation’s politicians and general public denounced feminism, and as feminists
themselves struggled to access sites of political power. Spanish feminists’ great domestic
political dilemma in the transition period was two-fold: first, activists sought consensus for a
general feminist platform from groups of women who could not agree on whether to identify as
feminist, what it meant to be feminist, or how far women’s rights ought to extend. Secondly,
feminists attempted to build relationships with the electorate and foster dialogue with politicians
and major political parties about the extent to which Spain’s as-yet-undefined democracy ought
to encompass a coherent vision of female equality.
In the transition era, at least, feminists failed on both counts. As feminists’ different
reactions to the WCOW in Chapter One foreshadowed, internal strife led to stark breaks within
the feminist movement in even its earliest iterations as activists devoted to conflicting strategies
for gaining women’s rights fought instead of finding common ground. Feminist challenges to the
vision of women’s rights proposed by Sección Femenina in the late Franco years were not part of
this picture, given that the SF was unwilling to cooperate with feminists and also was disbanded
in 1977 as part of the official dismantling of Franco’s National Movement; some non-SF
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conservative women, however, did pose an organizational challenge for early feminist leaders
when they expressed willingness to work alongside feminists but only as long as their shared
groups did not call themselves feminist.6
More consequential, this chapter argues, were disputes between double militant feminists
who wanted to prioritize support for Juan Carlos’ proposed democratic structure and work for
increased women’s rights from within the new government, and single militant feminists who
rejected the proposed democracy for its continued ties to Francoism and wanted the burgeoning
movement to make feminist activism its priority no matter the nation’s form of governance. In
general, double militants participated in Spain’s governance as politicians, as administrators, and
as staffers in bureaucratic divisions while single militants remained independent from
government and instead worked through grassroots political channels. The demands of both
camps remained frustratingly vague and lacking in specifics, though single militants generally
proposed policy and courses of action that Spaniards deemed “radical,” most of which hinged on
the core assertion that the Spanish democracy was too close in structure to Franco’s own
government, and that its inability to provide a radical break with Francoist politicians and
National-Catholicism meant that it was complicit in the perpetuation of systemic discrimination
carried out during the Franco regime. Double militants voiced some similar concerns, but to a
smaller degree; they clearly supported the Spanish democracy and perceived it to have fewer
flaws than did single militants. These differences between double and single militants always
existed but, as this chapter shows, were intially small stumbling blocks until the Partido
Socialista Obrera Español’s (PSOE) establishment of the Instituto de la Mujer in 1983.
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Moreover despite feminists’ desire to transcend being “only a vote”7 during the political
wrangling of the transition, even double militants were, politically speaking, only a vote
throughout the late 1970s and through the mid-1980s. Women made up a paltry percentage of
Cortes representatives throughout the transition era and beyond, and even left-leaning political
parties like the PSOE rejected female members’ requests to increase the number of female
representatives on the party’s slate of candidates for office.8 Feminists, both single and double
militant, equally lacked a voice in the shape and content of major pieces of transition-era
legislation. The Moncloa Pacts (an agreement between Spain’s political parties regarding how
the economy would be managed during the post-Franco transition), the Constitution itself, and
the (partial) legalization of abortion all contained some policy for which feminists had fought
(for instance, the Moncloa Pacts included a provision for contraception), but feminists did not
contribute to these policies’ development or have a voice in negotiations over how best to realize
their demands. We also see the lie of the triumphalist narrative in feminists’ own understanding
of what these legislative changes meant for them and for Spanish women more generally.
Feminists of all ideological affiliations did not feel that these ostensibly feminist legislative
changes met their needs or fulfilled their demands. Instead of celebrating these pieces of
legislation, feminist activists claimed they were mere salves for Spain’s real sickness: the
underlying patriarchal constructions of government and society that perpetuated female
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oppression.
For these reasons, despite contemporary feminists’ and scholars’ assertions that feminist
organizations’ growing memberships, influence on public opinion, increased number of positions
in government, and ability to attract domestic and international media coverage made their
movement powerful, I argue that this power was merely an appearance and did not translate into
the ability to shape legislative proposals or the new government’s final form.9 Indeed, rather than
agreeing that policies of the post-Franco era demonstrate the triumph of feminist ideals in Spain,
as Celia Valiene has asserted,10 this chapter instead builds on existing scholarship showing that
male politicians found advancing some women’s rights – equality of the sexes in the Constitution
among them – to be politically expedient because it demonstrated a willingness to embrace
Western European norms and particularly Western European conceptions of democracy.11
I expand this argument to also assert that, seemingly paradoxically, even as male
politicians found feminism a useful tool, feminism itself had no political leverage. Not only did
feminists struggle to find consensus between ideological factions within their movement and
struggle to gain access to the political arena as politicians and parliamentary delegates, male
politicians silenced and marginalized those double militant feminists who did become their
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colleagues. They did this while also misrepresenting feminists’ positions and demands and
advocating instead for watered-down versions of feminist demands that had little-to-no-basis in
what feminists, single or double militant, actually wanted. Thus what scholars have perceived to
be two major feminist political victories of the transition era – the equal citizenship clause in the
1978 Constitution and the legalization of abortion in 1985 – were neither feminist nor feministdriven.

Post-Franco Feminism
For many Spanish women, advances secured by Sección Femenina, the Francoist women’s
organization, were neither advances nor secure. As Chapter One shows, feminist organizations
took umbrage with the legislative changes promoted by Pilar Primo de Rivera and her
colleagues, as well as with the goals of the SF’s Congreso, the hallmarks of what the Sección
Femenina called progress. Even before Franco’s death, grassroots feminists gathered
clandestinely to contest the SF narrative that life was improving for Spanish women and to
advocate for what they considered real reform. Activism heightened in the years following
Franco’s death as the feminist movement sought a public presence in Spanish political life.
Women founded new feminist groups and joined women’s wings of political parties, and the
international and domestic press, eager to cover the upheaval in post-Franco Spain, catalogued
events that activists organized to condemn Francoist policy and foster feminist solidarity.
Yet feminists, despite the appearance of strength, lacked centralized organizational
structures and a coherent voice. They struggled to attract members and grow formal networks in
comparison with other political organizations – even in comparison with other women’s
organizations existing at the time, which included the Sección Femenina (until 1977) and
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housewives’ associations, both of which were rooted in Francoism and promoted the regime’s
policies. Pamela Radcliff’s study of Spanish housewives’ association, for example, estimates that
many of these organizations had membership in the thousands in the mid-1970s. The Barcelona
branch, the largest association, boasted 12,000 members. Others had memberships ranging from
150 to 3,657 women during a period in which membership in such associations was on the rise.12
The Sección Femenina also had a hefty roster. Kathleen Richmond estimated the number of
mandos – SF staff and organizational hierarchy – to have been 15,000 in 1968, a number that did
not include the many more women who comprised the organization’s membership.13
Feminism had a smaller draw. “Dissident” housewives associations formed by radicals in
the MDM to further feminist aims had fewer members than did legally sanctioned associations,
even after the transition when such dissident associations became legal and more widespread –
the Barcelona wing only counted 2,000 at its high point in 1979.14 Attendance numbers for
conferences and marches also provide points of comparison. The SF held national congresses
each year until 1974, and though meeting minutes do not contain statistics on attendance, the
organization nevertheless had a large enough attendance to sustain such meetings annually for
several decades.15 Looking at statistics for the Internacional de la Mujer also highlights the draw
of SF-sponsored events. The conference report lists 885 presenters, a total that did not include SF
leadership like Pilar Primo de Rivera, the invited male “experts,” or non-presenters in the crowd.
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In addition to its international attendees, it also drew Spanish women from over 50 organizations
and from 42 of the nation’s 50 provinces.16 In contrast, the First Conference for Women’s
Liberation, held in Madrid in December 1975, drew only 500 feminists from 15 organizations,
representing only a third of the nation’s provinces.17
Moreover, membership in feminist organizations was divided across dozens of smaller
organizations not subject to centralized leadership. The diversity of feminist organizations and
perspectives was apparent to outsiders as well as to feminists themselves. Historian Pamela
Radcliff cites a Catalan journalist’s description that “atomisation was the first impression one got
[of the feminist movement],” and that referred as well to the publishing of “periodic
‘dictionaries’...to distinguish between a variety of groups” with confusing acronyms and unclear
alliances.18 Feminists also, especially after the legalization of political parties in July 1976, faced
competition from other political organizations, including those founded by long-exiled
communists, socialists, labor activists, and other left-wing groups, hoping to capitalize on
Franco’s death by pushing for the adoption of radical liberalization in Spain. Anny Brooksbank
Jones, for example, has estimated that over 300 political parties participated in the 1977
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elections.19 In contrast, the housewives associations’ and SF’s larger membership numbers
occurred in a context of little to no political or ideological competition.
Looking at cultural impact offers another comparative lens. The Sección Femenina, as
Richmond shows, measured its impact less by membership numbers and more by “the fact that
SF’s moral and cultural standards were embedded in colleges, institutes and university
residences throughout Spain.”20 In practice, this included scenarios such as “a government-run
nursing school that hired SF teachers on staff to teach political, domestic and physical education
classes.”21 Even once the SF disbanded, the gender and moral order it had fostered retained its
impact on Spanish cultural consciousness and imbricated social structures.
Feminists relied on demonstrations and feminist-produced print media to attract members
and sway the public. The SF did have a series of magazines, Y, published from 1938-1946,
Medina, published weekly from 1941-45, and Teresa, published monthly from 1954-77, but
these catered to existing members and reinforced messages that Spaniards implicitly understood
and ostensibly bought into. The SF had other methods of attracting members, not least of which
was withholding social and cultural benefits from those who refused to participate in its
programs. Feminists, unlike the SF, lacked the complicity of the Spanish state and so magazines
were one of their few tools for articulating the nuances of their message and disseminating it
widely. They had markedly less success than the SF. Major feminist periodicals like Vindicación
Feminista and dones en lluita had comparatively prolific runs of three to four years, but more
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typical were smaller magazines like Opción that lingered for a handful of issues before folding
due to financial pressure. Indeed, feminist magazines sold so poorly on public newsstands that
even sympathetic vendors refused to stock them.22
Some of the reason for low sales may have been the magazines’ expense. Other women’s
magazines like Telva cost 35 pesetas (Ptas),23 and general interest magazines like Interviu or
¡Hola! cost 45 or 25 Ptas.24 Feminists’ direct competitor, the Sección Femenina’s Teresa, cost 25
Ptas through 1975.25 Yet Vindicación Feminista and Opción cost 80 Ptas, almost three times as
much.26 Feminist editorial boards could not maintain circulation to keep their magazines solvent,
but could not stay solvent because they could not maintain circulation. Magazine editors asked
women to use personal connections to sell copies, sold through feminist organizations that
bought and distributed copies for members, set up kiosks on street corners to make sales, and
canvassed for subscribers – the only ways they could sell, when newsstands declined to stock
them. Even though middle and upper class feminists comprised the majority of these editorial
boards, few women had access to financial resources that could help a magazine in its infancy
stay afloat. Vindicación Feminista was the exception; its longevity was in large part due to
prominent feminist Lidia Falcón’s ability to bankroll the publication with her personal savings.27
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Even less expensive feminist publications experienced financial strain. dones en lluita,
which began circulation in January 1978 with a 20 Pta cost, raised its price to 50 Ptas by the time
of its combined March/April 1979 issue. Its editorial board addressed rising prices in the January
1979 issue, which began with a summary of the magazine’s subscription plans, then laid bare its
dire financial situation and implored readers to buy in. This was not a gentle plea. Editors berated
their readership for not buying or selling enough copies to sustain the magazine:
This is the tenth issue of the Bulletin... During this time we have experimented. We are in
search of a magazine that is a strong, true spokeswoman of the feminist movement and
which would interest women in general at the same time.
What means have we during all this time? And what is the support we have received?
Little, very little. In the majority of cases we had to chase people to deliver items on time.
The majority of vocalías and groups are limited to receiving 5 or 10 bulletins, many are
slow to pay or don’t pay. They seem to forget that the idea of creating a newsletter was
not ours, but the Assembly’s, and we do not do anything other than execute an agreement
of the Assembly every time a new bulletin comes out. Why then is there no way to find
women to assume its distribution? We do not understand why “Dones en Lluita” was
created, if we do not fight to be read by as many women as possible.
The situation in these moments is practically unsustainable. Almost half of the costs of an
edition of “Dones en Lluita” are fixed. This means we have to pay as much to make one
copy as we do to print 20,000 copies. Right now we print 2,000 copies, of which 25%
remain unsold each month. How can we propose, in these conditions, to increase the
number of pages or increase the quality? This would mean an overwhelming increase of
fixed costs, and naturally implies a significant increase in the sales price.
There is only one alternative. We sell “Dones en Lluita” everywhere and immediately
begin an aggressive subscription campaign so we can increase sales, or it dies in our
hands and we are left without an instrument of importance. DO WE, OR DON’T WE,
ASSUME THE BURDEN OF DISTRIBUTING THE BULLETIN? DISTRIBUTING
THE BULLETIN IS A TASK OF MILITANT FEMINISTS!28
This tactic seems to have been ineffective. In 1981 dones en lluita’s editors called a hiatus to
evaluate the magazine’s revenues, which as of December 1980 totaled over 12,000 Ptas in losses.
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A few months later dones en lluita returned with quarterly issues costing 150 Ptas but published
only eight more issues before folding in March of 1983.29 Like other periodicals of its time,
dones en lluita had a limited readership and, it seems, a readership that consisted of women
already involved with the feminist movement or inclined to empathize with feminists’ cause. It
failed to connect with a broad audience that could engage with feminism through journalism.
International and domestic newspapers unintentionally filled the gap left by magazines
like dones en lluita by amplifying feminist voices, though feminists had little control over the
exposure they received. International journalists offered the most sympathetic coverage. They
placed Spain’s emerging feminist movement in context of what they portrayed as a righteous
global feminist movement pushing democratic nations to be better versions of themselves. In
these stories, journalists depicted nations that adopted women’s rights legislation as beacons of
progressivism. Articles often compared Spanish feminists to their counterparts in other nations,
with the implication that Spain lagged behind the rest of the Western world. Italy was one
common point of reference, as feminists there battled the Catholic Church’s influence and won
abortion rights in 1978. Onlookers wondered what that victory might portend for women’s rights
in Spain. The United States offered another reference point, especially as Betty Friedan’s
National Organization of Women gained prominence and the feminist movement radicalized.
Spain’s domestic media portrayed feminists in a more negative light. Even leftists –
“authors of defamatory libels” – participated in what Lidia Falcón in a January 1977 Vindicación
Feminista column called “the offensive against feminism.” According to Falcón, feminists had
suffered, and continued to suffer, “an exhaustive series of insults, disparaging descriptions, and
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aggressions [that had been] published in print,” which were all the more wearying because the
attacks did not come only from conservative opposition, but rather came from sources that
feminists would, under other circumstances, have considered allies.30 To the limited extent that
Spain’s journalists positively portrayed feminism, they echoed the international media’s claims
that the nation’s embrace of feminism would push it onto a progressive path and reinforce its
democratic trajectory. As Radcliff explained, the coverage was “not about women’s agency, but
about specific injustices that had to be corrected for Spain to join the world of modern
democracies…feminism was discussed in the context of Spain’s identity, not female
empowerment.”31
Spanish feminists struggled to attract and maintain membership and to disseminate
demands on their own terms; they also struggled because their movement’s ideological diversity
hindered organizations’ ability to build consensus. This picture of fractious feminists runs
counter to how historians have portrayed the movement in the transition era. Radcliff, for
example, argues that feminists reported experiencing their gatherings as productive,
empowering, and more-or-less unified, though Spanish media made much of the discord between
ideologically opposed feminist groups. Celia Valiente has asserted that political change was the
priority for the “majority of women’s rights groups.”32 Yet transition-era feminist media of all
kinds, ranging from published conference proceedings to magazines to pamphlets to internal
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communications of women’s wings of political parties, show that feminists felt themselves to be
irreconcilably divided over how, and even whether, to support Spain’s transition to democracy.
Divisions between activists were so profound that initially they struggled even for
consensus on embracing the label “feminist.” In the late Franco years Mujeres para Democracia
(MDM) worked to devise a women’s rights platform that members of both the Communist Party
and the Catholic Church (the two prongs of its membership) could support, and in 1971
concluded as a result that it could “not propose a separate women’s movement, but…[rather]
activities tied to other democratic sectors of the country that are fighting against the
dictatorship.”33 In 1975, participants in the First Conference for the Liberation of Women, held
in Barcelona, faced a similar dilemma. Though attendees negotiated a platform and a set of
demands, the published conference conclusions explained that there had been contentious debate
on a number of points and contained an addendum to the platform that housewives’ associations
and religious women’s organizations insisted on. This addendum consisted of a signed statement
noting that these groups disagreed with the platform delineated in the conference conclusions
and specifically objected to calling the women’s rights movement “feminist.” In their words, and
similar to the MDM’s decision four years prior, these activists “...support[ed] the conclusions but
not the distinction of ‘feminist’. [They] [a]dvocate[d] not creating a pre-feminist movement but
women’s awareness through extensive mass movements...”34 In both instances, religious and
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conservative women interested in women’s rights activism expressed that the emerging feminist
movement did not encompass their perspective or meet their needs.
Among self-identified feminists were still more problems. As with feminisms in other
nations, a chasm opened between those feminists who identified as “single militant” and those
who identified as “double militant.”35 Generally speaking, single militants argued that the only
answer to female oppression lay in a large-scale reconception of political, social, and gender
relationships. According to Basque feminist Begoña Ibarrola, who penned several first-hand
accounts of the Spanish feminist movement, single militants supported “militancy only for the
women’s movement.” This was in large part because single militants felt that discrimination
existed in all societies and forms of government, and so securing women’s rights necessitated
ensuring that cultures and social structures were, from their inception, constituted so as to place
women on equal footing with men. This could happen within a democracy or within another
form of government, provided it was not a dictatorship or a monarchy – single militants cared
only that the form of government, whatever it may be, guarantee equality to all and, especially,
to women. They were, one might say, singularly focused on gender. Double militants, on the
other hand, committed to “militancy in a leftist political party while in the feminist movement.”
They were, in other words, willing to work within an imperfect system for changes both to that
system and to policies buttressing women’s oppression.36
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Ideological discord was not exclusive to Spanish feminism, but it did impact Spain’s
feminists in unique ways. In Spain, single militants fought against the very fact of the
Constitution and the transition process. They believed that the new democracy was built atop the
foundations of Franco’s order, that it reproduced class divisions and patriarchal oppression, and
that it thus could not yield advances in women’s rights. Spain’s double militants, meanwhile,
accepted and even cheered the transition, planning to work within the democracy to secure
policy and legislative changes that would protect and enforce women’s rights. They placed
priority on refining the nation’s post-Franco democracy: for them, according to Ibarrola, “the
problem of women [was] secondary.”37 Resolving the nation’s democratic crisis had to happen
before women could be assured of their rights.
The approach that the Federation of Feminist Organizations of the Spanish State took
toward Constitutional deliberations in 1977 is indicative of how double militants worked. These
organizations rejected what they knew of the Constitution’s draft form because they felt it failed
to guarantee their rights, not because they believed democratic systems to be inherently tainted.
To this end, the group made clear that the right for women to participate in the elections was not
sufficient to meet their demands of equality: the organization adopted the slogan “We do not
want to be only a vote.”38 In addition, conference attendees devised a “feminist minimum” for
upcoming electoral campaigns. Their platform put adultery and adultery-related issues like
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custody, divorce, and division of marital property at the top of their list of demands. It then
demanded contraception, abortion, and educational programs designed to eliminate gender
discrimination. Rather than eschewing the Constitution entirely, these activists were willing to
work for a version of it and of the new government that they felt could meet their needs.
The fundamental incompatibility of single and double militant ideologies, in addition to
other ideologies working under the feminist umbrella, caused friction during events and in
organizations designed to present a unified feminist front. In May 1976, for example,
conservative women’s rights organizations attending the First Catalan Women’s Conference
withdrew because they objected to the conference’s goal of restructuring gender relationships in
Spain. In an opinion diametrically opposed to that of most of the conference’s other attendees,
these conservatives characterized the fight for women’s rights as the need to seek discrete
legislative solutions for the problems women faced.39 In other cases, feminist organizations with
diverse membership bases struggled to accommodate all of its members. ANCHE, a women’s
activist group, reported having just this problem in 1977 as a dispute over the organization’s
goals resulted in dissatisfied women leaving to form their own group.40
Despite the conflict, single and double militants found a sliver of common ground:
though they disagreed about whether having a democracy was desirable, they did agree that the
version of democracy promoted by Spanish officials in the late-1970s failed women. Their
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objections to the October 1977 Moncloa Pacts and, increasingly, to the 1978 Constitution
centered on their contention that politicians sought to pacify them but not to actually satisfy their
demands. The Moncloa Pacts represented the result of private negotiations between male
members of the nation’s liberal and conservative political parties. These men sought to boost
Spain’s struggling economy; they also sought to mollify activists agitating for social and cultural
change. Domestically, they hoped the Pacts’ provisions would stabilize Spain in advance of
Constitutional ratification. Internationally, they hoped to signal politicians’ liberalizing
intentions to European onlookers. This was the context in which the Moncloa Pacts included
seemingly feminist-approved policies – not only the decriminalization of contraception but also
the strengthening penalties for rapists – alongside economic reforms.41
Feminists chafed at Moncloa Pact reforms to varying degrees and their objections
temporarily, and tenuously, united single and double militants under one feminist umbrella. Both
single and double militants resented that politicians continued to ignore or deny their requests for
involvement and transparency, as well as for more structured efforts to combat discrimination
against women on a social and cultural level. That politicians neglected to consult feminists on
the Moncloa Pacts or on how best to meet their demands alienated even those feminist groups
inclined to sympathize with the transition government. Feminist Paloma Cruz Pepa-García
addressed this in an article for the left-leaning periodical Triunfo. Cruz acknowledged that
“[w]ithin the framework of the Moncloa Accords there are a series of positive aspects” which
included, in her opinion, “the disappearance of Article 416, which penalized the use, sale, and
advertising of birth control methods; creation of family planning centers within Seguridad
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Social; disappearance of the crimes of adultery and unmarried cohabitation; creation during 1978
of 200k free preschool spaces [presumably freeing mothers of young children to return to their
careers].” Yet she also assserted that the Moncloa Pacts were not feminist. “It is evident,” she
wrote, “that this is no feminist milestone; among other reasons, because the influence of different
women’s groups and movements have been pretty minimal within the Spanish state; rather [the
motivating factor has been] converging with European ways in these areas.” For Cruz, the
Moncloa Pacts could not be feminist because feminists had no voice in their creation and
because politicians crafting the Pacts’ “positive aspects” did so more for political purposes –
“converging with Europe” – rather than because they felt motivated to address women’s
concerns.42
Feminists also objected to the Moncloa Pacts because they feared that inclusion of
women’s rights legislation in that forum was politicians’ way of sidestepping the issue of
whether to include such provisions in the Constitution. Cruz in fact hinted at this concern in her
Triunfo article, noting that the next “task” for feminists after the Moncloa Pacts was for “feminist
groups [to] take on” reforms “that remain purely on paper,” meaning that the Moncloa reforms
were far from cemented either in transition era legislation or in social consciousness.43 Indeed,
feminists like Cruz argued that without subsequent inclusion in the Constitution, the Moncloa
Pact reforms would be toothless and subject to negation as political tides changed. As one
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double-militant dones en lluita columnist, who theoretically supported the transition to
democracy and the Constitution, explained:
With the agreements reached at the Moncloa Pact on adultery and contraception, the
UCD government has tried to give us something of what we requested, to make us
believe that we can collect our demands, and thus to more easily silence us; but we
women are not fooled, even as we admit that this is a positive step in achieving our
demands. The decriminalization of adultery and contraception is progress achieved
through the struggles of thousands of women across the country. But this conquest...is a
measure that has no value when not contained in the new democratic constitution...”44
Once it became clear that politicians would not introduce comprehensive women’s rights reforms
into the Constitution, leftists and feminists led the charge against it. As one OCE Bandera
pamphlet titled “Women, The Constitution is not for us, No to the Constitution” claimed, “the
Constitution institutionalize[d] woman’s oppression.”45

“The Constitution is made by men and for men”46
Spaniards, over activists’ objections, overwhelmingly approved the Constitution, with 91.81% of
voters casting votes in favor of ratification.47 Domestic and international observers lauded the
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result as a great progressive victory, and in some ways it was. The Constitution of 1978 was
Spain’s first since the Second Republic’s Constitution, which had lasted from 1931-1939, and it
accompanied a peaceful transition of power. Observers also found its equal citizenship clause
worthy of acclaim. International leaders lauded Spain’s new democratic structure, contemporary
feminists like PSOE delegate Carlota Bustelo pronounced it a triumph of feminist activism and
influence, and scholars have echoed those opinions, further asserting that the Constitution laid an
important foundation for future feminist advances.48 Scholars have embraced the vision of the
Constitution as a feminist triumph as well as reaching consensus that politicians negotiating the
Constitution did so in the attempt to win approval from Western Europe. In other words, scholars
have argued that both are true. However, contrary to this long-standing interpretation, and with
the combined help of this historiography and primary sources from contemporary Spaniards, I
argue that ratification of Spain’s new Constitution in December 1978 was not evidence of
feminism’s strength and that politicians’ embrace of feminism was motivated primarily by a
desire to win approval from Western Europe.
Despite feminism’s visibility in the mid-to-late 1970s, public perception of the movement
was mixed, at best. Even as the feminist movement garnered media attention and publicity for
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activists’ demands, the Spanish public mocked both feminism and feminists. Some of this came
from women unsympathetic to feminist demands, like lawyer Montserrat Amat Roca who in a
1976 letter to La Vanguardia Española argued that “the laws in [Spain were not] discriminatory
and slanted against women, but rather [recognized] that man and woman [were] simply different
and the law treats us correspondingly differently.” According to Amat Roca, feminists were,
moreover, not representative of all Spanish women:
As a result of all of these opinions voiced in favor of adultery and the public protests that
a series of women have made in the city streets, we might be left with the impression that
all women in Spain want the divorce law approved. If we stop to count the number of
households in which peace, love, and tranquility reign, however, we realize that reality is
very different, and that the majority of Spanish mothers don’t dedicate their time to
screaming in the streets but to caring for their families …49
Amat Roca dismissed feminists as shrieking harpies who neglected their domestic
responsibilities and were ungrateful for what she believed were the sufficient protections Spanish
law already afforded them.
Citizens opposed to feminism expressed this type of ire for the movement and its
participants throughout the transition period. Even in May 1978, as female equality seemed
widely accepted and the Constitution was actively debated, ABC ran an article by prominent
fascist journalist José Luis Calleja. Like Amat Roca two years prior, Calleja described a feminist
demonstration against adultery to argue that feminists’ demands for legal divorce were absurd: “I
am an adultress!”, one [picket sign] screamed. “I am an adultress!”, the next one seconded. “I am
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an adultress!” the last one confirmed...My God: they are adultresses and proud of it. Well then,
what do they want divorce for?”50
It was not just members of the Spanish public who rejected feminists and their demands.
Male politicians did so, too, by silencing and marginalizing their feminist colleagues. Openly
feminist politicians in particular suffered discrimination and saw their political reputations and
careers lag behind their male colleagues’. Carmen Diez de Rivera’s career is illustrative: Diez de
Rivera seemed heir to the kind of influence that Primo de Rivera wielded over legislative
negotiations at the height of the Sección Femenina.51 She became personal friends with Prince
Juan Carlos and his wife Sofia in the early 1970s and worked alongside Adolfo Suárez at
Radiotelevisión Española. When Juan Carlos appointed Suárez Minister-Secretary General of the
National Movement, Suárez named Diez de Rivera head of his cabinet and then promoted her to
Director of the Cabinet of the President of Spain upon his confirmation to the Presidency. As
Paul Preston noted, her responsibilities included helping negotiate the legalization of Spain’s
Communist Party in early 1977 and handling tricky domestic diplomatic affairs between warring
political parties in the early months of Suárez’s tenure.52 For her efforts, and for her aristocratic
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background, notable El País columnist Francisco Umbral dubbed her the “Muse of the
Transition.”53
But Diez de Rivera never acquired leverage on par with Primo de Rivera’s. She initially
faced opposition due to the simple fact of her gender. Shortly after Diez de Rivera took the
position in Juan Carlos’ cabinet, a Blanco y Negro columnist described the public’s negative
reaction to her ascent to power: “The first woman came to a position of responsibility in the new
government. And the commotion arose. And all for that, for being a woman.”54 In addition, Diez
de Rivera’s gender-bending traits as a jeans-wearing, beer-sipping policy wonk with expansive
knowledge and forceful personality made men in Spanish government uncomfortable. A Spanish
editor explained to an American journalist from Newsweek, “[Diez de Rivera’s] style rubbed
people around Suárez the wrong way. Imagine: a woman with power; a beautiful woman who
knows as much or more than they do, a woman who can influence the Premier and perhaps the
King, a woman who speaks her mind.”55 The SF’s formidable leader had coupled her women’s
rights policies with condemnation of feminism and a desire to lead women out from under its
thrall. That Diez de Rivera championed feminism from a similar position of influence was
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unacceptable, and doubly so because unlike under Franco, feminism stood a chance of
instigating change during the transition period. Being a woman was forgivable. Being a feminist
was not.
Diez de Rivera ultimately lost both her position and (temporarily) her professional
reputation in May 1977 when she “irked the men in government” by publically identifying as a
feminist and calling for the legalization of divorce, abortion, and free contraception, the latter of
which violated a ban on public expression of opinion about these issues.56 This was not just the
American perception of political events; while Diez de Rivera remained a prominent political
figure she never again wielded comparable political power, and after her death in 1999 Spanish
media looked back at what they considered her unfair treatment, describing it in similar terms as
the 1977 Newsweek article. One journalist’s retrospective in El Mundo for example, lauded both
her beauty and accomplishments, reminding readers that no subsequent woman had held a
government post on par with Chief of Staff, and detailing some of the discrimination Diez de
Rivera had experienced, including lewd sexual insults during diplomatic missions and
intimations that she got her position because she was the king’s lover.57
Women in the transition, especially in the wake of Diez de Rivera’s fall from grace,
lacked the benefit of a model and advocate like Pilar Primo de Rivera, who had enmeshed herself
in the regime and who thus had been able to champion reform. The dissolution of the Sección
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Femenina in 1977 further complicated women’s access to political negotiations. On the one
hand, the SF had represented only a subset of women’s interests. The lack of a women’s bureau
during the transition meant that women with diverse perspectives – and feminists certainly held a
diversity of perspectives – could in theory make them known in the Cortes. On the other hand,
the Sección Femenina, combined with the respect that Pilar Primo de Rivera herself commanded,
had given women a voice in even Franco’s political decision-making. And though women sat in
Cortes from 1977 onward, in the transition period there was no centralized, governmentaffiliated women’s group that could match the SF’s political stature. As a result, post-SF Spanish
women participated in government solely as elected members of Cortes or as appointed members
or staffers of government ministries, participation that resulted in the marginalization of feminist
views.
Neither was there an uptick in the number of female delegates in the Cortes that might
have compensated for the loss of the defunct SF’s political clout, and even those parties officially
championing women’s rights had few female delegates. Historians like Celia Valiente have
noted the lack of female representation in the new democracy’s early years, a situation that did
not improve until the PSOE instituted a gender quota system for its delegation in the 1990s.58 Of
the 598-member Constituent Cortes that met between 13 July 1977 and 2 January 1979, there
were only 27 female representatives, 25 of whom were elected and 2 of whom the King
appointed as some of his 41 Senate appointees. Women comprised 4.5% of the total members of

58

Celia Valiente, “The women’s movement, gender equality agencies and central-state
debates on political representation in Spain,” in State Feminism and Political Representation, ed.
Joni Lovenduski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 178.

117
Cortes or 6% of the Congress of Deputies and 2.4% of the Senate.59 In terms of party
representation, the Communist and socialist parties had the highest proportions of female
delegates, ranging between 6.5 and 13.6%; the Grupo Parlamentario de Unión de Centro
Democrático (GUCD), the centrist majority party, had the lowest at 4.1%.60 Women’s lack of
representation in Cortes translated directly into a lack of input in the Constitutional drafting
process. On 26 July 1977, a 36-member, all-male, Commission of Constitutional Affairs picked
seven male representatives from Spain’s major political parties to be the “fathers of the
Constitution.”61 They met over a series of months to draft the Constitution without oversight
from the press, the public, or their colleagues in Cortes; once the fathers completed the draft in
April 1978, the Commission of Constitutional Affairs debated and refined it. Only then did the
document come to Cortes for a vote.
The electorate bore limited responsibility for low numbers of female Cortes delegates.
Male politicians in control of political parties tightly controlled their parties’ political agendas
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and they were complicit in ensuring that there were few female politicians available for election.
In this environment feminist politicians’ demands took a back seat to larger party goals. Women
who could and did speak during Cortes debates were beholden first to their parties – which chose
who spoke during debate, and whose platforms may not have placed much emphasis on women’s
rights – and only then to their personal ideologies. Moreover, male party heads and delegates,
even ostensibly progressive ones, rejected their female colleagues’ requests for greater
representation. One member of Mujer y Socialismo, a feminist caucus within PSOE, recounted to
historian Monica Threlfall that she and her peers pushed the party to place more women in
political positions, urged the adoption of a quota system as early as 1979, and drafted a list of
potential female candidates for the PSOE to run in the 1979 election. PSOE leadership denied
these demands.62
Yet feminists found themselves in a strange position. Even as female Cortes delegates
strove for leverage and feminist organizations protested the Constitution’s exclusions, feminist
rhetoric when wielded by male politicians seemed powerful. Feminists bemoaned both the
powerlessness of female politicians and the fact that, for Spanish politicians, voicing solidarity
with the feminist movement’s goals seemed a political tactic and not a genuine ideological
position. As one columnist in the October 1978 issue of dones en lluita complained: “Feminism
is an exceedingly serious matter to become the laughingstock of the year...and it's sad that some
parties, moved by what I assume is a political tactic of the moment, and not because women
militating in them they have desired, have agreed to participate in the charade.”63
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Pro-feminist rhetoric found a positive reception in domestic media only when male
politicians spoke of their work to improve the new Spain and provide women with a new slate of
rights. As Pamela Radcliff has observed, “[f]eminism received positive press when it was
something done for women, not something done by them.”64 And indeed, male politicians’
support of the equality clause made it appear as if they embraced feminism. Yet they did so not
to improve women’s respresentation in politics or to satisfy feminist demands – the left-leaning
PSOE’s silencing of its women’s wing, and feminists’ steadfast contention that the Constitution
and other suposedly “feminist” legislation ignored their desires, among other things, show
otherwise – but rather in the hope of proving Spain’s liberalizing bona fides to international
onlookers and gaining Spain membership into the European Economic Community (EEC). In
this way, the very male politicians who had silenced and marginalized their female colleagues,
especially those pushing for feminist legislation and for greater representation in party politics as
did Carmen Diez de Rivera and the women of the PSOE’s Mujer y Socialismo caucus, wielded
and gave legitimacy to “feminist” rhetoric in the transition era while also reducing feminists
themselves and feminist causes to a joke or an afterthought.
For these reasons, though Carlota Bustelo called the Constitution a feminist triumph, she
was in the minority.65 The overwhelming feminist reaction from both single and double militant
feminists was to protest women’s lack of input in the Constitution. For Vindicación Feminista
columnist Lidia Falcón, one of the nation’s most prominent feminists, women’s exclusion from
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the drafting process meant that “the Constitution [was] made by men and for men.”66 But lack of
input was not the only flaw feminists identified. As Paloma Cruz Pepa-García’s article hinted
and a dones en lluita contributor explicitly stated, feminists also felt that the Constitution failed
to enshrine rights they had explcitly demanded. Feminists had, for instance, wanted the
Constitution to incorporate the Moncloa Pacts so as to provide a constitutional, and not just
legislative, guarantee of legal divorce, contraception, childcare support, and decriminalized
adultery. Without such clarity, the equality clause declaring “Spaniards...equal before the law
and [that they] may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex,
religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance” seemed troublingly
sparse; it provided no additional guidance for defining or enforcing the equality it proclaimed.67
As OCE Bandera’s critiques show, feminists felt that without more comprehensive protection for
women’s rights, the Constitution perpetuated discrimination against women.68 Summing up the
general feminist sentiment about the Constitution’s value, the Women’s Assembly of Vizcaya,
for example, declared that “for women, the Constitution is not worth the paper it’s written on.”69
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Post-ratification Feminist Strategy
Feminists’ inability to substantially influence the political conversation in transition-era Spain
was not limited to their meager impact on Constitutional debates. Women continued to make up
a small percentage of Cortes delegations until the Spanish government adopted a quota system in
2007 requiring that party delegations consist of no more than 60% men; neither did their roles as
politicians or members of government bodies – the latter greatly increased with the creation of
the Instituto de la Mujer (Instituto), or Women’s Bureau, in 1983 – offer them platforms from
which to advocate reform.70 Moreover, the cooptation of feminist rhetoric by politicians styling
themselves as, but not acting as, feminist allies carried over into subsequent women’s rights
debates, further limiting the impact that women themselves had on legislation seemingly
designed to meet their demands.
Feminists’ fight to legalize abortion offers an especially clear lens for understanding
these continued patterns and the development of post-transition feminist organizing. After the
Moncloa Pacts, Constitutional ratification, and the general liberalizing legislative impulse during
the transition, legal abortion was feminists’ most sought-after individual reform. Additionally,
feminists’ linkage of individual demands under the umbrella of dismantling repressive social and
cultural forces is especially visible in the debate over legal abortion, not least of which because
that debate intrinsically involved larger questions like the extent to which women should have
bodily autonomy. Yet examining the shifting public opinion on abortion’s legality demonstrates
that feminists’ broad ideological arguments did not resonate with the Spanish public. Instead,
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even as feminists continued to argue that the problem facing Spanish women was a flaw in
Spanish culture that perpetuated women’s oppression, a narrower argument won the day.
Activism portraying abortion as a public health crisis disproportionately affecting poor women
shifted public opinion and put abortion reform on the table. This strategic change was key to
feminists winning abortion reform, but was also a factor in feminists’ inability to influence the
final legislation. Moreover, political change in the early 1980s that placed the socialists in power
also created formal divisions between feminists, who had been during the 1970s, nominally
united despite intense ideological division.
Feminists’ understandings of their demands as interlinked predated Constitutional
ratification. For example, a February 1978 article in feminist magazine dones en lluita about the
prevalence of sexual violence explained feminists’ perspective: “to understand rape as an
individual phenomenon is a distracting maneuver that cannot deceive us … rape has social and
political content, it is a weapon employed by men to defend their patriarchal society...”71 In other
words, the article asserted that the problem with rape was not just the harm it caused to the
woman raped, but rather that its prevalence indicated men’s attempts to control and subdue
women in general. As such, feminists’ calls for increased criminalization of rape were a stopgap
measure on the way to ending patriarchy and granting women autonomy. Discrete demands such
as calls for legal abortion, contraception, divorce, and stricter penalties for rapists, were simply
incremental requests, ways to address individual symptoms of the larger problem as feminists
perceived it.
This pattern of incrementalism likewise manifested in late 1970s and early 1980s feminist
platforms that presented abortion not solely as a goal in and of itself, but as the linchpin of

71

Eva y Elisenda, “Sobre Violaciones,” dones en lluita, February 1978, 5.

123
interlocking oppressions that women continued to experience. Vindicación Feminista, dones en
lluita, and Opción, along with Tribuna Femenista, a Madrid-based feminist magazine launched
1983, published numerous articles detailing the ways in which feminists felt abortion’s illegality
repressed women. As a 1983 Tribuna Femenista editorial explained, “[w]omen are … interested
in winning the battle of the right to abortion, because we are the ones who directly suffer the
impositions of society, about our sexuality, our motherhood, work, education.”72 Feminists
argued that lack of access to abortion was yet another indication of women’s subordinate
position in society, and that their calls for access to abortion were not about abortion per se but
about gaining bodily autonomy and women’s liberation. A Catalan feminist pamphlet asserted
that in demanding abortion, Spanish women “[were] demanding the right to our own body, to do
with it whatever we like and nobody but us deciding about it.”73 Echoing that feminists
understood their demands for abortion as about bodily autonomy as much as about abortion,
Tribuna Femenista published the slogan, “We want the right to abort. We do not want to
abort!”74 And minutes from a December 1981 feminist gathering, representing activist groups
from across the nation, resolved that
the fight for the right to abortion represents something greater than fighting to improve
our lot as regards abortion alone … Rather, it is also a major step forward in the fight for
women’s liberation, for putting an end to the roles imposed on us and institutions that do
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nothing but keep us oppressed and discriminated against … the struggle for abortion
rights has a fundamental role in our struggle to change society.75
Feminists also understood abortion’s criminalization as an insidious side-effect of the
entanglement between church and state, and they protested that the church-state relationship
affected public policy and hindered reception of their demands. Radical organization L’eix
Violeta, for example, appropriated a government-sponsored public health campaign encouraging
condom use for its own, more expansive messaging.76 The organization’s poster, released in the
early 1980s, depicted a graffiti statement on a brick wall that began with the initiative’s slogan
“Put it on, put it on him,” and then continued on to say “Why aren’t there: Family planning
centers? Sexual education in schools? Free and legal abortion? Sex education and information
for gays and lesbians?” Around the edge of the poster ran the statement “Birth control is a right,
and abortion is also. If Bishops could become pregnant, condoms would be given out freely.”
This feminist campaign tied multiple issues together through cooptation of a common call to use
protection during sex, with the message that access to contraception was good, but not enough.
Feminists also chafed at restrictions imposed either formally, through political and legal
channels, or informally, through Church influence and social pressure from conservatives. L’eix
Violeta’s poster text hinted at the depth of frustration; its graphic content, of a priest trapped
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inside a life-sized condom and struggling to get it off while the graffiti artist (and presumably his
entrapper) ran away smirking, further illustrated how deep the resentment ran (see Fig. 2).77
Figure 2:
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Such depictions of Catholic figures, particularly images of priests, commonly appeared in
feminist media as targets of mockery or, less humorously, as targets for elimination. The cover of
a pamphlet titled “Abortion Without Restrictions! Women Decide!” depicts another such
instance (see Fig. 3). In it, two men cower, one wearing a suit and using another wearing what
appear to be Cardinals’ vestments as a shield. They face a woman twice their size, holding a
knitting needle like a spear, staring intently at them, and taking aim in their direction. This ad, on
its face about abortion, was also anti-capitalist, anti-patriarchy, anti-militarist, anti-religion; in
sum, it opposed everything that feminists perceived the government to be protecting and
championing, everything that feminists hoped to reform and repeal through attention to and
action about issues like abortion. Among other things, the imagery – of a government figure
using a bishop as a shield – revealed feminist resentment that the government continued to
protect church interests and use appeasing the church as a reason to continue restrictions on
reproductive freedoms that feminists found onerous and discriminatory. Indeed, the weapon that
threatened to take down religion and the government was a knitting needle - an abortifacient, an
instrument of one of the rights that women demanded and claimed for themselves.78
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Figure 3:
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These campaigns were engaging, but there is no evidence to suggest that they
significantly impacted public opinion in Spain. More demonstrably effective were campaigns
that fostered empathy for female victims of injustice. Grassroots feminists had worked within
their communities to assist women seeking abortions and to promote better sexual health
practices even during the late Franco years. They initially canvassed working-class
neighborhoods, going door to door with the support of liberal priests who allowed them to
deliver pamphlets and lectures about contraception and family planning in local parishes; in the
years after Franco’s death, feminist organizations in other nations helped Spanish organizations
by supplying these materials, though supplying such information about birth control remained
illegal until 1978.79 During and after the transition to democracy, feminist abortion-rights
activists engaged with the community, identified the extent of the demand for legalized abortion
among women from all walks of life, and publicized the hardships, both economic and physical,
for poor women seeking to have the procedure. The feminist underground also secretly chartered
planes and arranged international flights to London and Amsterdam for Spanish women seeking
abortions, something that feminist cartoonist S. Perez alluded to in an illustration for dones en
lluita in 1983.80 In Perez’ drawing (see Fig. 4), a policeman, a bishop, and a politician are
literally chasing pregnant women across the pages of the magazine, as the pregnant women hold
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signs proclaiming their pursuers “Fascists” and themselves chase a bus bearing a logo
reminiscent of the Iberia Airlines logo and sign saying “To London.”81
Figure 4:

In an El País retrospective about abortion laws, published in 2013 when abortion rights in
Spain were once again up for debate, a woman identified as Cinta described her trip to
Amsterdam in 1980. The procedure alone cost 30,000 Ptas, which she had to borrow from
friends – at the time 30,000 Ptas was nearly one and a half times an average monthly income.
Despite the expense, over 30,000 women per year made such trips.82 So many Spanish women
visited foreign clinics, either with feminist help or without, that clinic administrators hired
Spanish-speaking staff. Yet in 1978, the estimated number of abortions within Spain still totaled
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300,000 per year.83 The percentage of women who could afford to avail themselves of these
feminist networks was limited, as Cinta herself noted and, additionally, women like Cinta faced a
number of hardships in procuring abortions, not all of them economic. Women getting
clandestine abortions, whether in Spain or internationally, could be imprisoned or face social
ostracization even in more progressive regions. Carles Gomez-del-Moral, a middle-aged Catalan
man, recounted a memory from his high-school days: one of his friends had travelled to London
from Barcelona for an abortion, and when school officials discovered it she was called out of
class and expelled.84 Women also risked illness or death. At least one major feminist
demonstration, in 1977, occurred when a woman died after an abortion.85 Protestors sought to
foster empathy for such women and to illuminate the health risks that lack of abortion access
precipitated.
Still, activists did not gain traction on abortion reform until they found a focal point for
their pro-choice campaigns in 1979, when officials charged 11 working-class Basque women
suspected of participating in an abortion ring: a mother-daughter pair with having performed
abortions, and nine for having received abortions. The uproar surrounding the Bilbao case had a
different tenor than prior demonstrations and, as Ana Maria Prata Amaral Pereira has asserted,
“mobilized activists and women’s organizations in an unprecedented way throughout the
country.”86 Feminist media continued to draw connections between abortion legislation and
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women’s oppression by patriarchal structures, while feminist organizations mobilized
specifically around the issue of abortion and planned demonstrations to highlight its effects both
on women in general and on a specific population of women – the poor.
Even then, feminists faced opposition to and retribution for their activism. At one
feminist demonstration in Madrid, “police drove buses at a column of marching women to
disperse them.”87 At another demonstration in Bilbao, feminists participating in a sit-in were
beaten by police wielding nightsticks.88 The Church also used its significant influence to
condemn abortion and speak out against its legalization. In addition to the Spanish Episcopal
Council’s issuance of multiple bulletins pleading with members not to vote for pro-choice
political parties, bemoaning the state of Spanish society, and threatening Catholics’ eternal souls
if abortion became legalized,89 it also had enough political and social cachet to pressure regional
governments to alter their messages of support for abortion and contraception. In the early 1980s,
the Generalitat de Catalunya, Catalonia’s regional government, undertook a public health
campaign titled “Not One / Not a Single Undesired Pregnancy” that promoted the safe use of
contraceptives while also implicitly listing benefits of access to abortion. The Catholic church
protested the campaign, objecting to its seemingly pro-abortion stance. One ad was a picture of a
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bib in the form of a personals ad stating “seeking mother who wants me, between 20-35 years of
age, in good health (…and two siblings would be enough).” Underneath ran the campaign’s
slogan – “not a single undesired pregnancy” (see Fig. 5).90 The Church and conservative groups
successfully barred its use because it too explicitly addressed abortion and so, to feminists’
consternation, another ad ran in its place.91 This one was more ambiguous, featuring a
blindfolded woman with the caption “Love is blind, but you must see clearly. Do not renounce
your freedom as a woman. No unwanted pregnancy” (see Fig. 6).92
Yet, amid the outcry, the general Spanish public showed signs of being increasingly
sympathetic toward abortion activists, as illegal abortions caused a public health problem in need
of a solution.93 Women from around Spain participated in demonstrations and direct actions to
humanize women who sought abortions. Some of these took the form of more traditional
protests, such as those who “held sit-ins for two years” to support the women on trial and
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denounce abortion’s illegality, not just in the Basque regions or in the capital, but in cities as farflung as Sevilla.94
Figure 5:
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Figure 6:
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Other forms of feminist protest more creatively publicized pro-choice demands. Women
from all walks of life publicly discussed their abortions, including women in the midst of Cortes
debates about legalizing abortion. In one demonstration that made national news, 1300 women
lined up in a public square to announce that they had had abortions, signed a registry to that
effect, and had their pronouncement notarized. Organizers ultimately gathered between 25,00
and 26,000 signatures.95 In addition, 1,200 men, including prominent politicians, also signed and
sent a letter to El País saying they had helped women get abortions.96
Demonstrations like these attracted media attention, which was so intense that the trial
was postponed twice in an attempt to calm the environment and get a fair trial. International as
well as domestic newspapers publicized the plight of Spanish women seeking abortions,
amplified and provided legitimacy to arguments painting women as victims, and reinforced that
Spain was behind the curve on abortion rights in Western Europe. It was one of only four
countries with abortion bans, which international newspapers mentioned when covering feminist
protests.97 Politicians also began to back abortion reform in ways more substantive than signing a
petition. Some municipal governments bowed to public pressure, with Oviedo and Valencia both
“pass[ing] motions in favor of abortion decriminalization and of acquitting the Bilbao women.”98
The Communist Party, the most radical party with representation in government, and which had
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a strong women’s organization, had long advocated women’s right to abortion even before the
Bilbao case hit the headlines. With support from feminists, the party had introduced three bills to
legalize abortion on demand between 1978-1981, which got a great deal of press and garnered
heated parliamentary debate. By the conclusion of the Bilbao case in March 1982, in which ten
of the eleven were acquitted and the eleventh recommended for immediate pardon, the Spanish
public was willing to accept legislation loosening restrictions on access to abortion.
Spaniards’ new openness to legalizing abortion also coincided with a dramatic shift in the
political environment that made reform possible. Disagreements about the role of the Church,
and in particular the appropriate Catholic reaction to divorce legislation, broke apart the reigning
political coalition and paved the way for PSOE leadership in 1982.99 Once the PSOE gained a
majority in Cortes and a strong coalition, socialist leadership took steps to reinforce the party’s
image as friendly to women’s rights. Feminist activists identifying as double militants had
worked with and within PSOE since its legalization, including feminist PSOE delegates
advocating for abortion in Cortes debates in 1978, and PSOE political materials incorporated
some feminist goals and the goal of female equality. On 25 February 1983, three months into its
tenure, the PSOE introduced a bill to legalize abortion. This was not a political party’s first
attempt during the transition to reform the nation’s approach to abortion. It was not even a
party’s first post-Bilbao attempt to liberalize abortion laws. PSOE delegates, along with other
left-leaning and feminist delegates, supported each of these attempts, but each failed. This was,
however, the first moment at which the public’s desire for legal abortion coincided with a
favorable political atmosphere.
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“A form of the most brutal misogyny”: 100 Abortion’s Legalization on Male Terms
Feminist activism had changed public opinion on abortion, and passage of the PSOE’s bill to
decriminalize abortion (albeit only on restricted grounds) seemed proof of feminist influence in
government and of the movement’s success. Adding to this perception was the PSOE’s creation
of a government ministry, the Instituto de la Mujer, dedicated to researching, communicating,
and crafting policy to address women’s concerns. Scholars and contemporaries have incorrectly
surmised that the PSOE’s ascendancy represented feminists’ ascendancy – that feminists helped
craft party policy, particularly the abortion bill, and that the Instituto played a powerful role in
shaping the Spanish legislative agenda.
To the contrary, feminists’ role in the PSOE’s drive for abortion legislation began and
ended with their grassroots organization over the late 1970s and early 1980s. Grassroots activists
were outsiders to the legislative arena, and feminists in government, even PSOE delegates and,
later, Instituto de la Mujer members, did not have a voice in abortion legislation’s final form.101
Moreover, the formation of the Instituto also broke apart the already-fragile single-double
militant feminist coalition, such as it was, and created a clear division between the ideological
camps as the Instituto offered double militants a formal avenue for incorporation into the
government. Single militants chose to remain separate from the government and in independent
feminist organizations. Ultimately and ironically, though grassroots activism fostered by single
and double militant feminists instigated change, the changes they got were not necessarily what
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feminists themselves envisioned or even desired. Instead, the abortion law represented the
ascendancy of male politicians’ political goals, primarily maintaining the stability of the stillfragile new democracy by placating both leftists and rightists within Spain.
The PSOE’s abortion bill of 1983 reflected the party’s internal changes since assuming
majority power in 1982 and its attempt to strike a careful balance between conservative and
liberal sentiments in Cortes. The PSOE that had advocated women’s right to abortion in the
transition era was a different PSOE with different constituent parts and a different relationship to
Catholicism than the PSOE which governed in early 1980s and introduced legislation
decriminalizing abortion in 1983. The PSOE of the transition did not need to cater to
conservative political rivals – they filled the role of opposition party to Prime Minister (and
transition architect) Adolfo Suárez’s governing Christian-democratic and center-right political
coalition, the Unión de Centro Democrático (“Union of the Democratic Center”, or UCD). In
those years, the PSOE had accepted a “split” within its membership between those advocating
radical legalization of abortion and those supporting more limited reform, as its primary political
goal was to combat the majority party – the UCD – and secure its own dominance.102 Socialists
in favor of small-scale reform won out after the PSOE’s ascent to governing party because party
leaders, in an effort to appeal to a broader electorate, made a calculated decision to move away
from radical politics and toward moderate positions. The party needed to clarify its position,
which it did in 1982 when it publically supported limited decriminalization.
The PSOE’s approach to abortion regulations also reflected that the path to smooth
governance rested on finding common ground with the Church and with conservatives like
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Alianza Popular (“Popular Alliance”, or AP), which retained ties to the Church.103 Contrary to
some scholars’ interpretation of the Spanish Catholic Church as weak because they were unable
to block abortion’s legalization, or as having taken a step back from a role in influencing Spanish
social norms,104 the Catholic Church could and did influence governmental policy and political
negotiations both directly and indirectly. Though the 1978 Constitution had failed to meet the
Catholic Church’s moral requirements it did nevertheless acknowledge and protect Catholicism’s
ties to government, declaring, to the dismay of liberal politicians and progressive activists who
had hoped that the break with National-Catholicism would also mean a democracy with
separation of church and state, that the state would “maintain relations of cooperation with the
Catholic Church.”105 Subsequently individual Cortes delegates’ personal relationships to the
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church remained strong enough to precipitate the UCD’s political crisis and fall from power in
1981.
Even after this political shakeup handed the PSOE majority power, Catholic
conservatives still comprised a large portion of Cortes delegates and political parties loyal to
Francoism’s ideals also remained intact and wielded substantial political leverage.106 The
relationship between church and state had changed since the collapse of Francoism, but the state
still allowed the church a role in shaping policy and influencing cultural and social expectations
of Spaniards. The abortion law’s final, relatively restrictive, form thus also reflected Cortes
delegates’ personal ties to Catholicism. Large numbers of the Catholic conservative AP voted for
the 1985 abortion law, despite the Church's pleas that they not do so, but the PSOE party
leadership did not want to push its luck and the strength of its mandate by attempting further
liberalization. Rather, PSOE leaders perceived that their ability to govern rested on finding
common ground with conservatives like the AP, and feared that formulating a more liberal
abortion law would alienate those colleagues as well as the more conservative wing of the
PSOE’s own base of support.107
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The Instituto also did not have enough pull to counteract conservative influence over the
abortion bill. Instead, the PSOE’s creation of the Instituto weakened feminist activism and
presented new challenges for feminists agitating for abortion reform as well as for feminists in
general. While women working within the Instituto – institutional feminists – were doublemilitants comfortable with the political structures created in Spain’s transition to democracy;
activists outside the Instituto – independent feminsits – were single-militant feminists who
opposed Spain’s new governance and so also opposed many of the agency’s campaigns,
strategies, and reform suggestions on principle even when their own organizations’ strategies
dovetailed with the Instituto’s efforts.108 If the Sección Femenina had been the voice for a certain
brand of conservative women’s rights activist, the Instituto de la Mujer was its liberal
counterpart. The Instituto advocated for women’s rights from a perspective that independent
feminists did not consider liberal or progressive, and so the ideological divide and the dynamic
between the Instituto de la Mujer and independent feminism was similar in some ways to that of
Sección Femenina and the emergent feminisms of the late Franco period.
The relationship between the Instituto and the Spanish government highlights the extent
to which even those identifying as feminist allies continued patterns of discrimination against
women, often by excluding women from debates concerning the very women’s rights issues the
Instituto was founded to research and advise the government about. Other than the increased
tensions its creation caused between ideologically-opposed feminist groups, the Instituto did not
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participate in the debates over abortion legislation. First, the organization was founded seven
months after PSOE introduced its abortion legislation, and so did not contribute to the legislation
draft. This foreshadowed the Instituto’s subsequent politically weak position: its newness
translated into a lack of impact. The organization had a small budget that increased only
incrementally over the late 1980s, so it had few resources to fund policy research and proposals.
It also took two years for the Instituto to be fully staffed and for its leaders to establish a
functional organizational structure. Once it was staffed and running, the Instituto did participate
in abortion debates, but its real influence lay in helping with the law’s implementation, not its
creation.109 Moreover, the Instituto was a subdivision of a Ministry and not a Cabinet position,
which put distance between it and the locus of government power.110 All of these factors
minimized the Instituto’s influence over abortion rights in particular and Spanish politics in
general. Meanwhile, indepedent feminists had helped organize the grassroots demonstrations
drawing attention to the problems that the criminalization of abortion caused and shifting public
opinion on abortion’s legality; that was the extent of their role influencing the proposed
legislation.
The PSOE’s own female delegates also figured little in the debates surrounding the
socialists’ abortion bill. While the 1983-1985 Cortes debates about abortion legislation seemed a
reaction to feminist outcry and appeared to be an opportunity for feminist representation in
devising government policy, only three women spoke in support of abortion during the Cortes’
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debates.111 Women’s silence was such that in the 1983 debate Juan María Bandrés Molet of the
Mixed Parliamentary Group decried the lack of female representation in debate about an issue
that he felt “affects fundamentally, if not almost exclusively, women.” Moreover, Bandrés was
the only delegate, male or female, to discuss the gendered nature or gendered consequences of
abortion policy.112
With women taking a backseat in the debate, the PSOE championed the bill without
using feminists’ arguments about bodily autonomy or female oppression. In this respect,
feminists’ success in getting public support for abortion based on its effect on public health
worked against their larger ideological goals. PSOE’s representatives in Cortes argued for
expansion of abortion access by reasoning that abortions would happen no matter what and so
should be legal and safe; that abortion reform would make Spain more like other European
nations, most of which allowed abortion; and that the abortion bill was actually moderate rather
than liberal, since the majority of Spaniards favored it. When those favoring liberalization did
refer to the impact of abortion on women, they framed their arguments in terms of the
socioeconomic injustice done to women and not the gender injustice: rich women could afford
safe abortions (usually by going overseas), but poor women could not.113 The PSOE-sponsored
legislation also legalized abortion in only three narrow cases: during the first trimester in the case
of rape or incest; during the first 22 weeks, if two physicians confirmed that “the fetus would be
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born with serious mental or physical defects;” or at any time during the pregnancy with two
medical professionals unaffiliated with the abortion clinic affirming that the pregnancy posed “a
serious danger” to the woman’s mental or physical health.114 The Cortes overwhelmingly voted
in favor of the bill in July 1985, but feminists felt unsatisfied because the new law did not
address their concerns, either about abortion specifically or about the larger issue of women's
oppression. Even after legalization, the law’s restrictions kept abortion out of reach for many
women. There was a dramatic decrease in the number of women who left Spain for abortions
after 1985, but women did still leave to obtain abortions because of the obstacles the law put in
place domestically.115 Spain’s legislation on abortion remained among the most restrictive in
Europe, including in conservative Catholic nations like Italy which as of 1978 allowed women to
abort their pregnancies within the first 90 days for any reason, and where voters in 1981 rejected
an initiave to repeal abortion rights.116
For these reasons both independent and institutional feminists, rather than cheering
abortion’s legalization, protested the law for failing to deliver what they understood as real
change for women in Spain. This was hardly a new complaint. Feminists, as we have seen, had
objected to the Constitution on similar grounds. They felt similarly about the legalization of
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divorce, as a Tribuna Feminista article recapping major feminist issues and demonstrations
illustrated – it asserted that the divorce law “did not reflect the aspirations the feminist
movement had had for some years.”117 The article’s coverage of the PSOE’s abortion legislation
repeated the dismissve claim, almost verbatim: “the introduction of the PSOE Act in
Parliament…does not capture feminist aspirations.”118
Contributors to Tribuna Feminista were not alone in their ire. Independent feminist
organizations around Spain held demonstrations to condemn the new abortion law. In a move
that condemned the law while reinforcing feminists’ belief that all oppression women
experienced was interlinked, the 1986 International Women’s Day organizers in Barcelona chose
the law as one of its foci, sandwiching their call for “Abortion On Demand and Free” between
demands for “No NATO” and “Jobs for All Women” on the event’s promotional poster.119 In
addition, that December, independent feminists from across Spain participated in a Madrid-based
Tribunal that heard and recorded testimonies from women affected by Spain’s abortion law.
Conclusions published and distributed by the Tribunal’s organizers condemned the law, in part
for the burdens it placed on women seeking abortions, but also because they perceived the law to
be one more indication of the government’s continued support of “maintaining the subordination
and dependence of women in relation to men.” These findings furthermore singled out specific
members of government, in particular the PSOE leader and Spain’s president Felipe Gonzalez,
the minister of justice, other socialist government ministries and administrators, judges who were
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“applying laws contrary to the rights of women and which [were] a form of the most brutal
misogyny” and the urban guard and civil guard, whom the tribunal deemed responsible for
“defending the patriarchal order.”120 Institutional feminists were less overt in their criticism, but
nevertheless contributed to these critiques by trying, with limited success, to push for further
reform despite being tasked simply with managing the law’s implementation.121

Conclusion
The visibility of grassroots feminist activism in the late Franco years and during the transition,
coupled with Spain’s seeming rejection of the Franco-era gender order, led feminists and
scholars alike to hail the ratification of the Constitution in 1978 and passage of legalized abortion
in 1983 as feminist triumphs and proof of Spain’s willingness to embrace women’s rights. Yet
despite appearances, feminists throughout the transition period in fact struggled for political
leverage and had little influence on the outcome of either the Constitution or the form of
abortion’s legalization.
Their lack of influence was in part because feminists struggled both for unity and for an
audience receptive to their demands. Internal debates about feminism’s future and its desired
outcomes proved too complicated for the movement to maintain internal cohesion. Factions
within Spanish feminism disagreed about how to structure the government, what aspects of
Spanish society needed reform, and whether “feminism” was even an appropriate label. Though
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Spanish feminist organizations cultivated extensive international connections and involvement,
at home they struggled to stay financially afloat, to disseminate their views, and to bring new
women into the fold: the movement failed to attract a similar number of members as other
women’s organizations, and feminist print media lingered on the fringes of journalistic culture.
Also significant was the cultural position of feminism, as journalists, politicians, and public
figures mocked prominent feminist activists, pushed feminist politicians out of power, and
derided feminist demands. Paradoxically, the dissolution of Sección Femenina only exacerbated
women’s lack of access to politics. Since the transition government did not establish a new
women’s ministry in its place, women lost an avenue for influencing government decisions and
promoting women’s concerns.
Even as feminists struggled for a foothold in Spain's political arena, feminist rhetoric
found a rapt audience in Spanish politicians and citizens eager to rehabilitate Spain's
international reputation. Feminism was popular, but only when espoused by men. The elision of
women's rights with democracy meant that voicing support for female equality was a politically
expedient tactic and arguably a necessary one for Spanish politicians hoping to marshal political
power or gain international cachet in Spain’s new age. The contents of Spain’s 1978 Constitution
must be seen through this lens – not as indicative of feminist demands brought to bear on Spain’s
new democratic shape, but rather as indicative of male politicians’ self-conscious political
maneuvering in front of a European audience weighing whether Spain was liberalizing enough to
gain both international approval and EEC membership. From feminists’ perspective, the new
Constitution was insufficiently democratic and did not address women’s concerns. Equal
citizenship seemed a salve instead of a solution. Indeed, women had little to no say in the
Constitution’s contents: no women sat on the drafting committee, female Cortes delegates (of

148
which there were few) could voice dissent but were overpowered by their colleagues, and lastditch feminist efforts to persuade voters to reject Constitutional ratification failed.
Ratification of the Constitution was a turning point in Spanish feminist activism.
Grassroots activists in the late Franco era and during Constitutional debate framed diverse forms
of women’s oppression as interlocking pieces of one large puzzle and urged Spaniards to craft
and support comprehensive legislation protecting women’s rights instead of addressing single
problems ad hoc and piecemeal. Following the Constitution’s ratification, these feminists
continued promoting their view of women’s oppression within feminist circles but focused their
broader activism around discrete issues with simpler messaging. This is evident in how feminists
framed their demands for legalized abortion – the first major women’s rights legislation since the
establishment of the Constitution. In feminist media, women presented abortion as a
manifestation of lingering patriarchal oppression, normalized during the Franco dictatorship. To
the public, activists framed lack of access to abortion as both a public health problem and as
socioeconomic injustice, since poor women disproportionately struggled to afford safe abortions.
Feminist arguments about public health and socioeconomic injustice resonated with the
Spanish public, and legislation to legalize abortion found traction in the Cortes when a political
shakeup lifted the PSOE to a parliamentary majority. But interpreting the legalization of abortion
as a feminist success obscures what feminists most wanted and how Spanish citizens and
politicians perceived feminists. As the debate over legalized abortion shows, both independent
and institutional feminists lacked a voice in parliamentary proceedings, even as the socialist
party ostensibly supported women’s rights, evident in part through their creation of the Instituto
de la Mujer. Politicians, even those identifying as allies of women’s rights, spoke for women
instead of allowing women to speak for themselves and made arguments that either ran counter
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to feminists’ own or addressed concerns that women had not voiced. For politicians like those of
the PSOE, legalized abortion was politically expedient and helped expand their party’s base. For
feminists, the legislation was a disgrace that denied women agency and perpetuated both the
broader oppression they experienced as well as the public health problem and socioeconomic
injustice that limited access to abortion caused.
However, as Chapter Three shows, Spanish feminists’ fight for legalized abortion
resonated beyond Spain’s borders. As the relationship between the Spanish government and
Spanish feminists evolved, culminating with the creation of the Instituto and the final division of
feminists into institutional and independent organizations, so too did the relationship between
these groups of feminists and their counterparts in other nations. International feminist networks
throughout the 1960s and 1970s drew Spanish activists into a common feminist culture that
transcended the use of shared visual elements and chants, extending also to exchanges of tactical
advice and argumentation. In the 1980s and beyond, the Instituto de la Mujer, though largely
ineffective in Spanish politics in its early years, added another layer to this network by providing
both institutional and independent Spanish women access to international political debates even
as feminists of both persuasions struggled to contribute meaningfully to political debates on
domestic policy issues.
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CHAPTER THREE
Transnationalizing the Transition and Beyond:
How Domestic Feminist Conflict and Global Feminist Networks
Affected Late 20th Century Spanish Politics
By the 1990s, grassroots feminist activism in Spain, now dominated by the nation’s
independent feminist organizations, lacked the momentum and visibility that had marked its
activism throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. The PSOE’s founding of the Instituto de la
Mujer in October 1983 had created a new body through which Spaniards could channel women’s
concerns and debate equality policies; as a result, independent feminists using grassroots
organizational strategies no longer drove the political or cultural debates about women’s rights.
Instead, both independent feminism and its grassroots organization, eclipsed by the Instituto’s
efforts, faded into the background. Independent feminists recognized this decline, discussing it in
a number of conferences and pamphlets, and attributed it to the rise of the Instituto.1 Yet, though
diminished in number and influence, they continued their work, in part by pressing the Instituto
as well as various regional Cortes to back their domestic policy proposals.
Notably, the shift in visibility and political leverage from independent activists using
grassroots techniques to institutional feminists organizing through formal political networks and
using government resources coincided with a simultaneous shift in international feminist
activism over the 1980s and 1990s. This shift saw newly formed national women’s bureaus
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lobby organizations like the UN and EEC for female-friendly policy changes.2 Independent
feminists recognized the impact that institutional feminists’ international connections could have
on their own activism, and, for example, in October of 1996, an independent feminist contingent
from Valencia touched on just this subject in a presentation at a major feminist conference. Their
“Manifesto for Equality” declared:
We who are committed to a society where equality and solidarity are principles and
values that characterize it, we who, like so many, have struggled to achieve equality
between men and women, we are not willing to retreat back a step in our achievements.
What's more, we will not stop, we will continue forward in our purposes to achieve a real
Equality.
It is for this reason that we turn to the members of the progressive forces in the Valencian
Parliament to ask them to share our purpose and ... concentrate their energy and
commitment in the Struggle for Equality... in the Valencian Cortes, the Government of
the Generalitat and the Central Government, [and] the application of Equality Policies in
compliance with the Constitution, the European Union Regulations and the commitments
of Beijing.3
In addition to pushing their local government to cede their demands – here, a vaguely conceived
“real equality” – these independent feminists also implored both regional (the Valencian Cortes
and Generalitat) and national (central government) arms of the Spanish government to abide by
international edicts on equality policy, including those of the EU and those resulting from the
WCOW held in Beijing in 1995.
This invocation of international agreements followed a larger pattern evident during the
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transition and in post-transition Spanish politics. In some ways, the story of the Spanish
transition is the story of how Spaniards of different political affiliations and identities envisioned,
depicted, and fought over their interpretations of a post-Franco national identity for the embattled
nation. Politicians worked toward crafting a post-Franco national identity that observers in
liberal democracies, like those in North America and Western Europe, could find palatable. As
Chapter Two discusses, feminists and politicians battled over what democracy could and should
mean for women’s rights – what did those rights encompass? How far did they extend? And how
much representation ought women have in forums intended to settle the matter? As a rule, even
ostensibly sympathetic leftist politicians had their own agendas, which differed from feminists’.
This chapter explores how and why feminist organizations, both independent and
institutional, reached for international connections that could help them provide solutions to the
inequality they felt women still suffered. First, instead of marveling at the smoothness of the
transition, feminists used global networks to examine and denounce the oppression women still
experienced. Single and double militant feminists initially undertook this work together in the
1970s, as this chapter discusses, but even after feminists’ split into independent and institutional
organizations, each group continued to foster its own unique international networks for this
purpose. Their efforts lasted through the end of 20th century and remain ongoing in the 21st.
Indeed, though it came 20 years after Spanish feminists’ initial experiments with
internationalism, the Valencian activists’ reference to EU and UN policy in 1996 was itself a
denunciation of Spanish democracy, if a veiled one in the form of the implication that Spain (and
Valencia) fell short of meeting the internationally-mandated equality policies mentioned.
Feminists of the transition era used connections with feminists in other nations to work
toward solutions not only in Spain, but in other nations, and with an eye to improving conditions
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for women world-wide. Their connections flourished throughout the mid-century via pamphlets
and magazines, relationships between feminist organizations that transcended national
boundaries, and a common culture that spanned not only nations, but continents. The PSOE’s
creation of the Instituto de la Mujer in 1983, which provides a bookend to thinking about the role
of general grassroots feminist activism in Spain’s political transition, meanwhile created another
opportunity for feminists to build international networks – this time for institutional feminists
working through official government channels that plugged them into the inner workings of the
EEC (which Spain had finally entered in 1986) and the UN’s equality bodies.
Instead of alleviating the challenges feminists in general faced, however, the creation of
the Instituto, the organization’s flaws, and its reach for international networks of its own merely
added layers of complication for both independent and institutional feminists seeking political
solutions to their problems. Even as international organizations passed resolutions that should
have allowed feminists of both camps the political leverage to bring greater awareness to
women’s problems and to create domestic policy, the particular state of feminism within Spain
hampered feminists’ efforts.
These problems manifested in two significant ways. First, the Instituto’s decentralized
bureaucratic structure hamstrung the organization’s ability to craft centralized policy proposals
and coordinate across Spain’s regions. In addition, the longstanding animosity between
independent and institutional feminists meant that they also bickered about the desirability of this
new internationalization of feminist activism, and that independent feminists increasingly
understood institutional feminists’ entrenchment in officially-created networks to be evidence
that institutional feminists were feminists in name only. Independent feminists developed a deep
ambivalence toward institutional feminists and their policies: on the one hand denying their
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counterparts’ identities as feminists, while on the other hand recognizing that they sometimes
needed the political leverage that institutional feminists and their networks could apply even
though they disliked, disagreed with, or disavowed institutional feminism itself. The pleas of
Valencian independent feminists for the creation of a regional Instituto, which opened this
chapter, help highlight these complexities. Valencia had no regional Instituto as of 1996 and thus
had no official avenue for local feminists, either independent or institutional, to push for
advancement and alleviation of problems facing the region’s women. The most powerful
international networks that Valencia’s independent feminist activists could draw upon were those
in which the national Instituto participated, even as they disagreed with its ideology as well as
with most of its stated policies and goals.
This chapter argues that the relationships between competing groups of self-identified
feminists, in addition to the political leverage that feminists derived from internationallyaccepted and in some cases internationally-mandated policies, shaped the rights and the political
representation that ordinary women could access in Spain. The shift from grassroots activists’
internationalism to the decreasing possibilities for international engagement that independent
feminists still using grassroots organizational techniques faced once the Instituto’s own
internationalism predominated; the limited role of the national Instituto in deciding women’s
rights policies for the whole of Spain; and the conflict between ideologically opposed groups of
self-identified feminists over what equality meant and who got to be feminist all illuminate the
ways in which Spanish feminists of different ideological camps mobilized for and effected
domestic political change in the late 20th century.
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Transition-Era Grassroots Feminist Internationalism
In 1975, British feminists organized a demonstration against the Franco regime and the
repressive gender norms that they felt underlay it as well as all fascism. An article written by the
group for an issue of Red Magazine recounted:
Our group came together when some fifty women gathered at a picket outside the
Spanish Embassy on 5th October, coinciding with a demonstration at Hendaye on the
Spanish border, organised by the French women’s movement. We did not know each
other but we did not stand in silence. We began to talk. The discussion became a meeting
and from the meeting came a resolution to meet again – and to organise. It was not
enough to simply stand in silence for a few hours and then return home. So we have
formed the Women’s Campaign Against Fascist Spain. We believe that fascism is based
on sexism and as women we must fight both. We must fight to ensure that the liberation
of the Spanish people means the liberation of women too. We will fight as women – nonsectarian collectively; and our first aim is to tell women in the movement here about the
situation of their sisters in Spain and enlist their active support.4
As the Women’s Campaign Against Fascist Spain’s words underscore, national borders did not
constrain European feminism of the late 20th century. Instead, feminist politics of the era
confronted problems that activists believed affected all women, regardless of nationality.
Activists sought political and cultural solutions tailored to their nation’s unique political culture
and set of problems, but worked for change in other national contexts as well, assisting feminists
from those countries in their fights. In this sense, feminist activists functioned within an
international network of solidarity whose mission was not to pass specific laws or policies –
though that, too, as the case of abortion rights activism in the mid-70s showed – but rather to
lessen women’s overall experience of oppression worldwide.
Spain’s delicate coalition of single and double militant feminists, both under Franco and
after his regime’s fall, existed within this network and shared its feminist culture. They perceived
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themselves to be part of an oppressed class that stretched beyond Spain’s borders and linked
them with women throughout Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. Activists in
the network shared a symbology and vocabulary; exchanged ideas and messages of solidarity;
helped women in other countries distribute educational and ideological material; and participated
both in international conferences as well as directly in demonstrations to overturn or protest
domestic laws. Spanish feminists, like those with whom they built relationships, felt they were
part of a system whereby gains for women’s rights in another country would necessarily lead to
improvements in women’s lives everywhere, either because women in nations with lesser
developed rights systems relied on travel to access more liberal women’s rights laws (abortion)
or because change in one nation set off a pattern or increased momentum for change everywhere.
The international feminist culture necessarily shaped Spanish feminists’ domestic
activism and local feminist networks. Spanish feminist magazines of the period reflected this
internationalism and its refraction into Spain’s unique political environment. Articles placed
Spanish feminism in historical context globally as well as domestically; urged readers to contact
feminist organizations in other countries, forging transnational ties of solidarity and action; and
analyzed the major problems that women faced not just in 20th century Spain, but across the
globe.
To begin with, feminist magazines placed Spain’s feminist history within the historical
narrative of the international feminist movement. Opción, for example, ran a recurring column
called “The Other History” about the precursors of and foundations for 20th-century feminism. Its
first iteration explored “the birth of feminism” with the creation of French Revolutionary
women’s organizations and activists participating in the Seneca Falls Conference in the United
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States in 1848.5 Subsequent columns delved into the historical roots of Spanish feminism as well,
describing the achievements of Spanish women in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the
prejudices they overcame.6 Throughout, these columns positioned Spain’s experience as part of a
larger pattern. For example, writers discussing the relationship between social class and access to
equality in the Industrial Revolution stated that women’s rights in Spain, as elsewhere, were
initially “for the bourgeois” and that working-class feminism only came of age with the
Industrial Revolution.7 They also discussed the evolution of specific rights, like women’s
suffrage, and contrasted Spain’s experience with that of other European nations.8 Vindicación
Feminista and dones en lluita contained similar columns.9
These magazines also studied the major problems that women faced not just in 20th-century
Spain, but across the globe. Vindicación Feminista dedicated a significant amount of space to
long-form journalism about women in other countries. Its first issue, for example, included
articles about lesbian activists in Brussels, abortion rights protests in Italy, and a liberation
movement in the Western Sahara which, significantly, Spain had decolonized only a year before
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at the behest of the UN and which was then fighting for self-determination against Moroccan and
Mauritanian control.10 Subsequent issues ran articles about topics as diverse as women in
communist China,11 feminist activists involved in the fight against terrorist violence in Italy,12
life for women in Eritrea,13 and Chilean women opposing fascism.14 Throughout its tenure,
Vindicación Feminista’s covers frequently either featured women from other countries or
explicitly promoted articles on global topics: a photograph of a Western Saharan woman
comprised the cover of the magazine’s first issue, for example. And, befitting a magazine
aspiring to global scope, it solicited subscriptions from readers in Europe, Morocco, the
Americas, and the United States as well as from Iberia.15
Dones en lluita and Opción similarly covered international events. Though dones en lluita
focused primarily on domestic affairs during the first half of its 23-issue run, later issues of the
magazine regularly ran stories about feminism and politics in other nations. Indeed, one of its
most striking covers, from an October 1981 issue devoted to opposing NATO and militarism,
featured an altered version of Botticelli’s “The Birth of Venus.” A well-muscled Ronald Reagan
cloaked in an American flag and hugging a skeleton stood in for the angel, and swooped
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menacingly over the figure of Venus ( see Fig. 7).16 By the publication of its last issue in June
1983, dones en lluita’s feature articles often focused on international events and global
feminism, running the gamut from Palestinian women fighting for independence,17 to
prostitution in Nicaragua,18 to “feminism in England: past, present, and future.”19 Meanwhile,
feature stories in Opción’s first issue – which are indicative of the magazine’s focus for the rest
of its run – included a piece about women in India and the Middle East being sold as brides, as
well as a piece on sex education in Paris. Other stories included coverage of the female governor
of Washington state, Dixie Lee Ray, and short articles on a radical Italian feminist group and
female political figures in the IRA.20
This internationalist bent was not just voyeuristic. The goal of these articles was in fact to
foster international activism, not just to inform. In addition to reporting on feminism in other
nations, Spain’s feminist magazines also drew parallels between contemporary feminist fights in
Spain and elsewhere and drew inspiration from other feminists’ experiences. Most common were
articles using women’s experiences getting an abortion as a point of comparison, with journalists
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looking to Italy, France, Portugal, the United States, and England to provide both anecdotes and
information about the intricacies of these nations’ abortion laws.21
Figure 7:
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In addition, writers urged their readers to reach out to feminist organizations in other
countries, creating transnational networks of solidarity and action. Paloma Saavedra and Regina
Bayo’s “Women in the World” column in Vindicación Feminista attempted to provide a space
where they could, as neutral moderators, tease out and explain the nuances of different domestic
and international feminist groups’ ideological positions; describe how women across the world
tackled problems experienced by all feminists; and give Spanish feminists the foundation to
understand and contact feminist organizations in other countries. Though the majority of their
first column was dedicated to Spain’s own feminist organizations, they also ran two pages of
material about French feminist groups, complete with contact information for interested
readers.22
Another magazine, Tribuna Feminista, specialized in encouraging these kinds of
connections, by reporting on both national and international feminist activities. In its inaugural
issue alone, the magazine promoted Italian feminist publications and called Italy “one of the
European centers of international feminist activity.” It provided a blurb and contact information
for the Centre de Recherches de reflexion et d’information féministe (CRIF), a Parisian feminist
study group, alongside an informational paragraph about a feminist gathering in Brussels. And it
included information about a gathering of 600 Latin American women in Lima, Peru that was
also attended by women from France, Britain, Germany, and – very specifically - “the Spanish
state.”23 Subsequent issues included an article about Dominican feminists that was accompanied
by a list of 31 Latin American feminist organizations, periodicals, and their contact
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information,24 and a short article discussing the influence of French feminism and containing the
translation of a French feminist poem.25
Such magazine copy reflected a common desire for connection; that Spanish feminists
shared a common feminist symbology and visual culture with women across North America and
Western Europe demonstrates the real extent of those connections. The woman symbol, often
encircling a fist, predominated. For example the first “o” in the title of the magazine Opción was
a woman symbol and Tribuna Feminista printed the symbol before its title in the header of each
page. Also widely used, particularly during demonstrations and marches, was a hand gesture
where the maker created a diamond shape representing the vagina by facing her palms outward
and pressing together the tips of her index fingers and thumbs (see Fig. 8). These signs, along
with slogans like “Basta!”, meaning “Enough!” in the languages of Italian, Spanish, and Catalan,
permeated feminist media, adorning magazines, posters, photographs, and cartoons.26
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Figure 8:

A 1978 pamphlet titled “Abortion Internationally” serves as an especially clear example both of
the symbols and slogans themselves and the extent to which feminists from across Europe used,
understood, and related to them. This pamphlet’s cover photograph (Fig. 2) depicted two
demonstrators making the diamond symbol together and holding signs, one featuring the
“Basta!” slogan. Inside the pamphlet, a woman symbol encircling a fist accompanied a proabortion quote. As its title indicated, the pamphlet discussed international abortion laws, and it
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included articles on China, Chile, Italy, Spain, the USA, and Bangladesh. The publication was
British, as were most of its contributors, and it was written in English – but Italian protestors
served as its cover models, one of its contributing writers was Chilean, and Spanish feminist
archivists at the Centre de Documentació de Ca la Dona consciously preserved the copy
consulted for this study, despite its language and place of origin, because Spanish feminists
shared it amongst themselves and then donated it for preservation alongside home-grown
materials.27
Spanish feminists also relied on similar methods to spread awareness about feminist
issues, participating in demonstrations and marches, as well as distributing pamphlets and
printing magazines. They used posters and pamphlets not only to promote feminist
demonstrations taking place in Spain – International Women’s Day, for example – but also to
spread awareness of other causes. Most notably, pamphlets reached a larger audience than just
feminists or burgeoning feminists within the nation where they were produced. They also
circulated throughout Europe. On the one hand, Spanish women consumed feminist media from
Belgium, England, Italy, France, and the Netherlands as well as from Spain and/or their
neighborhood and regional associations. But significantly, feminists from other nations similarly
consumed Spanish – when Spanish feminists organized their first (ultimately cancelled)
conference in 1974, they “produced and circulated [the programme] to other countries so that the
different movements would discuss it and thereby enrich our own practice and analysis.”28 Of
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course not every Spanish feminist could read other languages, and so in some cases Spanish
magazines relied on multi-lingual friends or readers to translate interviews or articles from other
publications and report on those for their readership. Mirea Bofill, for example, was fluent in
English as well as Spanish and so served as translator for several feminist organizations and
periodicals.29
In some cases, feminist organizations shared pamphlets and other materials directly with
one another. The flow of pamphlets educating women about their reproductive systems and
reproductive healthcare options reveals how enmeshed in international networks feminists were.
Pamphlets like “How to avoid a pregnancy,” a comic book about women’s reproductive care and
birth control options from approximately 1974-1975, came to Spain from Italy courtesy of Italian
feminist group El Colective ‘Consulterios’ del Movimente Italiano de Liberación de la Mujer
(MLD).30 MLD shared the pamphlet with a neighborhood Spanish feminist association in
Barcelona, which translated it to Spanish from the original Italian. Two other pamphlets from the
same time, one about how to identify and cure vaginal infections and the other explaining how
gynecological exams worked, were first published by the Italian Gruppo Femminista per la
Salute della Donna and then, as the front covers proclaimed, “translated and edited for [the]
Vocalía de Mujeres del Carmelo” by Italian group Spina Piazaa Monte di Pieta.31 Though
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originally produced specifically for the Vocalia de Mujeres del Carmelo in the 1970s, the
pamphlet on vaginal infections also had an afterlife and a larger circulation: it appeared,
excerpted, in dones en lluita’s last issue, published in 1983.32
Spanish feminists also benefitted from international exchanges of information about how
to travel to various countries in order to receive care that their nations prohibited – specifically,
abortion and contraceptive services. The last few pages of “How to avoid a pregnancy” dealt
with just this issue, offering annotated listings for abortion and family planning clinics open to
Spanish women in England, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy. England and the
Netherlands were listed as being “cheap,” but women were warned that the Swiss clinic would
help them “only before the third month.” Italy’s listing was for the organization publishing the
pamphlet, rather than a medical office. In regards to France, a note at the bottom explained: “In
November 1974 abortion was approved in France. We do not yet have data on Family Planning
and Abortion Centers in this country, but in any case, it is necessary to take into account the fact
of the geographical proximity. Ask.”33 Similar pamphlets continued flowing into Spain from
European nations throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, including the aforementioned
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titles from Britain and the Netherlands as well as additional translated pamphlets from MLD.34
Spain’s grassroots feminists were not alone in accessing these resources. It was so
common for women in Europe to travel out-of-country for abortions that nations with less
restrictive abortion laws directly contacted women in nations with more restrictive abortion laws
– which included Spain, but other nations as well – to give them options for circumventing their
countries’ restrictions. Once the Netherlands legalized abortion in 1981, for example, the Dutch
organization Stimetzo, which worked to help women get abortions in safe and hygienic
conditions, distributed a Spanish-language pamphlet that detailed how to travel for abortions in
the Netherlands and that noted how Stimetzo had helped women from all over Europe access
abortions. The pamphlet included prices, locations, procedures, lists of paperwork women
needed to enter the country, a map with cities and clinics marked on it for easy visualization of
the trip, and, lastly, a catalogue of which clinics did and did not speak Spanish.35 And, as Chapter
Two notes, such contact extended beyond instructions in a pamphlet. Feminists in nations like
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the Netherlands and Britain worked directly with Spanish feminist groups to organize travel and
accommodation for Spanish women seeking abortions, and even hired additional Spanishspeaking staff in their local abortion clinics to accommodate the inflow of new, foreign
customers.
Finally, Spanish feminists, along with their counterparts in other nations, also became
directly involved in other nations’ battles for feminist-friendly legislation both to show solidarity
and because they understood their fates as linked. In 1977, for example, the British National
Abortion Campaign held a “Tribunal” to protest a proposed abortion bill that would restrict
women’s access to abortion in the UK.36 British feminists asked feminists from seven other
countries to testify about how their country regulated abortion and the impact of the restrictions
they encountered. Barcelona feminist Dolores Thomas, representing the Barcelona Women’s
Liberation Movement, was among them, though visa trouble prevented her attendance at the
Tribunal. In her sending her regrets, Thomas wrote: “… I and the women of Spain depend on
your solidarity and wish you the best. If the Benyon Bill is implemented, many of us will be the
first to suffer. We want to hear the results of your Tribunal and hope that we can attend your
demonstration in May.” Thomas’ inability to attend aside, the inclusion of her letter in the
Tribunal materials testifies to the extent of the connections between Spanish and British
feminists, and reveals ways in which feminists involved themselves in feminist battles beyond
their nation’s borders. Meanwhile, despite Thomas’ absence from the abortion rights tribunal,
Spanish feminists representing four different organizations attended an International Campaign

36

National Abortion Campaign (British), “Abortion Internationally,” pamphlet, 1978,
Fons Ca la Dona, Box 81: Avortament i dret al propi cos [1979-1992], Folder 81,1: Recursos i
informatius avortament i dret propius, Donació de Marcela Güell, Centre de Documentació de
Ca la Dona, Barcelona, Spain.

169
for Abortion Rights meeting in Paris in 1978, an indication of the broad participation of women
in these networks and the endurance of these ties.37
And, as Thomas’ story suggests, feminists also frequently travelled to attend each others’
protests and protested on each others’ behalves. Because of the networks these women
constructed, changes in laws – particularly laws regarding abortion practices – affected women
in more than one country. In this case specifically, the restriction of abortion in Britain would
have impacted Spanish women’s access, as Dolores Thomas noted. Though a national law, it had
international repercussions, which feminists understood and which bound them together in
networks of solidarity and action. Notably, these kinds of demonstrations also provided a pattern
for how to do feminist activism. Nearly ten years later in 1986, Spanish feminists held their own
Tribunal to judge Spain’s new abortion law and its implementation – a Tribunal patterned off of
the earlier British example in which Dolores Thomas had sought to participate.38
Through the 1970s, feminist activism was the domain of grassroots feminists who
spurred their communities to action and took inspiration from their connections with feminists
doing the same work in other nations. An international network of feminists transcended national
boundaries and shared vocabulary, ideology, and imagery as well as tactical plans and
overarching strategies designed to cement rights for women in a multitude of nations and not just
in a sole national context. But the World Conference on Women series, begun in 1975, heralded
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a slow shift in international feminist engagement, away from the feminism of spectacle that
flourished in grassroots transnational networks, toward formal, coordinated international
diplomacy and negotiation for women’s rights undertaken by or on behalf of individual nations.

Shifting Feminist Internationalism – From Insurgent Spectacle to Formal Diplomacy
The PSOE’s creation of the Instituto in 1983 enabled more formal channels for feminist
international outreach that solidified with the EEC’s acceptance of Spain as a member nation in
1986. The emergence of an official women’s bureau within the Spanish government, and the
nation’s deepening connection to the EEC, also coincided with a shift over the course of the
1980s and 1990s in how feminists built their international networks and how they pushed
international organizations to recognize sites of injustice. Women’s rights and human rights
activism intersected on the global stage, intertwining throughout the 1980s as feminist activists
worldwide insisted that women’s rights were human rights and made that pronouncement the
foundation of their activist platform.39 In addition, the 1980s saw a dramatic shift in how
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activists built networks of solidarity, moving from grassroots networks to formal diplomatic
negotiations that national women’s ministries undertook on behalf of their governments.40 For
Spanish feminists, this consequently cut independent feminists and their grassroots networks out
of the diplomatic loop while catapulting institutional feminists directly into the newly formal
international feminist networks. In the 1990s, international women’s rights activism also began
to move away from advocacy for isolated women’s rights causes like guarantees of equal pay
and legalization of abortion and toward a more holistic concept of equality. In this vein, feminist
activists working with and/or within the UN dedicated themselves to what women’s studies
scholar Elizabeth Friedman has called “gendering the UN agenda,” or fighting the confinement
of women’s concerns to the World Conference on Women (WCOW) series and insisting on the
recognition of women’s rights in other forums41 as well as the “recogni[tion] that the structure of
society and all relations between women and men...be revaluated.”42
The UN and EU acceded to feminist demands and reimagined their missions in the late
20th century to encompass ensuring gender equality and eliminating gender discrimination.
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Scholars of human rights and international women’s rights, as well as participants and
subsequent UN documents, have interpreted the 1995 Beijing WCOW as the key turning point
toward acceptance of gendering the UN agenda and toward implementation of the resulting
policy termed “gender mainstreaming,” which the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) defined as
the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a
strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral
dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and
programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.43
In other words, gender mainstreaming required that government and administrative bodies
consider the gender impact of all proposals, at all levels, to ensure that they would not create or
reinforce structural discrimination or inequalities; meeting gender mainstreaming standards
meant implementing only those proposals that ensured women, as well as men, had equal access
and equal opportunity. By the late 1990s gender mainstreaming was firmly entrenched in UN
talking points, policy, and administrative culture. It also made impact beyond the UN by
becoming an influential concept in the EU, which was an observer member of the UN. Though
the European Court of Justice does not rely on international precedent to adjudicate cases (and so
does not look to UN policy when making decisions), the Beijing WCOW nevertheless brought
gender mainstreaming into the EU lexicon and into EU policy making.
The turn to gender mainstreaming also trickled down into national politics. Women in
national government felt that international organizations set precedents on which they could
draw to persuade their nation to adopt new policies: when the international community used
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rhetoric that gave credence to feminist views, activists could then argue that local governments
should respect these and take them into account when setting policy. Gender mainstreaming
additionally provided a new common vocabulary and universal rhetoric that women agitating in
different national contexts could use to frame their concerns. Moreover, international acceptance
of the language of gender and women’s equality – whether international laws and resolutions
proved binding or not – gave women leverage to argue that in order to meet international
standards and be respected on the international stage, their nation needed to implement changes
and create new laws to protect women.44
Yet gender mainstreaming had its limitations. First, it was not a defined, prescribed plan
but rather a vague blueprint for achieving a similarly vaguely defined equality. Implementation
of this principle suffered as a result. Torild Skard, a Norwegian sociologist, activist, and
politician who has worked extensively with women’s rights organizations on an international
level, critiqued the UN’s implementation of gender mainstreaming, a process she described as
“slow, cumbersome, and incomplete.”45 One of the major problems Skard identified was that
men dominated leadership and management roles in UN bodies, which meant they had to not
only approve the implementation of new policies like gender mainstreaming but also ensure that
their bodies adhered to its guidelines.46 Adherence remained a challenge in part because of “a
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lack of training and subsequent confusion about concepts, goals, and means,” but also because
“there was a tendency to dilute the radical feminist texts of the world conference
recommendations.” This meant that, when applied on an administrative level, “power
aspects…[were] denied and the need for a basic restructuring of society concealed.” As a result,
Skard reported, “implementation measures…[did not address] the specific gender dimensions
and political aspects that were at the core of the original recommendations,” a problem Skard
termed “gender malestreaming.”47
In addition, gender mainstreaming resolutions that feminists used to promote women’s
rights suggested, but did not require, that nations institute legislation protecting women’s rights
or meet benchmarks toward gender equality. In an EU context, as Mariagrazia Rossilli shows,
this meant that resolutions represented an open conversation, and not a foregone conclusion,
about the desirability of legislation protecting women’s rights. Most often feminists took
responsibility for convincing their governments to conform to EU resolutions, but the public
nature of their lobbying left room for non-governmental organizations of all persuasions to
participate in and co-opt individual nations’ political conversations.48 Indeed, conservatives also
had networks with global scope – including the Catholic Church and right-leaning family values
groups with influence across Europe and in the United States. As a result, feminist arguments
were not always effective. Feminists’ ability to leverage connections for legislative reform varied
despite the enduring popularity and prevalence of rhetoric supporting human rights.
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Moreover, complications in finding the balance between men and women’s interests,
needs, and priorities included the erosion of programs that had been designed to bring women to
parity with men. As Jane Jenson argues, one unintended consequence of the new focus on gender
discrimination was that organizations discontinued practical initiatives to protect specific
women’s rights and so eroded feminist gains. For example, the EU defunded results-oriented
women’s rights programs such as those mandating equal pay and monitoring compliance in favor
of instituting new pedagogical techniques in early childhood education in an effort to prevent
gender discrimination in future generations.49
These problems presented unique challenges for feminists, both independent and
institutional, within Spain. Institutional feminists working within the Instituto, like their foreign
counterparts, brought home policy proposals discussed or ratified in international conferences or
by intragovernmental organizations and attempted to leverage these international agreements into
domestic policy change in Spain. As also happened abroad, this tactic faced roadblocks from
politicians and legislators unwilling to pass such policy in Spain as well as from international
organizations unwilling or unable to enforce their mandates. Yet the fractured nature of feminist
organization in Spain also affected institutional feminists’ ability to leverage their new
international networks. For example, independent feminists generally agreed with and wanted
the implementation of gender mainstreaming in Spain and they were, to some extent, willing to
work with institutional feminists to achieve it. Yet because the Instituto itself was also fractured
– it was limited by a decentralized structure giving it little-to-no say in regional policy – Spain’s
institutional feminists were less effective at making international connections that allowed them
access to global political negotiations on women’s rights policy and they were less able to create
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political leverage that would allow them press for new women’s rights policy within Spain. In
other words, Spain’s institutional feminists found themselves with weak international networks
and little domestic political clout to push for women’s rights reform. This only increased the
animosity that independent feminists felt towards institutional feminists and diminished their
already-low goodwill. Perhaps the combination of institutional feminists’ entrenchment in
government networks and their ineffective activism was, independent feminists felt, a sign that
institutional feminists were not actually feminist at all.
The primary challenge institutional feminists faced was that the PSOE’s creation of the
Instituto covered only the creation of the Madrid-based national Instituto and did not provide for
branches around the country or for centralized, coordinated efforts with policy bodies in Spain’s
emergent autonomous communities. This was a reflection of Spain’s complicated governance
system, which had become less centralized during the transition. The system provided for a statelevel government as well as for each of the nation’s 17 regions to have autonomy and their own
governments, a system that Xavier Arbós Marín has described as a “federation without
federalism.”50 Under this arrangement, each community took on responsibilities not explicitly
granted to the state. The transition to democracy included regional transitions to autonomy and
their adoption of formal Statutes of Autonomy. Those regions like the Basque country and
Catalunya, that had strong identities and sentiments about their ability to self-govern, finalized
the process in the early 1980s; others did not complete the process until the 1990s.51 This
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government structure affected the implementation of equality policy inasmuch as it also
impacted how regional governments organized the bodies that could create the policy in the first
place. Autonomous communities decided for themselves whether to have regional equality
bodies, what relationship to regional government those bodies would have, and what those
bodies’ priorities would be, all of which consequently varied widely between different regions.
Institutional feminists bemoaned the structural challenges posed by Spain’s decentralized
Instituto. In an editorial in a 1996 issue of the Andalusian Instituto’s magazine Meridiana,
regional director Carmen Olmeda Checa described in detail both what the Instituto looked like in
each of Spain’s Autonomous Communities, but also her understanding of the problems each
faced. Six autonomous communities had powerful Institutos: Catalunya, the Basque Country,
Aragon, the Canary Islands, and Andalucia. Some had newly-created equality bodies, like
Navarra, where 1995 elections put in power a party that created a regional Instituto separate from
the Institute of Social Welfare, where the women’s equality body was previously housed. Others,
like Asturia and Murcia, had equality bodies whose staffing, budget, and even position in the
regional hierarchy shifted with every election and change of reigning political party.52
A lack of centralized coordination meant that the priorities of regional equality bodies
were set by their autonomous community and not by, or in consultation with, the national
Instituto. And in some cases, these priorities did not align with the policies that the national
Instituto had negotiated with the EU. In Valencia, the regional government “slowly abandoned”
EU-financed and approved plans for coeducation and support of women’s associations. And the
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Asturian and Murcian regional governments continued only those EU equality plans for which
they still received financing, while otherwise discontinuing or moving away from the
suggestions of previous equality plans.53
Changing political tides affected these groups’ priorities, so long-standing plans and
efforts shifted or were discarded when new parties came to power. In these situations, regional
Institutos struggled to maintain coherence in their policies and struggled to provide women with
a consistent slate of services, which diminished the bodies’ effect on women’s lives. Valencia’s
abandonment of EU policies in 1996, for example, coincided with a new political party closing
that region’s Instituto and subsuming women’s equality into the Ministry of Labor, where the
organization’s focus became “empowering housewives” and “strengthening the family bond.” In
Valencia, Meridiana reported as the closure took place, these changes meant that the government
instituted “an offer of 10,000 pesetas per month for all those families who have a person over 75
years of age,” while simultaneously defunding regional coeducational programs that had been
designed, Meridiana contributor Encantada García implied, to comply with the EU’s gender
mainstreaming objectives. Similarly, the closure of the General Directorate for Women in
Murcia precipitated reorganization of a program to stop abuse against women; the program was
placed under the aegis of Social Assistance, which helped all citizens, and so the domestic
violence program that had been targeted to helping abused women was suddenly aimed at both
genders. In the eyes of the Andalusian Instituto this gave the – inappropriate, it was implied –
message that such violence was “not an exclusively female problem.” Similarly, Madrid
subsumed the Directorate for Women, formerly an independent organization, to the Ministry of
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Health and Social Services which Meridiana likewise bemoaned was “diluting” efforts to help
women in large part because of the accompanying “reduction of workshops, publications,
subsidies, and aid” meant specifically for women.54
The differing equality policies between regions and the lack of centralization meant that
Spain’s institutional feminists, at least on the local and regional levels, struggled to create or
access their own versions of the domestic or international networks that grassroots feminists had
cultivated for decades. Institutional feminists lacked clarity about their mission and resources –
and even about how many other women shared their goals. Moreover, once institutional
feminists from different regions did make contact, their regions’ differing degrees of
commitment to equality policy affected their ability to work together. As one Andalusian
institutional feminist put it, as late as the 1995 WCOW in Beijing, Spain’s institutional feminists
struggled to make effective use of the networking opportunities such meetings offered due to the
radically varied organization of their regional Institutos:
despite [the federal Instituto] having sent almost six hundred women, our presence [in
Beijing] was almost completely invisible. However, for many of us, the forum was the
place where we first came into contact with other Spanish women from different places,
and only those who had come from well-coordinated organizations ... could take
advantage of these meetings.55
In response, Andalusia’s institutional feminists pushed for greater links between Andalusia’s
women’s associations, and between Andalusia and the national Instituto. One potential vehicle
for this seemed to be the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), formed in 1990 to represent
women’s interests in the EU; women’s organizations in nations across Europe joined and/or
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created new organizations to affiliate with the EWL. Andalusian women aspired to international
as well as domestic feminist networks, pushing for “integration into the State-level Association
of Support to the European Lobby of Women,”56 or ASEWL, the Spanish affiliate, which had
been established in 1993 and was associated with the PSOE.57 Membership in the ASEWL
would, Andalusian institutional feminists hoped, give them a role in “organization and
coordination of the NGO State Platform for Beijing” as well as provide them a “link to several
European [feminist] Networks.”58
As the Instituto increasingly labored to plug into the new international feminist networks,
in part through membership in and coordination of Spain’s Association of Support to the
European Lobby of Women, and in part through attendance at UN conferences, Spanish
independent feminists, who were still reliant on grassroots activism, found themselves facing
economic and ideological roadblocks to their international engagement that meant they were, in
at least one instance, quite literally left behind. In 1985, independent feminists hoping to attend
an NGO Tribunal accompanying that year’s WCOW in Nairobi sought an agreement with the
Instituto to defray their expenses and so make the trip possible for representatives of Spain’s
poorly-financed independent feminist movement. The agreement fell through and independent
feminists, outraged at what they perceived as a silencing of their perspective and the Instituto’s
monopolization of the Spanish feminist mantle, lashed out at the agency through a denunciation
published in the July 1985 issue of Tribuna Feminista. Independent feminists first appealed to
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Spain’s desire for international acclaim and connection, arguing that the Instituto, in not
financing their trip, violated the recently ratified CEDAW’s tenet that “induces governments” to
“facilitate the presence of autonomous organizations in international forums.” They also
condemned the Instituto’s actions in terms similar to those that feminists had used to condemn
the SF’s participation in the 1975 WCOW in Mexico City: they asserted that without grassroots
activists to balance them out, the Instituto’s participation made it appear that the Spanish feminist
movement had attended when it really had no representation at the conference, a move that
independent feminists asserted “demonstrates [the Instituto’s] desire to control the Spanish
presence in the Non-Governmental Forum” that accompanied the official WCOW. In other
words, independent feminists strongly implied that they did not consider the institutional
feminists to be feminists at all.59
In sum, feminist successes at intervening in the international political agenda and making
women’s rights part of broader conversations did not always or easily translate into domestic
feminist successes. Within Spain specifically, the Instituto de la Mujer participated in
international events and cultivated its own formal international networks with bodies like the EU
and UN, but it lacked domestic organization and cohesion. Ultimately, the fractures caused by
the Instituto’s decentralization meant that it was unable to generate the political leverage that it
might otherwise have had in a moment of intense international attention to precisely the issues it
was founded to lobby for and address. This breakdown also affected institutional feminists’
ability to create potentially useful domestic channels of solidarity and communication. Moreover,
the vacuum created by the domestically weak national and regional Institutos allowed Spain’s
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feminist agenda to become once again up for debate, at least on the regional and local levels,
where independent feminists’ grassroots networks, though waning in influence internationally,
still held sway. By the 1990s, this shift meant that competing groups of self-identified feminists
once again battled over defining and creating feminist policy, with consequences for how Spain’s
regions implemented gender mainstreaming recommendations promulgated by the UN and the
EU.

Independent Versus Institutional Feminists in Spain
From the late Franco years and through Spain’s transition to democracy, debates about women’s
rights – what constituted women’s rights, who exactly ought to have them, and how the
government could best protect them – occupied the Spanish public, the nation’s politicians,
feminist activists, and international observers. Feminists themselves, who helped make these
debates central to transition-era politics, disagreed about what the “right” answers to these
questions were, as Chapters One and Two show, but they found unity enough to advocate for
change even when shut out of political decision-making.
Tensions between double and single militants had existed since the earliest days of the
feminist movement; creation of the Instituto in 1983, which enmeshed double-militant activists
both in the nation’s new democratic structure and in the shifting web of formal international
feminist politics, only exacerbated single-militants’ frustrations. Before the creation of the
Instituto, feminists’ primary disagreement was, in practical terms, whether to cooperate with the
democratic process that was unfolding, but feminists in general, on both sides of the ideological
debate, worked to define women’s rights and seek protections for them. The existence of the
Instituto created a tangible barrier between those camps: double militants (now institutional
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feminists) had acquired a place within the government they hoped to help refine, which gave
them increased access to and influence over women’s rights policy and its implementation.
Concurrently, the international paradigm for women’s rights activism shifted toward organized,
bureaucratized feminist groups affiliated with governments and working through official political
channels like UN conferences; feminist organizations who were independent of the government
continued community organizing and grassroots activism, but functioned primarily on the local
and regional level.
These changes, particularly the creation of the Instituto, constituted a major shift in how
feminists could access and engage with the political sphere. In the late Franco years and early
transition period, feminists of both ideological camps had the same limited ability to participate
in high-level political debate, and women’s rights activists had fought the Spanish government
for recognition that women faced oppression and that oppression should be rectified. In contrast,
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and on into the 21st century, institutional and independent
feminists had radically different levels of access to political decision-making and they
championed different ideas of what it meant to be feminist, how to define “equality,” and how
best to create and implement policies to guarantee that equality for Spanish women. In this sense,
feminists’ major fight of the late 20th century was not for the recognition that women should
have rights, but was instead about which group of self-identified feminists, independent or
institutional, had the right to claim the mantle of feminism and set the agenda for protecting
women’s rights.
Independent feminists’ major critique of institutional feminists was that they, like male
politicians, played politics with the idea of equality instead of being genuinely interested in
making concrete change. They also believed that institutional feminists’ “integration” into the
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Spanish government had made them complicit in the government’s continued oppression of
women. An independent feminist conference, titled “Feminism and Power” and held less than a
month after the founding of the Instituto, underscores these concerns. The conference was
established to explore the state of Spanish feminism and participants expressed concern over its
future and its goals. In it, independent feminists asserted the “need to review the politics of the
feminist movement to explain its current stagnation…and therefore, the loss of its character as a
social movement.” Presenters opined that the feminist movement as they had known it was
“scattered and isolated” and that “for a few years now, it [had] been difficult to find many
independent feminists.”60
Speakers ultimately laid blame for the feminist movement’s “stagnation” on double
militants – institutional feminists – whose “integration” into the government meant an end to the
potential to restructure the social relationship between men and women through activism. First,
activists Lola G Luna and Maria Luisa Marino i Serra, the former from Oviedo and the latter
from Barcelona, co-presented what they termed a Foucaultian analysis of power relations
between feminists, and concluded that those incorporated into the state “[did] not hesitate to
apply all the techniques and strategies learned as political party militants, in order to retain their
hegemony.”61 The second presenter, Karmele Marchante Barrobes, furthered the critique by
denying independent feminists’ self-identification as feminist, arguing that such women “have
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their exact role to play within their organization and they have stopped asking questions. Of
course, they would not have an answer, either, because they are in a different orbit from the
feminist galaxy.”62
Independent feminists believed that institutional feminists’ integration was not a genuine
attempt to create change, but rather to buttress patriarchal power: “Society is interested in a
certain kind of feminism,” they wrote, “from which it can...extract something for its benefit and
to control its interests.”63 To this end, prominent Spanish feminist Lidia Falcón opined in an
interview with Basque feminist magazine Lanbroa that Spain’s institutional feminism was
ineffective because, unlike in the US, feminists in Spain had not “become independent from the
intellectual colonization that the men of the parties have had over women.”64 Journalist and
scholar Concha Fagoaga, meanwhile, expressed her opinion that institutional feminists were
knowingly complicit in women’s oppression, answering the leading question “how important do
you think it is that the feminist movement be autonomous” with the pronouncement that it was of
utmost importance because “today Party feminists also know how easy it is within those
organizations to postpone feminist goals again and again, waiting for the timing that is never
timely.”65
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These tensions permeated Spanish feminists’ engagement with the international
community as well. Throughout the 1980s, independent feminists coupled their critiques with a
desire to have equal billing with the Instituto’s feminists and for financial support to attend
international conferences that set the global agenda for feminist activism. By the 1990s, Spain’s
independent feminists no longer clamored for a seat at the table, instead rejecting the
international networks in which institutional feminists across Europe participated, and
condemning institutional feminists, both Spanish and foreign, as at best brain-washed and at
worst power-hungry.
Independent feminists expanded their critique of institutional feminism’s “integration”
into the power structure to include critique of the “integrationist” policies that institutions
promoted, namely the Instituto’s adoption of the UN and EU’s gender mainstreaming policies
and equality frameworks. To this end, contributors to Lanbroa argued that “the integration in the
modern democratic society of Equality Feminism,” common across Europe, was in actuality the
integration of “the least revolutionary discourses of alternative movements,” which caused
radicals’ “marginalization” and thus “the silencing of the [critical] analysis of the power relations
between men and women.”66 Independent feminists argued that the kind of equality promised by
gender mainstreaming was tantamount to forcing female integration into the male world instead
of making a world designed for both men and women:
People no longer openly defend misogynistic behaviour or laws that explicitly
discriminate against women; to the contrary, they are careful to make statements,
especially written statements, affirming that women are ‘equal to men’. They begin by
using the term ‘equality’ as a shorthand for equal opportunities or equal rights, but end up

66

El Colectivo Lanbroa, “Analisis y Perspectivas del movimiento Feminisa en Bizkaia,”
Lanbroa, December 1994, 17.

187
not meaning the sameness of rights … but rather a goal for which women must now
strive: conformity with the male world.67
In this sense, Spain’s independent feminists’ critique of gender mainstreaming echoed Torild
Skard’s: both asserted that gender mainstreaming became stripped of its radicalism in
institutional contexts and that, as a result, the policy designed to provide equality for women
instead primarily helped men. Skard, of course, still believed in gender mainstreaming; Spain’s
independent feminists found it to be a deliberate rerouting of women’s rights efforts away from
the possibility of real change.
Despite the gusto of independent feminists’ critiques, they lacked specifics and,
moreover, reached only a small, specialized audience that remained limited largely to
independent feminist circles and did not include ordinary Spaniards. Thus the conversations that
feminists had with and about each other were different from the conversations that Spaniards not
directly involved in feminist groups had about feminists and their goals. In addition, independent
feminists’ failure to communicate or even formulate a platform of concretely-defined problems
and potential solutions perhaps accounted for some of the misunderstandings and misgivings that
ordinary Spaniards had about their brand of feminism and their intentions.
This is not to suggest, however, that Spaniards were silent about feminism or oblivious to
feminist demands. Though press coverage of feminism routinely failed to make distinctions
between feminist groups in ways that feminists themselves did, coverage of feminism throughout
the 1980s and 1990s was nevertheless extensive, and it focused heavily on discrete issues like
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divorce, legalization of abortion, and calls for domestic violence reform.68 It also included
reviews of works by prominent international feminists, occasional opinion pieces by journalists
and intellectuals about the state of feminism in Spain, and ordinary Spaniards’ letters to the
editor. Yet the flood of coverage on feminist issues neither explained the nuances of the feminist
movement nor even hinted there were nuances of the feminist movement beyond a general
mainstream feminist versus radical feminist divide, which translated roughly but not exactly into
the institutional versus independent divide. With few exceptions, those espousing feminist
viewpoints in major periodicals were the same kind of feminist – mainstream and institutional –
and even those who felt otherwise comfortable aligning themselves with feminism rejected socalled “radical,” or independent, feminists.
Though Spaniards seemed to agree that “feminism” was a good idea, feminism seemed
acceptable in the 1980s and 1990s only if defined as a vague recognition that men and women
should have equal rights. This held true even for progressives who ostensibly held fast to
feminist ideals. At the height of the progressive PSOE’s political reign in 1986, for example, and
as the party was working to secure what it defined as feminist goals, an ABC article described
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez’s wife Carmen Romero as having “[become] the star of [a]
massive gathering of socialist women organized by the PSOE in Torremolinos.” The article then
quoted Romero as saying that she rejected what most Spaniards would have defined as “radical”

68

Radcliff has noted that similar media attention to feminists in the early transition also
failed to provide “a conceptual framework that made sense of their presence” despite “significant
coverage” so this was typical of Spanish perceptions of feminism. Pamela Beth Radcliff,
“Imagining Female Citizenship in the ‘New Spain’: Gendering the Democratic Transition, 19751978,” Gender and History 13, no. 4 (November 2001): 509. https://doi.org/10.1111/14680424.00241.

189
feminist views: “I do not understand feminism more than as a collaboration of men and women
to social progress, I do not understand a movement that marginalizes men...”69
The construction of a dichotomy between radical feminists who seemed to hate men and
femininity and more mainstream feminism that embraced the opposite sex extended to
descriptions of feminist politicians. In 1990, in an article lauding Isabel Donaire, the newlyelected female mayor of Jerez in 1990, ABC for example described her as “feminist, but very
feminine.”70 Meanwhile, the portrayal of radical feminism as divisive and undesirable was not
limited to politicians and their families. Spanish model Raquel Revuelta shared a similar
sentiment in a 1989 interview: “I am against radical feminism. I do not share their theories ...
Feminism had its raison d'être in its time, when women achieved, fighting, achievements as
transcendent as the feminine vote. But now, those theses have been obsolete, because nowadays
men and women have the same opportunities as long as they show their personal worth.”71
Revuelta’s perception – that feminism’s moment had come and gone now that women could vote
and feminist demands had been answered with legislative concessions – was widespread: many
women voiced that Spanish women still needed to fight for equality, but no longer needed
radicals’ feminism to do it.72
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Institutional feminists helped reinforce the conceptions of mainstream and radical
feminism in the national press. In 1990, Blanco y Negro ran an article on Naomi Wolf’s path
breaking book, The Beauty Myth, and used it to discuss the trajectory of feminism. The article,
titled “Twenty Years Later: The Resuscitation of Feminism,” posited that feminism within Spain
had died over the prior decade of the 1980s, but that Wolf’s book resonated with a new
generation of feminists beginning to become active in the last decade of the 20th century. Much
of the five-page article summarized Wolf’s conclusions, but its last pages also offered a minifeature on “Spain, Past and Future” that discussed the nation’s history of feminist activism and
asked women to weigh in about the state of feminism in Spain. The Instituto’s director, Carmen
Martínez Ten, rejected claims that feminism had died, arguing instead that it had simply
“changed much over the decade of the 1980s” and that it had “become more diffuse...less
radicalized, but more widespread” with the result that most Spanish women “favored equality
between both sexes.” She also noted that “[h]er preferred definition of feminism [was] ‘a
heartfelt appeal to the common sense of society so that men and women develop as people on
equal terms, regardless of their sex.’”73
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In each of these instances, Spaniards identified only with a mainstream conception of
feminism; independent feminists, deemed ‘radical,’ faced simplified mischaracterizations of their
ideas (as in Romero’s concerns about the marginalization of men), derision, or, as with Martínez
Ten, a sentiment that radicalism’s time had passed. Moreover, editorials and letters to the editor
penned by Spaniards far less famous than Romero or Revuelta echoed these figures’ rejections of
radical feminism. Most newspaper letters to the editors focused on what they felt was feminism’s
attempts to eradicate differences between the sexes. Some writers felt that these differences were
“natural” and that trying to make men and women equal was upsetting the balance.74 Others felt
that equality seemed like a good idea, but that, as one letter-writer suggested, radical feminist
over-reaching made life worse for all women:
The worst thing of all in this disaster is that almost always we come across as horribly
ridiculous because people are able to see through us, because even when the most ardent
feminist digs her fingernails into her palms to keep from telling her fiancé that she wants
to marry a lo Pantoja [this references the desire to have an extravagant wedding] and the
housewife hits the bottle to not tell off her husband who has her completely out of sorts
with his unwillingness to take on any responsibility, men immediately perceive our
schizophrenia and end up handling us as they like – without the advantages, of course,
that came with being so managed back in our grandmothers’ time, because then men
could do as they liked, but some little courtesy or gift always came your way, and now
you’re the one who has to invite them to the movies.75
Once again, aside from writers who rejected feminist calls for equality outright, most rejections
of feminism were in actuality rejections of what Spaniards considered “radical” feminism and
not rejections of mainstream, institutional feminist calls for equality of the sexes and legislative
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changes designed to help the process along. All of this is to say that Spain’s independent
feminists had a circumscribed audience: unlike in the 1970s, independent feminists’ viewpoints
were largely ignored by major periodicals, though when independent feminists did receive
newspaper coverage they were dismissed in similar, if slightly less biting, terms as single
militant feminists in prior years.
However, despite independent feminists’ failure to impact public debates, they
nevertheless were able to make strategic choices that provided them a foothold for influence on
political negotiations for equality policy in Spain. Independent feminists understood the power
of gender mainstreaming rhetoric, and positioned themselves as the real arbiters of gender
mainstreaming, as opposed to the Instituto who they felt implemented it poorly. This choice,
combined with the Instituto’s organizational challenges, put independent feminists in a strong, if
un-reported upon, political position. Ultimately, independent feminists claiming to uphold the
values of gender mainstreaming enmeshed themselves in regional political structures dominated
by the Instituto, as a way of using political leverage to force the “integrationist” institutional
feminists to take seriously independent feminist views on feminism and equality. Thus, despite
their stated animosity towards both institutional feminists and institutional networks,
independent feminists’ political strategies betray what seems in actuality to have been a deep
ambivalence.
The ensuing dynamics can be glimpsed in the example of the Basque country’s battle
over how to improve coeducation in the early 1990s. Independent feminists already at odds with
the Instituto over ideological differences accused its proposed coeducational programs of being
poorly thought out, insufficient, and staffed and managed by individuals so unqualified as to
prevent the schools’ success. Independent feminists’ response was to become immersed in
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regional politics, the structure and content of which was until that point dominated by local
politicians and institutional feminists. When in 1991 the Basque regional Instituto, Emakunde,
published an Action Plan for reshaping the region’s coeducation system, radical feminists sought
appointments to government-established Coeducation Advisory Boards (CAB) tasked with
surveying the education system and instituting change. When these feminists failed to win
enough seats to give them influence, they sought it in other ways, like controlling the staffing of
teacher training programs so they could influence their curricula.76
Independent feminists’ involvement in regional politics also helped shape the priorities of
the national Instituto.77 In at least one instance independent feminists sought to shape not just the
priorities of their regional equality body, but the existence and structure of the body itself: on
International Women’s Day in 1996 Valencian independent feminists, as noted in this chapter’s
opening, begged their regional parliament to create an Instituto, calls they also echoed in a
feminist conference the following year.78 Despite their ideological differences, these independent
feminists also recognized the utility of regional Institutos that, once pushed to change, could then
leverage their action for national change, something scholars Alba Alonso and Tánia Verge have
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called “level shopping,” meaning that independent feminists generally reliant on grassroots
organizational methods worked their way through different “levels” of government
administration seeking a level through which they could effect change.79 In these exchanges,
independent feminists often exerted political leverage in Spain from the bottom up, with the help
of rhetoric and policy formulated and implemented through international bodies like the EU and
UN even as they rejected institutional feminism and institutional feminist networks.

Conclusion
The later decades of the 20th century saw the development of sophisticated, transnational
grassroots feminist networks through which women produced an international feminist culture.
Women in these networks not only shared solidarity, but also strategic and tactical information as
well as practical advice about such matters as how to obtain abortions or help women learn about
their reproductive systems. Significantly, women within these networks understood themselves
as working for a common goal that transcended their ambition for individual pieces of legislation
in their national contexts; they believed that women in all nations were affected by similar
political milieus that routinely denied women rights and thus that the plight of women in other
nations was their plight also.
Over the 1980s and 1990s, international feminist networks underwent a dramatic shift,
moving from a system in which grassroots feminist activists organized protests and direct actions
that transcended national boundaries to a system in which government-affiliated women’s
ministries sent delegations to international conferences organized by intergovernmental bodies
and negotiated for women’s rights policy through diplomatic channels. This shift transformed
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feminist activism into a career for a subset of feminists. Those feminists working within
government ministries could aspire to titles, offices and salaries; the professionalization of
feminism gave women’s rights activists legitimacy, access to the process of legislating, and
increased leverage to request policy change and to influence their national governments.
As international feminist networks changed, so too did the goals of such activism. In the
1990s, feminists had successfully lobbied intergovernmental organizations for a new way of
conceiving, measuring, and implementing equality measures. EU gender mainstreaming policy,
for instance, required that member states take the potential impact on women into consideration
when weighing any organizational decision.
In Spain especially, these shifts upended the already uneasy balance between double- and
single-militant feminists. The creation of the Instituto de la Mujer in 1983 gave double militants,
now institutional feminists, a home within the government they had defended; single militants,
now independent feminists, lacked such official recognition. Independent feminists developed a
deep ambivalence for institutional feminists as dominant methods of feminist politicking
changed. On the one hand, independent and institutional feminists shared some common goals.
Gender mainstreaming was one: it satisfied both groups’ desires to pinpoint and resolve at least
some of the causes of discrimination that women suffered in Spanish society. And as their
request for financial assistance to attend the 1985 WCOW NGO Tribunal shows, independent
feminists also clearly hoped to benefit from the same institutional feminist “integration” that they
critiqued.
However, institutional feminists’ political failures, as well as what independent feminists
perceived as their ideological shortcomings, served as the foundation for a dispute about who
should have the right to define feminism as well as for a political battle for the right to define
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equality. A struggle over which feminists should design and implement legislation and policies to
protect this still-undefined equality ensued, primarily on the local and regional levels in Spain as
the Instituto’s decentralization left a vacuum of institutional feminist political power in those
places. In this way, both institutional and independent feminists’ desire to influence domestic
politics, and to reach toward Europe for solidarity reproduced and ossified decades-old
arguments about how best to define and protect post-Franco women’s rights and trumpet Spain’s
post-Franco national identity. In other words, international representation and connection simply
became new sites for feminists intent on waging their identitarian battles as each ideological
camp persisted in its belief that the other did violence to the larger feminist cause. Soon,
however, as activists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries gained ground on a newly publicly
debated issue – changing attitudes toward domestic abuse – feminists of all varieties would
concentrate on combating a more spectacular and far more material brand of violence.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Violent Inequalities:
Debates on Domestic Violence, Gender Equality, and the Ongoing Struggle
to Define Post-Francoist Democratic Spain
On 4 December 1997, Ana Orantes, a middle-aged Spanish housewife, mustered the
courage to appear on TeleCinco’s popular daytime talk show and testify to the domestic abuse
she had endured during her forty-year marriage to José Parejo Avivar. Over the course of the
interview, Orantes described daily beatings and screamed epithets; revealed how her husband
had raped her while she was postpartum; talked about her greatest fear, that her spouse would
similarly abuse their children (including a daughter whom she suspected he had already sexually
molested); and questioned her God for seemingly sanctioning such a match for her: “Now
Christmas is coming and I have no joy in life,” she sobbed. “I'm as if buried alive, and I just want
to cry. I ask the Lord why I had to come across this man.”1
Orantes never fully explained her willingness to share such a personal story with TeleCinco
and its viewers, but there are some clues about why she may have wished to. A recent fight, in
which her husband had choked her, gave Orantes courage to ask for a divorce. But escaping the
legal bonds of marriage did not mean escaping her ex-husband: the court refused to grant
Orantes alimony, sole custody of their eleven children, or possession of the house. Lacking
financial independence, and with her life inextricably intertwined with his, Orantes’s only option
was to continue living with her abuser. She created a makeshift apartment in the top floor of the
house the couple had previously shared. This proximity enabled Parejo’s bullying to continue.
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He no longer beat her, but even after he moved out to pursue a new relationship, he often
returned to threaten Orantes. “I start to tremble when our dog starts barking,” Orantes told
TeleCinco, “because we know [that means] that he's coming.”2
Thirteen days after the interview aired, Orantes’ ex-husband stomped up the stairs to
threaten her for the last time. But this time he did not stop at the threshold and wound her with
words alone. This time he burst through the door and bludgeoned Orantes until she crumpled to
the floor. He threw her from the second-floor balcony and into the courtyard below, where he
then doused her with gasoline and lit her broken body on fire. The couple’s 14-year old daughter
discovered the horrific scene – Orantes’ body still smoldering – upon her return from school.
Parejo claimed temporary insanity as his motive for the crime. Orantes had insulted him, he said,
and provoked him. An enraptured nation watched the murder trial, and when it was over, with
Parejo sentenced to 17 years in prison, a public outpouring of support for Orantes turned into a
national call for stricter domestic violence laws.
This public attention seemed a windfall for feminist activists who had desired domestic
violence reform since the late Franco years and who had campaigned on behalf of victims of
sexual and domestic violence since Franco’s death. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two,
feminists had long framed their advocacy for women’s rights, including their calls for sexual and
domestic violence reforms, as a fight against the lingering traces of National-Catholicism’s
repressive gender order. Orantes’ death marked the moment at which other Spaniards also began
to entertain the idea of crafting legislation to attempt to eliminate, or at least reduce, the
remaining repressive social and cultural forces that feminists of all persuasions understood to be

2

“Entrevista íntegra a Ana Orantes días antes de su asesinato,” Informativos TeleCinco,
November 25, 2008, https://www.telecinco.es/informativos/sociedad/Entrevista-intregra-AnaOrantes-asesinato_0_747600023.html.

199
permeating – and poisoning – Spanish society. The momentum generated from Orantes’ death,
and subsequent deaths like it,3 culminated in the Cortes passing Ley Orgánica de Violencia de
Género, or Measures of Integral Protection against Gender Violence (GVL), on 28 December
2004, which explicitly stated that the legislation’s goal was to remedy remaining imbalances
between the sexes. Yet the path to passing the GVL was riddled with complications, as was the
final version of the bill itself.
First, Spaniards intent on solving the nation’s domestic violence crisis did so in a time of
protracted cultural upheaval. Both institutional and independent feminists’ prevailing
understanding of domestic violence was that violence happened because of larger sociocultural
forces at work: a nation-wide tacit acceptance of discrimination against women and belief in
female inferiority, given voice and political power through the Franco regime’s policies.
Conservatives – those on the right of Spain’s political spectrum – chafed at this characterization
and, as such, throughout the 1990s they clashed with progressives – those on the left of Spain’s
political spectrum – over how to define domestic violence. Was domestic violence a crime
committed by dysfunctional individuals, or was it a symptom of “machismo,” a term Spaniards
generally used as shorthand for aggressive shows of male dominance, including those that had
been encouraged by National-Catholicism? Conservatives favored labelling the crime “family”
or “domestic” violence to signal their belief in the first interpretation, and progressives – who
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ultimately won the rhetorical battle – favored the term “gender violence” to denote that social
conditions enabled men to abuse.
Conservatives and progressives relatedly struggled over how to shape the nation’s family
and religious values in the post-Franco era. Conversations about the domestic violence crisis
necessarily took place within this larger debate, as defining and punishing the crime also
required defining which family and romantic partnerships were affected, and under which
circumstances, and how those partnerships should evolve or end as a result of the abuse.
Labelling the crime “gender violence” had unintended consequences, however, and further
complicated the debate over domestic violence legislation. The term “gender violence” implied
that only women were victims and only men were abusers, and in consequence also foreclosed
the option of applying newly strengthened domestic violence protections to families other than
traditional families. This was especially significant in the early 2000s as the Spanish debate
about legalizing gay marriage overlapped with the debate about domestic violence protections.
Even as legislators demonstrated their willingness to expand definitions of family to encompass
same-sex partnerships, they created stronger domestic violence protections applicable only to
families consisting of a (male) husband and a (female) wife. Moreover, as feminist terminology
like “gender equality” and “gender violence” gained currency and activists came closer to
attaining their vision of women’s rights, conservatives began to appropriate feminist rhetoric –
such as the term “gender violence” – to argue for restrictions on women’s rights.
Moreover, tension between ideologically opposed feminist groups also affected the debate
surrounding the GVL. The professionalization of feminism that took place with the creation of
the Instituto marginalized independent feminists and their grassroots activism. Both feminist
factions supported legislation to resolve Spain’s domestic violence crisis, but institutional
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feminists had greater access to resources, including data that helped them understand the scale
and scope of the problem. In addition, institutional feminists had political leverage and social
standing that allowed their inquiries and their denunciations to take root and that opened the way
for their organizations to lead the legislative process. Independent feminists, on the other hand,
struggled throughout the 1990s to rebuild networks, both domestic and international, that had
eroded with the shift to professionalized feminism. In some ways, these differences allowed
institutional feminists and independent feminists to play complementary roles advocating the
increased criminalization of domestic violence: institutional feminists involved themselves with
the political particulars, while independent feminists participated in community activism that saw
the establishment of crisis centers, safe houses, and marches. Sometimes institutional and
independent feminists’s efforts overlapped: they occasionally worked together to gain media
attention, or to gain local and regional resources for abused women. Yet the two groups of
feminists still found themselves at odds over who the GVL ought to protect. While the legislation
was undoubtedly an achievement, independent feminists objected to the new law and its perhaps
inadvertently problematic exclusions of LGBT couples and men who suffered abuse.
Institutional feminists, meanwhile, defended the law as written and worked to secure its passage.
Lastly, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Spaniards once again grappling with the legacy
of Franco-era traumas. Parties debating policies and legislation to protect victims of domestic
violence – that is, intimate partner violence – did so in a moment of intense attention to other
instances of violence visited upon Spaniards, including renewed attention to the Franco regime’s
mass executions (and subsequent mass burials) of Republican soldiers, sympathizers, and
political dissidents, as well as terrorist bombings by ETA and, in the early 2000s, by Islamic
extremists. Commentators and politicians used the same language to parse these forms of
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violence and their resulting traumas as they did to discuss domestic violence. Politicians also
made explicit connections between all of these kinds of violence, for instance equating the
trauma experienced by victims of domestic violence with that experienced by victims of ETA’s
terrorism, and positing that government assistance for both sets of victims should come from the
same funds.4
In all cases, Spaniards merged discussion of Franco and his legacy with debates about
solutions to the epidemic of domestic abuse. Conversations about Franco’s legacy were not new,
and indeed feminists of all persuasions had argued for decades that women’s problems persisted
precisely because Spanish society had inadequately dealt with the lingering social and cultural
effects of Francoist ideologies. New in the 1990s and early 2000s was a willingness to attribute
Spain’s social ills directly to Franco and to tackle them head-on, and this came out clearly in
Spanish society’s wrestling with how to define domestic violence, how to understand what its
prevalence meant for their nation, and how to determine an appropriate legal response. The terms
of both popular and political discourse reflected this preoccupation as Spaniards universally
derided policies they opposed as “fascist” or “Francoist” or “totalitarian” measures that
threatened to plunge Spain back into “backwardness” and “oppression.” There seemed to be
consensus that “Francoist” was a slur encompassing a wide variety of moral ills with dire
consequences for post-Franco society, and indeed this slur soon became a catch-all denoting all
manner of horrible fates for Spanish democracy, but what actually constituted “backwardness”
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and “oppression” remained, and still remains, up for debate. Significantly, the debate occurred
through conversations about women’s rights, conversations which have become a catch-all for
confusion and complication surrounding the definition of democracy in Spain and the delineation
of its boundaries.

Discovering and Defining a Social Problem:
Legal and Rhetorical Battles over Domestic Violence Before and Following Orantes
Orantes’ shocking murder highlighted Spain’s long-standing problem with domestic violence; it
also underscored that violence against women remained socially acceptable in late-20th century
Spanish society, as it had been for decades, and that the legal consequences, though more
punitive than in the past, remained insufficient. Orantes’ murder occurred in 1997, but her abuse
stretched back four decades to 1957. Orantes recounted in the TeleCinco interview that Parejo
had first beat her three months after their wedding, an incident that met with a mixed response
from her new in-laws. While her father-in-law hit and admonished his son, Orantes’ mother-inlaw was furious with her husband for interfering. Marriage, she believed, was a private matter,
and whether Parejo hit Orantes or kissed her, it was no one’s business. Society, Orantes
explained, held the same perception. She had not reported the abuse to the authorities “because at
that time it was not done.”5
Social stigma and perception of domestic violence as an infrequent, isolated problem made
it difficult for women like Orantes to receive help and contributed to the violence becoming so
widespread in Spain as to constitute a public health epidemic by the 21st century. Several factors
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contributed. First, as media scholars Sonia Aran Ramspott and Pilar Medina Bravo have shown,
during the Franco regime, Spaniards did not perceive domestic violence as a systemic, social
problem, at least in part because media representations of domestic violence obscured its
prevalence and effects. At mid-century, newspapers published reports of domestic violence
crimes only rarely, and then only in local editions and only in especially gruesome or shocking
cases. Even when periodicals did publish information on a particular incident, they blamed it on
the abuser’s jealous rage, alcoholism, or temporary insanity. In these cases, domestic violence
was considered a crime of passion. In addition, labelling domestic violence a “crime of passion”
excused men from responsibility: insanity, alcohol, a woman breaking his heart – all of these
motives placed the blame for a man’s violent attacks elsewhere, and sometimes on the abused
woman herself.6 Moreover, even if Orantes had reported her early abuse, she would have found
little, if any, legal support. Under the Franco regime there were no laws criminalizing domestic
violence. Divorce was also illegal, so women had no escape from or recourse against marital
abuse.
Public perception of domestic violence evolved in the late Franco years and during Spain’s
transition to democracy as feminist demands and international scrutiny of Spanish culture and
politics drew attention to the Franco regime’s repression. The executions of political dissidents
and ETA’s acts of retaliation carried headlines worldwide, but the oppression of women did, too.
Along with their struggle for political representation and abortion access, feminists’ early
demands – all of which international newspapers eagerly reported – also included stronger
criminalization of violence against women.
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As with other forms of violence and female oppression, feminists connected violence
against women to larger social problems within Spain. In a 1978 New York Times article, a
Barcelona feminist identified only as Inma asserted that rape had a broader definition than forced
intercourse, and that it could also serve as an illustration of the machismo in Spanish society that
violently oppressed women: “rape is not only the aggression that takes place in the street,” she
stated. “It is all the aggression that occurs against women, from the insults on the sidewalk to the
disguised rape that takes place in marriage.”7 Feminists were also angry that victims and not
rapists suffered social stigma – in one particularly sad case, a child victim of rape was expelled
from school because administrators feared that she would be a bad influence on her peers – and
feminists railed against cultural commentary that treated rape as a joke. For example, a
Barcelona newspaper published the following quote from popular cartoonist Chumy Chumez:
“When I learn that someone has raped a fourteen-year-old girl, I’m envious, truly. I know that
this may not sit well with some people, but I say what I think. To me, rape seems a good thing
from eight to fourteen.”8 Perhaps unsurprisingly in such an environment, feminist statistics
showed that 80 percent of rapes in Spain went unreported and that even when women did report
rapes, criminal investigations were rarely productive.9
Though sexual violence, unlike domestic violence, was criminalized, it was legally
classified as a misdemeanor and carried negligible penalties. Moreover, the legal definition of
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“rape” also made prosecuting the crime a challenge. A 1978 New York Times article for instance
recounted the story of one woman who, though she reported her rape and a medical exam
revealed semen in her vaginal canal, was determined to have an intact hymen, which meant that
under Spanish law she was still a virgin and so had not, in fact, been raped.10 In addition, sexual
violence was only criminalized outside of marriage: marital rape became criminalized, and then
only by default, with a 1992 Supreme Court case ruling that the violence accompanying one
man’s sexual assault of his wife signified that she had been unable to make her own decision
about whether to engage in the sexual activity and thus that she had been raped.11 There is still
no explicit legislation criminalizing marital rape in Spain. In comparison, most European states
had criminalized marital rape by the early 1990s and by 1993 it was criminalized in all 50 United
States.12
The legal separation of domestic violence and sexual violence had important
consequences for how both domestic and sexual violence were legally defined, evident in part by
the long-overdue criminalization of marital rape, as well as by the fact that domestic violence
protections did not explicitly extend to women who had been raped by their partners until the
2000s. In 1978, the legal environment surrounding rape was sufficiently ill-defined that the
mother of 4- and 6-year-old daughters who had been raped by their father “faced the possibility
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of contempt of court” for refusing his requests for visitation.13 That rape stained the reputation of
victims, that culturally speaking rape was a joke, that family affairs were considered private, that
divorce was illegal, that men retained the right to full custody under Spanish law, even as abusers
and rapists – each of these factors affected this mother’s inability to get legal separation from her
abuser and protect her children from abuse. Orantes’ own sad fate in the 1990s seems similar,
though she was divorced: she also could not fully escape her marriage or prevent visitations,
despite her husband’s history of abuse and despite her fears that he was, or would soon be,
raping their daughters.
Feminists protested these injustices with anti-rape campaigns and campaigns to raise
awareness of domestic violence, and included stronger protections for domestic violence victims
in their platforms along with demands for citizenship reforms, legal divorce, and access to
contraception and abortion. Spanish feminists also used the international connections they had
forged through their work for abortion reform to strengthen their calls for domestic violence
reform, and they made explicit connections between their work and that of feminists in other
nations, arguing that “the problem of battering that our sisters in England, Germany, Denmark,
and the Netherlands are fighting against has similar conditions and characteristics in our
country.”14 As historian Conny Roggeband has shown, Spanish feminists were especially taken
with the American model of rape crisis centers, and also participated in a number of international
conferences that brought them together with women from nations with better developed anti-rape
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and anti-domestic violence laws, from whom they could learn how to lobby their governments
and how to set up autonomous services. Of course, Spanish feminists had to adapt the models
they observed to the Spanish cultural and political environment. Particularly troublesome was the
negligible criminalization of domestic violence in Spanish law, the difficulties women had in
escaping their abusive husbands since divorce was illegal, and regulations that made it nearly
impossible for feminists to found non-governmental rape crisis centers.15
In 1983, when control of the Spanish government passed to the Socialist Party and Prime
Minister Felipe Gonzalez founded the Instituto de la Mujer, abortion and divorce reforms were
either, as Chapter Two discussed, in process or already cemented and left no room for
institutional feminists to influence negotiations. As such, institutional feminists moved to make
rape and domestic violence reform the cornerstone of their platform once they had the ability to
participate in government policymaking. In 1986 the Instituto participated in a Cortes-sponsored
task force investigating the mistreatment of women. The Instituto’s first action was compiling
statistics about the rates of domestic violence in Spain, a tricky proposition given that at the time
there had been few studies on domestic violence and women who had been abused did not selfreport for reasons ranging from fear to that they had normalized their abuse and did not
recognize that what they experienced was domestic violence; in Spain as in many other places,
abuse was under-reported.16
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Moreover, as Spain contemporaneously joined the EEC, the Instituto gained access to
statistics on domestic violence in other nations, permitting comparisons that showed Spanish
levels to be on par with the rest of Europe, though with lower levels of criminalization and
government involvement. This new international tie, in addition to Spain’s status as a signatory
on the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or
CEDAW, and its participation in the UN’s series of World Conferences on Women, gave
institutional feminists more leverage to lobby for the kinds of reforms that they wanted and that
other nations locked in a similar struggle against domestic violence had already implemented.
In the decade before Orantes’ death, the landscape of domestic violence activism had
already begun to change. Feminist agitation and international intervention combined with new
media depictions of domestic violence to make acts of abuse seem less isolated.17 In the legal
arena, Penal Code reforms passed in 1989 classified repeated physical abuse against domestic
partners and dependents as an offense punishable by one to six months in jail.18 Lawmakers also
expanded the definition of rape to include oral and anal rape as well as vaginal rape. More
significantly, these laws criminalized rapes occurring within marriage and other romantic
relationships though they, notably, did not include such sexual assault under the rubric of
domestic violence. The legal definition of domestic violence still excluded sexual assault even
though sexual violence in a relationship was criminal, so women experiencing sexual violence
within relationships could not avail themselves of protections meant for victims of domestic
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violence. The Cortes strengthened domestic violence laws in 1995 as well, increasing penalties
for domestic abusers from a one-to-six month jail term to a required jail sentence of six months
to three years;19 at the same time, and foreshadowing a shift in the government’s legislative
strategy, Spanish media began reporting on women’s experiences of domestic violences,
focusing on the emotional trauma that abused women bore and not on the motivations of their
abusers.20
Yet for all this change, it was Orantes’ death in 1997 that truly opened doors for activists
seeking solutions to Spain’s domestic violence problem. Indeed, the murder was to domestic
violence reform what Bilbao had been to abortion’s legalization: the resulting media frenzy
helped the public understand domestic violence as a public health problem; it paved the way for
perception of domestic violence as a symptom of a larger social burden that women bore; and it
catalyzed support for further legal changes that feminists demanded. This helped the
pervasiveness of the problem become visible and helped frame domestic violence as
simultaneously exceptionally violent yet, in contrast with 1970s narratives, heartbreakingly
wide-spread. Media still portrayed domestic violence as a spectacle, but now the public was
being prompted to receive that spectacle as signifying social dysfunction rather than individual
tragedy. A statement by Archbishop Elias Yanes, the head of the Spanish Catholic Church,
further underscores just how significant Orantes’ murder was in Spain’s evolving understanding
of the intersections between culture and violence, as well as how complex the debate over
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domestic violence legislation was becoming. Despite his organization’s historical alliance with
the conservative right, Yanes proclaimed that ending domestic violence involved “fighting
machismo.”21 Given that Yanes was what scholar of Spanish Catholicism William Callahan has
described as an “ecclesiastical moderate” who was generally sympathetic to conservative parties
and causes, Yanes’ statement was more an indication of the Spanish Church’s changing position
on the origins of domestic violence than an expression of personal progressive political beliefs.22
Yanes’ linking of domestic violence to machismo points to the increasing social acceptance
of this idea over the late 20th century, but Spain’s politicians and government officials
nevertheless could not reach consensus about the source of the violence or about how to use the
state’s resources to prevent it. In the months after Orantes’ death the Cortes and the Instituto both
proposed ways to tackle the problem, but a gulf remained between the two bodies’
interpretations of the problem and the solutions they proposed. First, in 1998 the Cortes amended
the Penal Code of 1995 by passing new legislation that focused on providing assistance to
women abused by their romantic partners, as opposed to prior interventions that focused on
either punishing the abusers or alleviating only family violence that affected children and the
elderly.23 Though the Cortes’ new focus on specifically female victims constituted a major shift
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in how politicians legislated questions of domestic violence, it was a far cry from recognizing
feminist arguments, like those the Instituto made, that domestic violence disproportionately
affected women, and that the Spanish state too was complicit in abetting these crimes by having
done little historically to combat toxic notions of gender that ultimately fueled this abusive
behavior.
That same year, the Instituto issued the Action Plan Against Domestic Violence 19982000, which opened: “Spanish society has become increasingly aware not only of the seriousness
of violence against women, but the true extent of this problem behavior. In the present day,
violence against women has moved beyond being a private concern and is now regarded as an
assault on society itself, an attack on the essence of democracy.”24 The Plan, in other words, was
the Instituto’s claim for understanding domestic violence as a problem that plagued society as a
whole, not just individual women. In addition, strategically, the Instituto linked combating
domestic violence with the ideal of democracy itself, a strategy that also positioned opponents as
anti-democracy.
The Action Plan was ultimately both a suggestion for new legislation focusing on domestic
violence and a powerful denunciation of the government’s refusal to engage in debate about the
relationship between violence and machismo. That the government had received 18,535
complaints of domestic violence in 1997 alone, the Plan’s text argued, indicated that such abuses
remained a significant problem. And the 91 Spanish women who had been murdered by their
male partners so far that year proved that existing statutes designed to protect victims were
ineffective. The Action Plan provided an outline for new legislation: the government should
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recognize that psychological abuse could be as damaging as physical; it should provide
restrictions on the contact abusers had with victims; it should provide victims with more
resources so they could escape their abusers. The Action Plan, in other words, called for
correctives to Spain’s legal code so the conditions leading to Orantes’ death could not be
replicated.25
It also provided an outline for how Spaniards should understand the problem of domestic
violence. Domestic violence, according to the Instituto, was a failure not just of the
government’s inadequate enforcement of legislation and statues; it was a failure of transition-era
legislation mandating equality of the sexes. For how, the document asked, could men and women
be equal if men continually, and on such a large scale, deprived women of their right to live
without abuse? The Instituto argued that such equality was impossible under the present
conditions and that the government needed to also undertake measures such as educating
children about gender equality and working to ban media advertisements that reinforced sexist
and misogynistic stereotypes.. From their perspective the government had a responsibility to
institute stricter domestic violence laws to protect individual women from individual men, but
also to protect all women from the discrimination they faced in a society that led men to feel that
such abuse was justified, acceptable, and excusable.26
The government adopted the Instituto’s Action Plan, promising to follow the organization’s
recommendations, but this caused confusion and anger in Cortes when politicians debated the
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extent to which the plan was useful for shaping new domestic violence legislation. Maria Carme
Solsona i Piñol, a center-right MP from Barcelona, argued that the Plan in its presented form was
useless. In her opinion, the government’s adoption of it represented the PP’s attempts to shunt
the problem of domestic violence aside:
… the Action Plan against domestic violence that they present us today, which in
principle was going to be an emergency plan to combat violence against women, is also
the product of the government’s hurry to pursue a problem that has caused a certain alarm
in society and not a serious policy concern with putting in motion measures destined to
eradicate the problem of gender violence … Of the 57 actions that the plan proposes, a
simple analysis confirms that fewer than ten percent are concrete measures that can be
implemented; how the rest will be developed in the short or long term is unknown. I
reiterate that, from our perspective, this seems a mere declaration of intentions, they seem
more objectives than concrete actions, because many of them limited themselves to
“insisting”, “elaborating”, “disseminating”, and other rather vague terms.
Solsona believed that officials adopted the Action Plan as a way to look like they were working
for change while in actuality doing very little to help sufferers of domestic violence. To this end,
she also questioned the structure of the government’s financial commitment to the Action Plan,
arguing that as adopted it failed to provide emergency budget support and, moreover, did not
provide sufficient funds to implement the Instituto’s recommendations.27
PP representative Maria Jesus Sainz Garcia hit back against Solsona’s claims, arguing that
the Action Plan represented a marked departure from the previous government’s failed policies
and was, in fact, a true commitment to change:
Let us recall…that the previous administration, the Socialist administration, only created
two equality plans, which lacked any section dealing specifically with family violence,
and featured a mere six measures, all of these far less concrete than those in [our gender]
violence plan, and of which only two came to anything. It may perhaps be difficult for
this group to accept that the Partido Popular’s administration had to arrive for the third
plan to contain a section devoted specifically [to gender violence] and for the creation,
for the first time, of a plan that emerged not in reaction to some truly bloody event, but as
27
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a result of a very clear commitment … We believe that, as a result, the plan marks a
watershed in government policy, a real commitment to a politics of equality and
solidarity … 28
In reality, the impact of Cortes’ adoption of the Action Plan, unanimously passed in June 1999,
fell somewhere between Solsona and Sainz Garcia’s assertions. The PP’s Action-Plan-inspired
legislation did constitute an evolution of Spain’s domestic violence policy, in that it offered
solutions for victims and not just punishments for abusers and that it acknowledged, if implicitly,
that it was most often women who suffered domestic abuse. To this end, the policy pledged to
provide “more and better protection for victims of such appalling behavior,” “criminalization of
psychological violence exercised on a routine basis,” and introduced restraining orders for abuse
victims that made it easier for them to evict their abusive husbands. 29
But, to the great disappointment of the Instituto and some independent feminists, the 1999
law stopped far short of what the Instituto envisioned in its Action Plan. Sexist and objectifying
media representations of women and the call for more comprehensive education to combat
gender inequality, for example, were discussed in committee but did not make it to the floor for
Cortes to debate. The law also continued to normalize the perception of domestic violence as
exclusive of sexual violence. The normalization of domestic violence as purely physical violence
had consequences for those women experiencing other forms of domestic abuse, evident in the
ways that victims of domestic violence self-identified and the low rates at which they reported
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their abuse. A survey of abused women, conducted by Juanjo Medina-Ariza and Rosemary
Barberet in 2003, showed that only 18 percent of those who had experienced sexual abuse in
their relationships considered themselves victims of domestic violence, as compared to 80
percent who experienced physical abuse, and found that sexual domestic violence was the least
reported form.30 Medina-Ariza and Barberet felt the discrepancy large enough to urge further
investigation into the incidence of marital rape, though they noted the difficulties of gathering
accurate domestic violence statistics and making the crime fully visible to a public receiving
messages from media and government agencies that domestic violence consisted of physical
(and, increasingly, psychological) abuse.31 Feminists had succeeded in gaining criminalization of
marital rape and gaining acceptance of the idea that committing to a relationship did not mean a
priori consent to sexual acts – but they had not managed to move the government to include
sexual violence in the rubric of domestic violence or to include it as a concern in negotiations for
domestic violence legislation. Still more concerning for feminists was the 1999 law’s silence
concerning the origins of domestic violence and its roots in Franco-era misogyny. The law was
rendered in sterile legalese that gave no sign of the issue’s complexity and, though its text and
tenets flirted with the idea of framing domestic violence as a larger social problem, the
legislation ultimately treated it as a mundane matter of criminal law.
In 1999, at least, the Instituto failed to gain legislative concessions for its broader agenda
of attacking Franco-era gender norms and the machismo it felt continued to affect Spanish social
customs. However, it still moved the needle of public opinion on the causes of domestic
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violence. Media representations of the crime’s true extent, the Catholic Church’s response to
Orantes’ death, and the terms in which Cortes debated legislation to curb domestic violence all
show that Spaniards were becoming more comfortable with thinking of the crime as one with
gendered elements and which revealed something, albeit something unsavory, about Spanish
society and women’s experiences within it. Moreover, the Socialist opposition in the Cortes, the
PSOE, increasingly championed domestic violence legislation along the lines of what both
institutional and independent feminists demanded. In the year 2000 and again in 2002, the PSOE
sponsored “leyes integrales,” or comprehensive laws that would address feminist calls for
domestic violence legislation that included social reform, though the ruling PP blocked them.32
Both the Instituto and independent feminists used this momentum to further publicize the
extent of domestic violence, to encourage women to file complaints with the police and leave
their abusive partners, and to embrace a new generation of would-be activists. The Instituto, for
example, created wide-spread awareness campaigns in 1998 that proliferated images of abused
women and used the slogan “If he beats you, he doesn't love you. Love yourself! File a
complaint against him!,” and continues to rely on visual media to spread awareness of domestic
violence (see Fig. 9, the “Show the Red Card to an Abuser” campaign organized by the Asturian
Instituto, in which soccer players and other public figures urged abused women to report their
abuse and to leave their abusers).33 In the same year, the Instituto partnered with independent
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feminist groups to begin an annual march, with women across the nation gathering on 25
November to rally against domestic violence.
Activists found solidarity and community at such marches, but also, in the dawning digital
age, on the Internet. In 1996 feminist journalist Montserrat Boix had founded an online
community, Mujeres en Red, or Women Online. She did so wanting to understand more about
the common experiences of Mediterranean women and to combat domestic violence on a global
scale, but also noted that there was “an absence of feminism on the Internet, especially in
Spanish.” Her initial work developing the site, aimed at “gathering information on the status of
women,” led her to undertake extensive reporting on domestic violence in Spain. It was not her
original intention – and indeed, the site features other significant issues – but after Orantes’
death, Boix’s website became one of the major places where Spain’s feminists, whether aligned
with the Instituto or not, shared their thoughts about the problems of gender violence and
women’s inequality in their country.34
This shift in perception of domestic violence meant that even conservative politicians
began committing themselves to legislation that described – if not treated – domestic violence as
a social problem as the 21st century dawned. As feminist activism grew increasingly vocal and a
new rash of high-profile murders took place in early 2003,35 the Cortes, with the backing of the
majority PP, unanimously passed the Order for the Protection of Victims of Domestic Violence
in July 2003. Its explanatory statement read:
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Violence in the family and in particular gender-based violence is a serious problem in our
society that demands a comprehensive and coordinated response by all public authorities.
The situation giving rise to these forms of violence transcends the home to become a
scourge that affects and involves all citizens. It is therefore essential to devise new and
more effective legal instruments, technically well-articulated, that tackle from the outset
any conduct that could, in the future, escalate into something more serious.36
In this new law, the Spanish government acknowledged that violence in the family was often
“gender-based,” with women suffering the most from abuse by their husbands. Later invocations
of “supranational organizations (UN, Council of Europe, EU institutions)” underscore the
influence that international bodies had on those designing the legislation. For instance, in its
General Recommendations, the United Nations’ Committee for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women originated and defined the term “gender-based violence” to
describe violence against women for the fact of being women, and violence that might be used
against women because of the perception of women’s inferiority.37
Lastly, the Cortes’ passage of a law describing domestic violence as “a scourge that affects
and involves all citizens [emphasis mine]” emphasized that the prevalence of abuse was society’s
problem, with every Spaniard both impacted by and complicit in the perpetuation of such crimes
against women. Legislators, by also introducing the law as an answer to the “serious problem in
[Spanish] society” that “violence exerted in the family and, in particular, gender violence” posed,
also hinted at the violence’s origins in the machismo that feminists continually decried. Yet the
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law itself did not include provisions for broad social reform of the kind feminists wanted, nor
were politicians willing to entertain legal solutions for overhauling the social structures
perpetuating machismo, instead choosing to focus on deterring abuse by devising novel ways of
punishing abusers.38
Figure 9:
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The 2003 law as such was at odds with how Spanish society increasingly perceived
domestic violence. Before 1997, violence that women experienced in their intimate relationships
was private: it was not publicly discussed, and the legal system treated abuses as a series of
individual crimes. Orantes’ death marked a turning point, and also blurred the line between the
violence being perceived to be a private matter or a public one: society talked about violence as a
social problem even as legislation dealt with abuse as unique, isolated, individualized cases.
Politicians and activists struggled with this disconnect between the legal and cultural perceptions
of domestic violence, which played out in a rhetorical battle over what to call the crime of
domestic abuse. The term each party used to name the violence became an indicator of the
strategy they promoted for eradicating it. These parties did not have different definitions of what
constituted domestic violence, but rather different opinions about how to legally assign
responsibility and help victims.
On the one hand, the term “gender violence,” appropriated by feminists and the PSOE from
European Union and United Nations contexts, signified progressives’ belief that domestic abuse
was caused by persistent patriarchal repression. On the other, accepting the implication that
society caused “gender violence” was at odds with the conservative push to legally categorize
domestic abuse as a matter of individual criminality. For this reason, the PP and the Catholic
Church used the terms “family violence” and/or “domestic violence” instead of “gender
violence:” each of these referred to the same physical crime, but carried different implications
about its causes and the appropriate legal way of managing it.
As political scientist Emanuela Lombardo has shown, conservatives’ rhetorical choice to
call violence against women “family violence” or “domestic violence” stripped the crime of its
gendered nature, “blurring the patriarchal component of violence in the more ‘neutral’ and less
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feminist concept of ‘family violence,’ in which roles of perpetrators and victims are not clearly
defined.” Lombardo also argued that “the result is that responsibility for violent actions appear
more widespread rather than focused on male dominated society,” while at the same time making
violence against women more personal and individual. Conservative measures to combat the
violence followed from these assumptions, with the effect that the legislation passed by the PP
“privilege[d] individual rather than structure oriented actions. Measures [we]re not designed for
men in general to change their attitudes. Rather, they tend to be targeted at individual women
(and men) rather than at the dismantling of the patriarchal structures that provoke and maintain
male domination over women.”39
I argue that use of the terms “family violence” and “domestic violence,” at least legally
speaking, also allowed their proponents to sidestep the question of Franco’s legacy. It allowed
the PP and the Catholic Church to continue their doublespeak by rhetorically wrestling with the
meaning of Francoism, and its possible impact on gender relations, without doing so during the
parliamentary process in a concrete and legally binding way. This was likely due, at least in part,
to the Catholic Church’s reticence to support legislation that could disrupt nuclear family
structures. The legislation that the PSOE and feminists wanted would make it easier for women
to divorce their husbands – something to which the church was categorically opposed. Divorce
had, of course, been legal in Spain since 1981, but it was still not easy to obtain and there were
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steep social costs for individuals who chose to do so. Indeed, as Orantes herself discovered,
securing a divorce from one’s partner did not necessarily (or even often) come with either the
legal or financial means to disentangle one’s life from the life of a former partner.
The Catholic Church had a vested interest in maintaining these complications. In their
eyes, divorce should be granted in only the most severe domestic violence cases: in the Church’s
opinion, violent battering ought to be punishable by law, but ought not be a valid reason for
women to secure separations. Indeed, the church argued that in order for domestic violence to
lead to divorce, the perpetrator should be shown to have a mental disorder causing his aggression
– and use of violence against a partner was not itself a sign of mental illness.40 Retooling the
legal structure to view such aggression as motivated by society, rather than by mental illness,
would undermine the Church’s fundamental understanding of domestic violence, and would also
tear asunder established family structures. The Church thus found itself committed to
condemning patriarchal family structures and speaking out against the evils of machismo as well
as rejecting that these factors played a role in the prevalence of domestic violence.

From Domestic to Gender Violence:
The Contentious Reframing of a Francoist Legacy in Twenty-First Century Spain
The early 2000s saw a reinvigoration of domestic violence reform efforts, led by the Instituto and
made possible by the Socialist party’s return to power. The Measures of Integral Protection
against Gender Violence (GVL) of 28 December 2004 was a bold restatement of the problem
Spain faced: it recast domestic violence not as an isolated problem, but rather as a sign of large
rents in Spain’s social fabric. This law was, of course, the heir to decades of feminist work for
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increased protections for victims and punishments for abusers, but its conception, formulation,
and the subsequent debate about it did not happen in a vacuum. Instead, debate about the GVL
occurred amidst a backdrop of uncertainty about Spain’s democratic future and as Spanish
society experienced collective traumas due to terrorism and mass violence. These factors
necessarily impacted how Spaniards debated, formulated, and perceived the effects of the GVL
both for individual citizens and for society as a whole.
Some of these traumas literally unearthed Franco-era skeletons: in the early 2000s
Spaniards from across the country campaigned for the exhumation of mass graves from
executions during the Civil War.41 This, along with new rumblings of discontent about labor
used to build, and burial practices at, the Valle de los Caidos, the Francoist Civil War cemetery
known as the Valley of the Fallen, pushed discussion about the horrors of Francoism to the fore.
Other such traumas highlighted the complicated relationship between the Spanish central
government and regions seeking greater autonomy, or reminded Spaniards of the deep
interconnections between their nation and international politics. The nation’s tenuous cease-fire
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with ETA and uneasy relationship with its leaders increased fear and political tensions.42 And in
the deadliest terrorist attack in Spanish history, Islamic extremists bombed the Atocha train
station in Madrid in March 2004, killing 191 and injuring almost 2,000.
These violent incidents, combined with traumas lingering from the Franco era and others
stemming from more contemporary concerns, shocked the Spanish public and influenced the
tenor of debate about domestic vmiolence and the legal remedies offered to victims. Activists
supporting domestic violence legislation labelled Spain’s domestic violence crisis a problem of
“domestic terrorism,” a choice that conjured images of both private and public abuses: the
former literally within the domestic realm, the home, and the latter affecting the functioning of –
indeed, attacking the heart of – an entire nation. Feminists like the members of the institutional
Federacion de Mujeres Progresistas (or FMP) felt it an apt comparison, as they, along with
independent feminists, believed negligent government officials were affected by the same
discriminatory tendencies that also influenced the actions of abusive men. This rhetoric was not
confined to the feminist sector either: major newspaper El Mundo echoed the phrasing “domestic
terrorism” in a 2004 online information page containing facts about domestic violence and its
prevention that was aimed at both female victims and other interested members of society.43 This
page included the forum for debate about the GVL between independent and institutional
feminists, which ran, as did the rest of the information page, under the header “domestic
terrorism” and contained an image depicting a female figure inside what appears to be the
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crosshairs of a rifle sight (see Fig. 10).44 Politicians advocating for terrorist victims’ rights
similarly made comparisons between the trauma experienced as a result of terrorism and that
experienced by women abused by domestic partners, even suggesting that funds set aside by the
Spanish government to assist victims of terrorist attacks by ETA or radical Islamic groups should
also be devoted to helping abused women seeking to escape their abusive partners.45
In December 2004, Cortes passed the Measures of Integral Protection against Gender
Violence, a comprehensive gender violence law that once again redefined domestic violence
while also restructuring penalties for abusers and providing additional avenues of assistance for
those abused. For the first time, under the GVL, Spanish law defined domestic violence as the
byproduct of long-standing social inequalities that placed women in an inferior position to men.
More broadly, and perhaps more significantly, it was also the Spanish government’s first step
redefining discrimination, its origins, and its impact on women. Indeed, a later law, the Law for
the Effective Equality of Men and Women, or Equality Act of March 2007, built on the
foundation laid by the GVL by declaring, as feminists had argued for decades, that “full
recognition of formal equality before the law, even though it [was] undoubtedly... a decisive
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step, has turned out to be insufficient.”46 Both the GVL and the Equality Act represented a longawaited changes: noted above, both institutional and independent feminists had lobbied for
increased criminalization of domestic violence, and increased protections for abused women, for
decades, not to mention the feminist fight for recognition and alleviation of discrimination
against women and their assertions that the equality clause of the Constitution, and subsequent
amendments, did not go far enough to guarantee equality of the sexes.
Figure 10:

A confluence of factors made these laws possible. First was the election of a PSOE
government that had a history of championing women’s rights. Socialist deputies had supported

46

Ley Orgánica 3/2007, de 22 de marzo, para la igualdad efectiva de mujeres y hombres,
Jefatura del Estado (Spain), Boletín Oficial del Estado núm. 71, March 23, 2007, pgs. 1261112645, http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2007-6115.

228
divorce and abortion reform laws in the early post-Franco democratic period, continued to
introduce domestic violence legislation throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, and pioneered a
gender quota system for the party’s MPs that became enshrined in Spanish law in 2007.47 Its
political platform in 2004 was similarly progressive, and made domestic violence reform the
party’s priority. Incoming Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero promised to open his
legislative agenda with a comprehensive gender violence law like those the PSOE had repeatedly
introduced over the prior five years, and which the PP had vetoed. In addition, as discussed
above, and as underscored by the PSOE’s return to power, the Spanish public increasingly
desired dramatic change in how their nation criminalized domestic violence, and was open to
thinking of the crime as rooted in historical inequalities that affected primarily women.
Unlike ratification of the Constitution and the legalization of abortion, the GVL was also
a great feminist achievement, at least for institutional feminists. Passage of the law reflected
nearly two decades of research, public awareness campaigns, and lobbying by the Instituto de la
Mujer. In addition, as discussed in Chapter Three, the evolution of feminist networks that placed
the Instituto de la Mujer in diplomatic relationships with intragovernmental bodies and other
women's ministries also gave institutional feminists recourse to international recommendations
on women's rights. In this instance, Spanish institutional feminists successfully leveraged
recommendations defining domestic violence as a larger social problem for legislative change
within Spain.
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International organizations’ recommendations provided the foundation for the GVL’s
new definition of domestic violence as well as for the legal solutions that the GVL provided.
Indeed, the text of the law attributed its legal reasoning to international sources. Its opening
section quoted the United Nations’ definition of violence against women as “a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between women and men,” while the subsequent section
stated that the GVL “aim[ed] to meet the recommendations of international organizations.” The
following sentence listed eight international resolutions, reports, and treaties upon which the
GVL was based. These included the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), the United Nations’ Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women, resolutions from the Beijing World Conference on Women, a resolution from the World
Health Organization, and a resolution from the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission,
among others.48
Drawing from these sources, and in a dramatic shift from prior domestic violence laws,
the GVL named domestic violence a symptom of Spain’s endemic discrimination against
women. Such violence was, according to the GVL, “a brutal symbol of inequality persisting in
[Spanish] society” and “an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of equality.” As such, it
was “no longer a private concern” but rather “a clear cause of social alarm.” Statements about
domestic violence serving as a symptom of discrimination were not just confined to one sentence
or one section of the GVL, but rather repeated throughout. The law’s introductory and
explanatory material acknowledged again and again, and in a variety of phrasings, that the
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prevalence of domestic violence was but one manifestation of discrimination against women, and
that such discrimination prevented Spain from realizing true equality. For the first time, Spanish
law attributed the prevalence of domestic violence not to individual men, but to flaws within
Spanish society that allowed the perpetuation of discrimination and inequality.
Creation of the GVL also initiated a shift in how Spanish law understood discrimination
more generally by explaining how the existence of domestic violence prevented women from
exercising the rights guaranteed to them under the Spanish Constitution. The GVL’s second
paragraph invoked the Constitution to imply that the existence of domestic violence violated
“Article 15” of the document, which guaranteed “the right of everyone to life and to physical and
moral integrity, without under any circumstances being subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” A subsequent section was more explicit: “Public authorities
cannot be oblivious to gender violence, which constitutes one of the most flagrant attacks on
fundamental rights such as freedom, equality, life, security and non-discrimination proclaimed in
our Constitution.” This, in combination with its stance that domestic violence represented
inequalities in Spanish society, positioned the crime as a manifestation of flaws in Spanish
culture that needed correction in order for women to gain the full equality offered by the
Constitution.49
Later laws built on the GVL’s conception of discrimination by extending the idea of
corrections necessary for equality beyond domestic violence. The Equality Act, for example,
explained that there existed instances in which “inequality...[could not] be remedied by the mere
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formulation of the principle of legal or formal equality.” For instance, it described domestic
violence cases where judges and government officials neglected to intervene on behalf of abused
women even when Spanish law provided for such intervention. The Equality Act mandated that
“all public authorities reverse” inequalities like these, and moreover “ensure[d] constitutional
legitimacy” for “the formulation of...unequal right[s] in women’s favor.” The Equality Act’s
premise was that women’s struggles to realize their legal rights to equality had been obscured:
Spanish society had been too intent on creating legislative reform to recognize that such reform
would not help women without concurrent cultural change. It also posited that inequalities “in
women’s favor” could balance out long-standing inequalities in men’s favor, and therefore
actually give women the equality to which they were legally entitled. To this end, the Equality
Act included provisions such as those mandating that businesses over 250 employees implement
gender mainstreaming, provided greater maternity and paternity leave so that childbearing would
do less harm to women’s careers, and enshrined into law the quota system for political parties
that the PSOE had practiced for decades. This represented a new legal approach to guaranteeing
women’s equality: instead of merely stating that men and women were equal under the law, the
Equality Act advocated and indeed required social changes so women could actually achieve it.50
Significantly, though the Spanish government’s reconception first of domestic violence and
then of discrimination were revolutionary for Spain, organizations from which they drew
guidance were less impressed. First, the GVL provided a narrower definition of gender violence
than international recommendations actually suggested. Where the UN used the term “gender–
based violence” to encompass a whole host of crimes against women, of which domestic
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violence was only one, Spain restricted its definition of “gender violence” to domestic violence.
The GVL thus conflated the two, leaving no room for gender violence to include other forms of
violence against women like sex trafficking, female genital cutting, or coerced prostitution.
CEDAW noted the oversight at its July 2004 meeting, calling it “regrettable that [Spain’s
proposed] new Organic Law targeted only domestic violence” and encouraging Spain to broaden
its approach before the bill’s passage later that year.51
Moreover, the GVL’s narrow definition of domestic violence also excluded LGBT
couples and men abused by female partners. The law specifically stated: “[t]he purpose of this
Law is to act against violence that, as a manifestation of discrimination, the situation of
inequality and the power relations of men over women, is exercised over them by those who are
or have been their spouses or of those who are or have been linked to them by similar
relationships of affectivity, even without coexistence,” a definition which, by specifying its
application to violence exercised because of male-on-female power differentials, explicitly
excluded same-sex couples.52 Prior domestic violence legislation had protected gay couples, yet
when the GVL strengthened the existing statutes it only extended the new protections to women.
Feminists’ desire to align Spain with mainstream Western European political ideals regarding
women’s rights – in this case, by terming domestic violence “gender violence” and defining it as
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male violence directed against women which aligned Spain’s position on the issue with that of
international bodies like the EU and the UN – had the unintended consequence of stalling
progress on LGBT rights within Spain.
Independent feminists similarly opposed the GVL. An El Mundo internet forum
published in June 2004 presented arguments from both institutional and independent feminists
about the desirability of the GVL, which was at that time still under debate. First, independent
feminists, represented by Mujeres para Democracía, objected to how the federal government
sought to legislate domestic violence abuses. They argued that the federal government had
overstepped its bounds by not consulting more closely on the GVL with Spain’s Autonomous
Communities, many of which already had domestic violence legislation that they feared the GVL
might overwrite or conflict with. Institutional feminists, represented by FMP president Enriqueta
Chicano, dismissed independent feminists’ concerns, arguing instead that the scope of the
domestic violence crisis necessitated “comprehensive measures that [would] have an effect on
powers ...delegated to municipalities and Autonomous Communities, [measures that] unless they
possess legal weight will be impossible to enforce.”53
Independent feminists also objected to the contents of the GVL. Where institutional
feminists defended the GVL as having “pedagogical value” for society and as helping to
facilitate a social evolution, independent feminists condemned it for lacking practical solutions.
It, according to independent feminists, had “insufficient protective measures” and ignored the
possibility of helpful technologies like tracking bracelets for abusers, it created legal “ghettos”
for women by hearing domestic violence cases in specialized courts, it still “lack[ed] measures to
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expedite separation and divorce proceedings,” and its accompanying budget was short on both
funding and detail. More damningly, MD declared the GVL unconstitutional and “barbaric”
because of its exclusion of abused men and gay couples.54
Institutional feminists won the battle over the GVL: it passed in December 2004, went
into effect in January 2005, and remains in effect, though it continued to be strengthened through
a variety of judicial reforms as recently as July 2015. Yet the debate between feminist factions
was another revealing glimpse of how women’s rights activists fought for the right to define and
protect women’s rights. Feminist factions used the same rhetoric – speaking of gender
inequalities, female oppression, machista society – to advance their different and at times
competing agendas. In short, independent feminists displayed intersectional tendencies and
institutional feminists remained focused solely on the plight of straight women.
Remarkably, after the GVL’s passage feminists also began to face competition from
conservative activists who appropriated feminist rhetoric as a way of pushing not for liberation
of women, but rather for restrictions on women’s rights. Whereas Spanish feminists saw and
continue to see domestic violence reform as existing within a spectrum of women’s rights
reforms that constrain abusive men and prove liberating for women, Catholic conservatives have
in recent years espoused a rather different view. The PP, in conjunction with the Catholic church
and Foro Español de la Familia, the Spanish equivalent of Focus on the Family, has sought to
curtail women’s rights, especially the right to abortion, and they have done so by framing
abortion as a form of gender violence and as something that hurts women in part because, they
claim, it is not liberating.
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In a series of 2008 interviews, including a speech given on behalf of the PP to the
Congress of Deputies (the lower house of Spanish Parliament), Benigno Blanco, the president of
the Spanish Forum on the Family, argued that legalized abortion “ha[d] become a form of gender
violence.”55 In his opinion, abortion was bad for all parties. He asserted that legalizing abortion
gave women the sole power to decide whether to end a pregnancy or not, a process which would
render men “not responsible for [their] sexual conduct,” and so give men license to misbehave
sexually. But the real problem, in Blanco’s eyes, was not the effect legalizing abortion had on
men. Instead, he was concerned that putting the decision in women’s hands encouraged men to
treat women badly – in his estimation legalized abortion was “a machista solution” that would
create a culture encouraging men to behave irresponsibly and to harm women in the process.
Blanco’s rhetoric played to men’s fears of liberated self-determining women while also claiming
to be sensitive to women’s vulnerability, emotional and otherwise.

Conclusion
There is little that is clear-cut about the recent and current state of gender, domestic, and sexual
violence legislation in Spain in general, and the 2004 Gender Violence Law in particular. On the
one hand, the law is a product of international pressures that operated during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and which have continued to operate in subsequent decades through the political
and legislative conduits of Spain’s ties to international bodies such as the UN and EU, most
especially the CEDAW. Notably, the consequence-laden base assumption underlying all
currently circulating discourse in Spain regarding the origins and nature of Spanish gender
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violence – that violence springs from a deficient society and culture – owed much to CEDAW
documents, and CEDAW influence continued thereafter, as when the organization condemned
the insufficiency of Spain’s 1989 Penal Code reform.
But, on the other hand, the way in which Spaniards adapted and internalized this concept,
and the consequences that have resulted, reflect anxieties and impulses, as well as a history, that
is particular to Spain. Spanish society for the most part accepted CEDAW doctrine that culture
was and remains a prevailing factor in enabling pervasive trends of violence against women.
Such adoption proved easy for a people eager to move past its dictatorial past, the act itself
serving as a way for Spain to self-represent as post-Francoist, as a means of finding redemption.
As the issue of domestic violence grew less controversial over the years – that is, as all segments
of society came to recognize it as a problem and to call for reform or legislation to help abused
women – rhetoric surrounding more specific changes became highly charged, again in ways that
point to Spain’s unique Francoist legacy. It was (and still is) generally agreed in Spain that
gender violence is a social problem, but few have agreed on the solution, and in debating this
question, groups spanning the political spectrum have invoked the fearful spectres of Franco,
totalitarianism, and fascism, warning especially that their opponents’ proposals will lead to
repression and – naturally – Francoist backsliding. Spaniards have certainly internalized the
notion that gender violence is a cultural problem to be solved, and that domestic abuse harms not
just the individual but society as a whole. But Spain’s wish to move past the legacy and history
of Francoism is just as sharply manifest.
As Spanish authorities in the 1990s and 2000s accepted that domestic violence was a
cultural problem, they also moved to integrate domestic violence legislation into measures
focused on eliminating discrimination, again drawing upon CEDAW theories, and to implement
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a number of programs that reflected the United Nations’ strategy of gender mainstreaming in the
workplace as a means of fomenting the social changes necessary to ensure the elimination of
gender-based discrimination.
Yet, once again, practical application of these European Union- and United Nationsauthored measures in Spain produced complications, as, albeit unintentionally, reforms helped
obscure both the nature of domestic violence and the blame for its perpetuation. Legislation and
popularly-circulating social perceptions have combined to obscure sexual violence as a problem,
starting with the separate legal classifications of rape and domestic violence in the 1970s. That
discursive construction of domestic violence in Spain long focused on battery to the exclusion of
other forms of violence, including rape, but also psychological abuse, made it difficult at best for
Spanish society and abused women alike to define the extent of the nation’s domestic abuse
problem and to fully understand the ways in which women have experienced domestic violence.
Unsurprisingly, this invisibility has only preserved Spain’s domestic abuse problem, despite
government and feminist intentions and efforts to the contrary. Moreover, in this labyrinth of
layered, multiple interpretations of and definitions for a collection of insufficiently fixed terms
including ‘gender violence’, ‘domestic violence’, ‘sexual violence’, ‘maltreatment’,
‘discrimination’ and, of course, ‘feminism,’ perhaps most corrosive is that conservatives who
desire a return to Franco-era norms have found ways to manipulate ‘feminist’ rhetoric to support
policies undermining feminist demands and, indeed, the legislative advances that have occurred.
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CONCLUSION
Spain has undergone dramatic change in the past forty years, not least of which has been
the shift from governance by an authoritarian dictator to democratic, constitutional rule. Yet, as
this dissertation argues, and as the strength of Comisión 8M’s International Women’s Day strike
and demonstrations in 2018 reflect, post-Franco Spain continues to wrestle with tensions about
how to define and protect women’s rights that marked the late Franco era and dominated
political conversations during the transitional period. In this sense, the transition is ongoing.
Debates over abortion, equal pay, domestic and sexual violence, coeducation policy, the
respective roles of church and state – these and other conversations have persisted and have
continued to have a dramatic impact on the Spanish national political milieu.
Of these issues, abortion reform has perhaps been the most contentious in recent years.
The turning point in contemporary abortion debates occurred in the late 2000s, when Prime
Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s newly elected Socialist government found itself
embroiled in a culture war with conservative activists and politicians determined to stop the
party’s efforts at gender equality. Then, in December of 2007, a scandal erupted in Barcelona:
authorities arrested fourteen people alleged to have provided or obtained illegal abortions,
including several psychologists and psychiatrists accused of falsifying medical records to grant
mental health concessions to perfectly healthy women desiring abortions.1
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Zapatero seized this as an opportunity to reevaluate his government’s stance on abortion.
In a move influenced by other European nations’ legislation and by the feminist movement’s
demands, Zapatero asked his party to consider broadening the circumstances and extending the
time period in which abortion would be allowed.2 As a result, the PSOE formally announced its
intention to reopen debate on abortion legislation 2008, and in 2010 a new law guaranteeing
abortion on demand up to 14 weeks went into effect.3
However instead of quelling tensions about abortion’s legality that the Barcelona trial
made visible, the loosened restrictions stoked controversy between those, like feminists, who
wanted further liberalization, and conservatives, who wanted restrictions greater even than what
had existed before the 2010 law came into effect. When the conservative Partido Popular (PP)
regained parliamentary majority, and thus control of Spain’s governance, in 2011, new Prime
Minister Mariano Rajoy, along with his Minister of Justice Alberto Ruíz Gallardón, vowed not
only to reinstitute restrictions on abortion but also to restrict access to abortion beyond Spain’s
original law in 1985 legalizing the procedure.
Rajoy ultimately withdrew this proposed legislation in 2014 for “lack of consensus” after
considerable public outcry,4 but even after the bill’s withdrawal feminists maintained focus on
protecting abortion rights within Spain. Indeed, politicians and commentators in the days leading
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up to the International Women’s Day marches in 2018 attributed the demonstrations’ size and
popularity to, among other things, the lasting feminist outcry to Rajoy and Gallardón’s thwarted
proposal. One PSOE spokesman, Ángeles Álvarez, voiced just this sentiment in the days before
the 2018 event. He proclaimed that feminist demonstrations against Rajoy and Gallardón’s
abortion restrictions “marked a before and after in the women’s movement in Spain” – in other
words, that feminist ire about abortion created a turning point that made the 2018 International
Women’s Day possible.5 Similarly, an El País commentator positing reasons why the march had
a historic turnout also pointed to the PP’s 2010 proposal to restrict abortion, also arguing that
feminist demonstrations against the law were important for mobilizing opposition not only to
Rajoy’s policies, but to discrimination against women in general.6
In addition to their ardent defense of abortion rights, Spanish feminists remain concerned
about the prevalence of domestic violence within Spain – this even as domestic violence in Spain
has been on the decline overall in the early 20th century and Spain’s rate of domestic violence is
either level with or lower than most other European countries. In the days before the 2018
International Women’s Day marches, Castellón feminist group Femme Força created a public art
installation titled “Art Against Domestic Violence.” The installation consisted of a “makeshift
graveyard by the sea” containing 739 crosses, one for each Spanish woman who had been
murdered by a domestic partner since 2007. That Femme Força termed this “sexist violence”
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illustrates one reason why feminists found its continuation troubling: they understood it as a
reflection of a larger unsavory dynamic between men and women in Spanish society.7 Moreover,
though, according to El País, rates of domestic violence declined from 2012-2014, both 2016
and 2017 saw increases in the number of reported incidents.8 Purificación Causapié, member of
the Madrid City Council, in fact promoted the International Women’s Day marches by arguing
that one reason to support the demonstrations was to bring attention to domestic violence,
mentioning specifically that “every 40 minutes a woman makes a report for having suffered
gender violence in Madrid.”9 In addition, the same article that talked about the relationship
between abortion rights activism and feminists’ resolve to support the 2018 8M demonstrations
also asserted that “mobilizations ... against macho violence have been gaining in intensity during
the last years” had had a similar effect, including a march in November 2017 that occurred in 50
cities across Spain.10
8M brought these diverse complaints under one umbrella while continuing, as feminists
before them, to also advocate not solely individual pieces of intervention but rather a societywide reckoning with systemic, structural discrimination faced both by Spanish women and
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women across the globe. Moreover, the ongoing Catalan crisis highlights that these tensions exist
beyond the boundaries of feminist issues and debates over women’s rights. Instead, debates
about women’s issues have reflected and continue to reflect larger political hot spots within the
Spanish nation. All of this is to say, the process of constructing democratic citizenship – its
structures, its responsibilities, its protections – has continued to the present day and remains
ongoing. Just as scholars like Victor Pérez Díaz has argued that Spain’s democratic transition
lasted beyond the Constitution’s ratification,11 so I contend that the process of defining the very
character of democracy in Spain remains a work in progress. The dissertation’s chapters each
highlight a small segment of how this process has been negotiated to date.
The Sección Femenina, as shown in this dissertation’s first chapter, worked throughout
the midcentury to create a version of female citizenship that could both satisfy their desires for
autonomy and participation in public life while also hewing to their antifeminism and NationalCatholic ideology. Significantly, the legal structures for women’s economic and labor rights that
the Sección Femenina helped usher in during the late years of the Franco regime were, for their
time, progressive though Pilar Primo de Rivera, her colleagues, and Francisco Franco himself
would certainly have rejected that label.
As the Franco regime came to its close, Chapter Two argues, feminists battled for
legislative concessions including equal citizenship, but also decriminalization of adultery,
legalization of divorce, and legalization of abortion. These reforms did make their way into
Spanish legislation, though feminists themselves could claim little responsibility for it.
Moreover, feminists struggled for common ground and battled each other over whether the
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democratic order outlined in Spain’s new proposed Constitution was even worth working for (as
double militants felt) or whether feminists needed to promote their causes untethered to such a
flawed, and seemingly still Francoist-tinged, government structure (as single militants argued).
Ultimately, feminists’ lack of input into the final versions of the Constitution and subsequent
ostensibly feminist legislative victories widened these divisions, and encouraged more radical
activists to continue battling for a form of democracy that could meet their demands.
These struggles – between Spain’s ideologically diverse feminists as much as against a
Spanish state and society that too often either ignored or sought to coopt the cause of women’s
rights – only continued as the nation’s new democratic order established itself in the century’s
closing decades. Increasingly, this study’s third chapter reveals, Spain’s feminists sought to
internationalize these various conflicts, liaising with foreign bodies like the United Nations and
the European Union in an effort to use outside pressures to shape Spain’s changing political
culture and social order. Meanwhile, as both this and chapter four underscore, feminists’ internal
conflicts grew more acerbic as the 1980s passed into the 1990s and then into the new
millennium. The national government’s official Instituto de la Mujer, founded in 1983 and soon
home to Spain’s double militant (now “institutional”) feminists, quickly became an especially
active flashpoint. Indeed, institutional feminists’ successes eventually so embittered Spain’s
single-militant grassroots feminists that they came to reject all such officially-sanctioned
feminisms, abroad as well as at home, for having made what they deemed a Faustian alliance
with the patriarchy.
And meanwhile, as this study’s fourth chapter shows, though feminists achieved a
landmark victory in 2004 with the passage of a groundbreaking law that reconceived the crime of
domestic partner abuse as a symptom of deep-seated and explicitly gendered problems in
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Spanish society, both the lead-up to and aftermath of the new law saw these activists still at
loggerheads with one another and with powerful social and government figures. Radical
feminists rejected the 2004 law – an Instituto initiative – for phrasing that excluded same-sex
couples from its protections; feminists as a whole contended with pushback from conservatives
who, in a curious inversion, began to use feminists’ own rhetoric on Spain’s gender violence
epidemic to press new attacks on abortion rights.
Recent conflicts – only the latest in a long series of battles fought over all of the issues
cited above, as well as others – are still more broadly part of not just a war over “culture” or
women’s bodies, but for claim over the very essence of contemporary Spanish national identity,
whose mythic foundations include a sacralized Constitution of 1978 and the notion that, under
this new political framework, Spain has fully shed its Francoist ghosts and developed into a
democratic Western European paragon. This contest is far from decided. The shakiness of those
foundations and, relatedly, the degree to which the complaints that feminists have long voiced
about the Spanish Constitution remain unaddressed, have most recently been underlined by the
crisis over Catalan independence that came sharply to a head in late 2017.
This crisis stems in no small part from the asymmetric structure of the modern Spanish
state, in which some regions have greater autonomy than others, as well as a continued
perception that the Spanish state is built on a Francoist foundation from which it has inherited an
unreconstructed centralism and hostility to true progress. These are frustrations (as efforts to
coordinate between regional Institutos faltered) and fears (which fueled radical feminists’
hostility toward the Institutos) that marked Spanish feminism during and after the transition, and
which remain unresolved. It is telling how closely a common Catalanist quip, which accuses the
1978 Constitution’s architects of having sold them the document as a point of departure (“punt
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de partida”) when they and the Spanish political right always intended it to be an end point
(“punt i final”), echoes single militant refrains.
And yet, this sound bite notwithstanding, the Constitution was for Spanish feminists as
for Catalonia’s secessionists an end point they refused to accept, and so has instead proven a
point of departure indeed – if not for a socially progressive consensus, then at least for an
ongoing struggle over the very definition of Spain and Spanish modernity that continues into the
present and threatens to tear the nation apart culturally, socially, and even geopolitically.
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